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Abstract
The latest Eurobarometer published in December 2016, reflecting the percep-
tions of the European citizens on privacy and security in telecommunications,
shows that, although people are not always informed on the privacy regulations
or the implications of privacy breaches, they demand specific privacy protection.
In particular, citizens want their data, their communications and the data that
they give or outsource to online services to be well protected and not shared
with unwanted parties. The demands of the public can be partly covered by
the application of privacy-by-design principle and the use of Privacy Enhanc-
ing Techniques (PETs) in commercial applications. The use of PETs by major
service providers is not widespread, as they are typically seen as negatively
impacting on the performance of applications and the functionalities they can
offer. Moreover, major providers use the data they obtain from their customers
(often more data than strictly needed to run the service being offered) to sell
targeted advertising services to third parties (usually smaller service providers
or application developers that do not have enough data of their own). In this
work we combine known and novel privacy-enhancing techniques to design new
commercial applications and services that respect and protect the identity of
the customers and/or their sensitive data. The applications we present are
group discounts, loyalty programs and implicit authentication. For group dis-
counts, we propose a novel privacy-preserving group size accreditation method,
whereby a service provider can cryptographically verify the number of members
of a group accessing a service, while the group members remain anonymous.
Regarding loyalty programs, we propose a novel privacy-preserving loyalty pro-
gram construction whereby a service provider can issue and verify loyalty points,
as well as profile users to the level chosen by the users themselves: the user is
rewarded with more loyalty points as she reveals more details on her purchase
history. In what regards implicit authentication, we propose two new mecha-
nisms based on secure multiparty computation that make it possible to conduct
xv
ABSTRACT
authentication based on the user’s profile while protecting the privacy of the
profile. The privacy-preserving features of the mechanisms proposed in this
thesis have a quantifiable and limited impact on the security and performance
of applications.
xvi
Resum
El darrer Eurobaro`metre, publicat al desembre de 2016, referent a les percep-
cions dels ciutadans europeus pel que fa a la privadesa i a la seguretat en
telecomunicacions, mostra que, encara que els ciutadans no sempre estiguin
al corrent de les normes sobre privadesa ni de la relleva`ncia de les violacions
de la privadesa, demanen proteccio´. Concretament, els ciutadans volen que
llurs dades, llurs comunicacions i les dades que forneixen als serveis en l´ınia
estiguin ben protegides i no es comparteixin amb tercers. Aquestes demandes
de la ciutadania es poden satisfer en part aplicant el principi de privadesa per
disseny i fent servir te`cniques de millora de la privadesa (PETs, de l’angle`s Pri-
vacy Enhancing Techniques) en aplicacions comercials. L’u´s de PETs per part
dels grans prove¨ıdors de serveis no e´s gaire comu´, car se sol pensar que aquest
tipus de te`cniques tenen un impacte negatiu en el rendiment i en les funcional-
itats de les aplicacions. A banda, els grans prove¨ıdors aprofiten les dades que
recullen de llurs usuaris (sovint me´s dades de les estrictament necessa`ries per
al servei que ofereixen) per vendre serveis de ma`rqueting a tercers (normalment
petits prove¨ıdors o desenvolupadors independents d’aplicacions que no tenen
prou dades ells mateixos). En aquest treball, apliquem te`cniques conegudes i
tambe´ te`cniques noves de millora de privadesa al disseny de noves aplicacions i
serveis comercials que respecten i protegeixen la identitat dels usuaris i/o llurs
dades sensibles. Les aplicacions que considerem so´n descomptes de grup, pro-
grames de fidelitzacio´, i autenticacio´ impl´ıcita. Pel que fa als descomptes de
grup, proposem un mecanisme d’acreditacio´ de la mida d’un grup amb preser-
vacio´ de privadesa, mitjanc¸ant el qual el prove¨ıdor d’un servei pot comprovar
criptogra`ficament el nombre de membres d’un grup que vol accedir al servei,
alhora que els membres preserven llur anonimat. Pel que fa als programes de
fidelitzacio´, en proposem una construccio´ respectuosa amb la privadesa, amb la
qual el prove¨ıdor pot emetre i verificar punts de fidelitzacio´, aix´ı com perfilar
els usuaris en la mesura que aquests ho permetin: l’usuari pot triar el nivell
xvii
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de perfilatge i e´s recompensat amb me´s punts de fidelitzacio´ com me´s detalls
revela d’allo` que ha comprat. Pel que fa a l’autenticacio´ impl´ıcita, proposem
dos nous mecanismes basats en protocols de computacio´ multipart, que perme-
ten d’autenticar l’usuari a partir del seu perfil tot i protegint la privadesa del
perfil. Les propietats de preservacio´ de la privadesa dels mecanismes proposats
en aquesta tesi tenen un impacte quantificable i limitat sobre la seguretat i el
rendiment de les aplicacions.
xviii
Resumen
El u´ltimo Eurobaro´metro, publicado en diciembre de 2016, referido a la per-
cepcio´n de los ciudadanos europeos respecto a la privacidad y seguridad de las
telecomunicaciones, muestra que, aunque los ciudadanos no siempre este´n al
corriente de la normativa sobre privacidad ni de la relevancia de las violaciones
de la privacidad, piden proteccio´n. En concreto, los ciudadanos quieren que sus
datos, sus comunicaciones y los datos que suministran a los servicios en l´ınea
este´n bien protegidos y no se compartan con terceros. Estas demandas de la
ciudadan´ıa podr´ıan resolverse parcialmente aplicando el principio de privaci-
dad por disen˜o y usando te´cnicas de mejora de la privacidad (PETs, del ingle´s
Privacy Enhancing Techniques) en aplicaciones comerciales. El uso de PETs
por parte de los grandes proveedores de servicios no es muy comu´n, ya que se
considera que este tipo de te´cnicas impactan negativamente en el rendimiento
de las aplicaciones y limitan sus funcionalidades. Adema´s, los grandes provee-
dores utilizan habitualmente los datos obtenidos de los usuarios, tanto aquellos
imprescindibles para el funcionamiento de la aplicacio´n como aquellos que no lo
son, para ofrecer servicios de ma´rqueting a terceros (con frecuencia, pequen˜os
proveedores de servicios o desarrolladores independientes de aplicaciones que no
suelen tener bastantes datos ellos mismos). En este trabajo, aplicamos te´cnicas
conocidas y tambie´n te´cnicas nuevas de mejora de privacidad al disen˜o de nuevas
aplicaciones y servicios comerciales que respetan y protegen la identidad de los
usuarios y/o sus datos sensibles. Las aplicaciones consideradas son descuentos
de grupo, programas de fidelizacio´n, y autenticacio´n impl´ıcita. En cuanto a
descuentos de grupo, proponemos un mecanismo de acreditacio´n del taman˜o
de un grupo con preservacio´n de privacidad, mediante el cual el proveedor de
un servicio puede comprobar criptogra´ficamente el nu´mero de miembros de un
grupo que quiere acceder al servicio, a la vez que los miembros preservan su
anonimato. En cuanto a los programas de fidelizacio´n, proponemos una nueva
construccio´n respetuosa con la privacidad, con la cual el proveedor puede emitir
xix
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y verificar puntos de fidelizacio´n, as´ı como perfilar a los usuarios en la medida
que estos lo permitan: el usuario puede escoger el nivel de perfilado y es recom-
pensado con ma´s puntos de fidelizacio´n si revela ma´s detalles sobre lo que ha
comprado. En cuanto a autenticacio´n impl´ıcita, proponemos dos mecanismos
basados en protocolos de computacio´n multiparte, que permiten autenticar al
usuario a partir de su perfil, a la vez que se protege la privacidad del perfil. Las
propiedades de privacidad de los mecanismos propuestos en esta tesis tienen
un impacto cuantificable y limitado sobre la seguridad y el rendimiento de las
aplicaciones.
xx
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The latest Eurobarometer [39] reflecting the views of European citizens on secu-
rity, privacy and surveillance of online communications shows that a majority of
interviewed citizens are concerned about the privacy of their communications.
Although most people incorrectly believe that the current laws completely pre-
vent access to their private communications by companies and public organisms,
they agree that there should be specific tools and measures to protect their pri-
vacy. This concern about privacy has increased in the few years since Snowden’s
revelations, that confirmed that the US government (and other governments as
disclosed afterwards), conducted mass surveillance operations on their citizens
on account of national security. Most developers of instant messaging applica-
tions, such as WhatsApp, have since deployed end-to-end encryption to meet the
users’ demands, but contextual data (a.k.a. metadata) are still being recorded
by most online services and applications.
The privacy-by-design principle requires application designers to gather only
the personal data that are essential to the correct operation of their applications.
That is, applications following this principle should only ask the users to input
those personal data that the specific application explicitly needs. Most applica-
tions in the market (and especially smartphone applications) clearly disregard
this principle —a look at the permissions they request is conclusive—: they
collect contextual information too, even if it is not needed. The privacy policies
of major service providers explain that all data may be used for commercial
1
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purposes. Although major service providers collect more data than strictly nec-
essary, the privacy-by-design principle demands that users be empowered with
the decision about when to grant access to their data, when to modify them
and when to delete them. While this is more or less being taken into account by
service providers, sometimes the procedures to modify or delete personal data
are not transparent enough or too cumbersome.
Privacy Enhancing Techniques (PET) are cryptographic and non-cryptogra-
phic tools that, when used appropriately, minimize the amount of personal data
being handled by applications, and therefore help developers to more easily
comply with regulations on personal data processing. Therefore, research on
privacy enhancing techniques and on the practical deployment of the privacy-
by-design principle is backed by the demands of the general population.
In this work we aim at demonstrating that, if appropriate techniques are
used, privacy does not necessarily work against security and/or utility. We
focus on three specific application cases described below:
Group size accreditation mechanism. Group discounts are offered by ven-
dors and public authorities to encourage a more sustainable (or profitable)
way to access their services or use public resources. An example of this are
high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) tolls in highways, which offer discounts for
vehicles carrying more than a given number of passengers (2 or more, 3 or
more, etc). There are several ways to ascertain the number of members of
a group: employees at access points that count them, cameras that take
photos and analyze them in toll booths, or registration procedures that
require the names of all members of groups, among others. We argue that
automated mechanisms, such as cameras and registration procedures, take
more information from the participants that is actually needed (thus vio-
lating the privacy-by-design principle), and that the only really necessary
information is the size of the groups.
Loyalty programs. Loyalty programs are marketing efforts implemented by
vendors, especially retailers, that are aimed at establishing a lasting rela-
tionship with consumers. In a loyalty program, the vendor pursues two
main goals: i) to encourage the consumer to make more purchases in the
future (returning customer); ii) to allow the vendor to profile the con-
sumer in view of conducting market research and segmentation (profiled
customer). In order to lure consumers into a loyalty program, the ven-
dor offers them rewards, typically loyalty points that consumers can later
exchange for discounts, gifts or other benefits offered by the vendor. Nor-
mally, enrollment to loyalty programs involves some kind of registration
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procedure, in which customers fill out a form with their personal informa-
tion and are granted a loyalty card, be it a physical card (magnetic stripe or
smartcard) or a smartphone application. Although loyalty programs have
become widespread, they are experiencing a loss of active participants and
they have been criticized by business experts and consumer associations.
Criticism is mainly due to privacy issues, because it is not always clear
whether the benefits offered by vendors in their loyalty programs are worth
the loss of consumer privacy caused by profiling [78, 91, 1, 45].
Implicit authentication. Implicit authentication refers to a software system
authenticating individuals based on the way they interact with their de-
vice, i.e. their behavior. In this context, the user’s behavior can be de-
termined by collecting a variety of features, such as keystroke patterns,
browser history and configuration, IP addresses, location, visible anten-
nas, etc. Implicit authentication can be viewed as a complement of the
usual explicit authentication based on identifiers and credentials.
Note that a common trait in these three application cases is that users need
to prove something about themselves or their context without revealing more
than what is strictly necessary. We believe these cases can be used as an example
for other applications in which the goal is similar.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are protocols to solve the privacy, security and functionality
conflict in the above three applications. Specifically:
1. In the group size accreditation case (motivated by applications involving
group discounts), we contribute a mechanism, based on an identity-based
dynamic-threshold (IBDT) signature scheme and a novel key manage-
ment scheme, that allows participants to prove the number of members in
a group without revealing the identities of group members. The IBDT
signature scheme is a novel advanced signature scheme that combines
the properties of identity-based signatures and threshold signatures. In
identity-based signatures, the public keys are arbitrary strings; we leverage
this property to introduce a novel parameterized key management scheme,
in which the functionality of the scheme (the size of the groups that can
be certified) and the level of anonymity are defined by two configurable
parameters. In threshold signature schemes, a key dealer distributes key
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shares that, when combined in a specific way and in a specific quantity,
produce signing keys that are valid for the system. The system is evalu-
ated analytically and experimentally, namely in a high-occupancy vehicle
application.
2. In the loyalty programs case, we contribute a mechanism, based on par-
tially blind signatures and zero-knowledge proofs, that allows implement-
ing loyalty programs, including loyalty points and customer profiling, and
also allows customers to control the amount of sensitive information (from
their purchase histories) they reveal. To that end, we entrust the manage-
ment of loyalty points and purchase receipts to the customers themselves,
who can generalize the purchase receipts before returning them to the ven-
dor for more loyalty points (or not return them, at the cost of receiving
less loyalty points). To ensure that loyalty points and purchase receipts
are not altered by malicious participants, these are treated as electronic
cash, but without a centralized authority. To prevent the vendors from
linking loyalty points and purchase histories to specific customers, we in-
troduce (untransferable) anonymous tokens with controlled linkability (by
leveraging partially blind signatures and zero-knowledge proofs) and a
generalization scheme for purchase receipts. The security of the scheme is
formally evaluated and experimental results are provided. We finish this
contribution by providing a feasibility study in physical stores.
3. In the implicit authentication case, we propose two schemes following the
same principle of authenticating users based on their behavior without
revealing the user profiles to the service provider. Both schemes are pred-
icated on computing the distances between private feature sets. We show
that these distances can be obtained from the size of the intersection of
the feature sets, for sets of categorical independent values, categorical cor-
related values and numerical independent values. The computation of the
size of the intersection of sets is carried out using secure multiparty compu-
tation (MPC) protocols. The first of our proposed implicit authentication
schemes uses an MPC based on the homomorphic properties of the Pail-
lier cryptosystem, and provides a robust solution for authentication. The
second one is based on the intersection of Bloom filters. While the second
proposal does not ensure as high a level of security as the first one (namely
it does not provide semantic security), its lower computational complexity
and the compact form of the protected user profiles make it suitable for
everyday use (always as a second-factor authentication mechanism). We
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provide formal security analyses and experimental evaluation of the two
proposed implicit authentication schemes.
The first and second contributions of this thesis (privacy-preserving group
size accreditation and privacy-preserving loyalty programs) received partial sup-
port from a Google Faculty Award granted to Prof. Josep Domingo-Ferrer. The
third contribution (privacy-preserving implicit authentication) is an offshoot of
the research started in the EU FP7 project “InterTrust”.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this Chapter we provide the background on cryptographic and non-cryptogra-
phic technologies that will be used as building blocks for our privacy-preserving
constructions. The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides an
overview of bilinear pairings and introduces some hardness assumptions that
will be used in our group accreditation and loyalty programs constructions.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce, respectively, threshold and identity-based sig-
natures. These kinds of signatures are the main building blocks of our novel
IBDT signature scheme (described in Chapter 3) on which our group accredi-
tation protocol is based. Section 2.4 introduces the concept of partially blind
signatures, a generalization of blind signatures which eliminates the need for
cut-and-choose protocols and that is the main building block of our loyalty pro-
grams construction (described in Chapter 4). Section 2.5 provides an overview
of zero-knowledge proofs, which we explicitly use in an extension to the loyalty
programs construction to provide untransferability of loyalty points and pur-
chase receipts. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are also part of the IBDT
signature scheme. Section 2.6 recalls secure multiparty computation protocols
to compute set intersections. The size of the intersection of sets is the basis of
our two proposed implicit authentication schemes. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 describe
the Paillier cryptosystem and Bloom filters, which we use in our implicit authen-
tication schemes to instantiate two concrete multiparty computation protocols
to compute the size of the intersection of sets. Finally, Sections 2.9 and 2.10
briefly describe anonymous payment mechanisms and short-range communica-
tion technologies. These two are used when implementing the group accredita-
tion protocol and the loyalty programs scheme in specific use cases.
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2.1 Bilinear pairings
Given cyclic multiplicative groups G1, G2, GT of prime order p, with generators
g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, a bilinear map is a function e : G1 × G2 → GT with the
following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Zp, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: The value e(g1, g2) generates GT , that is e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT .
• Efficient computability: The function e is efficiently computable.
Bilinear pairings are classified in three general types according to [50]:
Type I: G1 = G2. These pairings are typically called symmetric pairings.
Type II: G1 6= G2, and there exists an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 that is
efficiently computable, but ψ−1 is not.
Type III: G1 6= G2, and there is no efficiently computable ψ.
Types II and III are called asymmetric pairings. We will use Type III pair-
ings throughout this work, as they have been found to be the most efficient
pairings at equivalent security levels. We use multiplicative notation for all
groups Zp, G1, G2, and GT .
2.1.1 Hardness assumptions
Definition 1. Given a cyclic group G of order p and a generator g of G, the
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is defined as follows: given a
tuple (g, gα, gγ), compute gαγ .
Definition 2. Given a cyclic group G of order p and a generator g of G, the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is defined as follows: given a tuple
(g, gα, gγ , gδ), decide whether αγ = δ.
Definition 3. Given a cyclic group G of order p and a generator g of G, the
chosen-target Computational Diffie-Hellman (chosen-target CDH) problem [19]
is defined as follows: given set Z = {z1, . . . , zn} ∈ Gn a random public key
y = gx and access to a helper oracle (·)x, output a set V = {v1, . . . , vl} ∈ Gl,
such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there exists a zj ∈ Z with zj = vxi , with less than
l queries to the helper oracle. This problem is equivalent to the CDH problem if
no access to the helper oracle is given.
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Definition 4. In an asymmetric bilinear pairing G = (G1,G2,GT , e) of prime
order p, the asymmetric n-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (asymmetric n-DHE) prob-
lem [22] is defined as follows: given a tuple
(g1, g
γ
1 , g
γ2
1 , . . . , g
γn
1 , g
γn+2
1 , . . . , g
γ2n
1 , g2, g
γ
2 , g
γ2
2 , . . . , g
γn
2 )
where γ ← Zp, g1 ← G1, g2 ← G2, compute gγ
n+1
1 .
2.2 Threshold signature schemes
Threshold signature schemes are commonly based on (t, n)-threshold secret shar-
ing schemes, such as the ones introduced in [12] and [86], and they require a
minimum number t of participants to produce a valid signature.
A threshold signature scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Threshold signature scheme) A threshold signature scheme con-
sists of tree participants: trusted entity, user and verifier. There are five algo-
rithms: Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Combine, and Verify.
• The Setup algorithm is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter λ and parameters n and t, and outputs the system parameters
pms, a master secret key msk and a master public key mpk.
• The KeyGen algorithm is a PPT algorithm that takes as inputs the system
public parameters pms and the master secret key msk, and outputs a secret
key share ski.
• The Sign algorithm is a PPT algorithm that, given the system public pa-
rameters pms, a secret key ski and a message m, outputs a partial signa-
ture σi.
• The Combine algorithm is a PPT algorithm that, given a message m and a
vector of partial signatures {σi}ti=0 on the message m outputs a signature
σ.
• The Verify algorithm is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes as inputs
the public parameters pms, a master public key mpk, a message m and a
signature σ, and outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on the message m; 0
otherwise. σ is a valid signature if at least t out of n partial signatures
have been used to compute it.
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Our group accreditation mechanism makes use of a signature scheme that
has a dynamic threshold. Dynamic threshold signature schemes differ from the
previous ones in that the threshold t is not fixed during the set-up phase, but
is declared at the time of computing the signature.
2.3 Identity-based signature schemes
Identity-based signature schemes, theorized by Shamir in [87] and with the first
concrete protocol, based on the Weil pairing, developed by Boneh et al. in [23],
allow public keys pkid to be arbitrary strings of some length, which are called
identities. These strings are associated with a user U and reflect some aspect
of his identity, e.g. his email address. The corresponding secret key skid is then
computed by a trusted entity, the certification authority (CA), taking as input
the user’s identity and, possibly, some secret information held only by the CA,
and is sent to the user U through some secure channel. Identity-based public key
signature schemes offer a great flexibility in key generation and management,
which is a feature we require in our group size accreditation method.
An identity-based signature scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Identity-based signature scheme). An identity-based signature
scheme consists of tree participants: trusted entity, user and verifier. There are
four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify.
• The Setup algorithm is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter λ and outputs the system parameters pms and a master secret
key msk.
• The Extract algorithm is a PPT algorithm that takes as inputs the system
public parameters pms, the master secret key msk and an identity id, and
outputs a key-pair (pkid, skid).
• The Sign algorithm is a PPT algorithm that, given the system public pa-
rameters pms, a secret key skid and a message m, outputs a signature
σ.
• The Verify algorithm is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes as inputs
the public parameters pms, a public key pkid, a message m and a signature
σ, and outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on the message m with secret
key skid; it outputs 0 otherwise.
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2.4 Partially blind signature schemes
Blind signature protocols are interactive protocols between a user, a signer and a
verifier, in which the signer produces a digital signature of a message submitted
by the user, but does not learn anything about the contents of the message. This
primitive was introduced by Chaum in [31] and has since been used in a vast
array of privacy-related protocols, such as e-cash, electronic voting and anony-
mous credential systems. An inherent drawback of blind signature protocols
is that the signer cannot enforce a certain format on the message. Tradition-
ally, this problem has been solved using cut-and-choose techniques, in which
the requester of a signature generates and blinds a number n of messages, the
signer asks the requester to unblind all messages but a randomly chosen one,
checks whether all unblinded messages conform to the required format and, if
yes, signs the only message that remains blinded. Using cut-and-choose tech-
niques solves the problem (the probability that the requester succeeds in getting
a non-conforming message signed is upper-bounded by 1/n), but it does so at
the cost of high computation and communication overheads.
Partially blind signatures were introduced by Abe in [6, 7] as an alternative
to cut-and-choose protocols. In a partially blind signature protocol, the user
and the signer agree on a public information that is to be included in the signed
message. Both the user and the signer can be sure that such an information
is really included in the signature, and the secret message of the user remains
blinded to the signer.
Definition 7 (Partially blind signature scheme [98]). A partially blind signa-
ture consists of three participants: signer, user and verifier. There are three
algorithms: Key Generation, Partially Blind Signature Issuance, and Verifica-
tion.
• Key Generation is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as
input a security parameter γ and outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
• Partially Blind Signature Issuance is an interactive protocol between the
signer and the user. The public inputs of both the user and signer contain
the previously agreed upon public information info. The private input of
the signer is sk, and the private input of the user is the message m to be
signed. Upon protocol completion, the private output of the user contains
either fail or (info,m, σ), where σ is the signer’s signature on info and
m.
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• Verification is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes (pk, info,m, σ) as
input and outputs either accept or reject.
Definition 8 (Correctness and security of a partially blind signature scheme).
A partially blind signature scheme is considered correct and secure if it satisfies
the following properties:
• (Correctness) For honestly generated parameters, and for honest execution
of Partial Blind Signature Issuance, the resulting partial blind signature
passes verification with overwhelming probability.
• (Partial blindness) The following must hold: 1) the signer must be assured
that the embedded public information is included in the signature, and
that no one can modify this information; and 2) based on the embedded
information, a signer cannot link the signature with the concrete issuing
instance that produced it.
• (Unforgeability) A partially blind signature scheme is called unforgeable
against one-more forgery under chosen-message attack if, for some integer
`, and a given public information info, there is no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A that can compute, after ` interactions with the signer,
{(info,mj , σj)}j=1,...,`+1 valid signatures with non-negligible probability.
Boldyreva proposed in [19] a blind version of the BLS signature scheme
from [26]. The security of Boldyreva’s scheme rests on the chosen-target version
of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (see Definition 3) in Gap Diffie-
Hellman groups. In [97], Zhang et al. proposed a signature scheme based on
the k+ 1 Exponent Problem. Later, the same authors published in [98] a blind
version of the previous scheme, following the same approach of Boldyreva.
2.5 Zero-knowledge proofs
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), as introduced by Goldwasser et al. in [52],
is a method whereby a party (the prover) can prove to another party (the
verifier) that a given statement is true, without leaking any information from
this process beyond the fact that the statement is true. ZKPs are typically
used as building blocks for other cryptographic protocols as protection against
cheaters or malicious participants. For example, in multiparty computation
protocols, ZKPs can be used to ensure that the inputs given by the participants
are of a given form (that is, participants follow the protocol correctly).
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The Schnorr [85] ZKP protocol, for example, is used to prove that x ∈ Zp
is the discrete logarithm of a public value y = gx in the cyclic group G with
generator g. This ZKP can be used as an identification protocol, when x is a
secret identifier of a user (Schnorr identification scheme).
The Fiat-Shamir [48] heuristic can be used to turn interactive ZKPs into
non-interactive ZKPs (NIKZs). The non-interactive version of the Schnorr
identification scheme is known as the Schnorr signature scheme. This proce-
dure has been used to build other digital signature schemes from interactive
zero knowledge proofs. The Groth-Sahai [55] proof framework is used to build
non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of statements formulated in terms of any
operation associated with bilinear groups.
In [70], the authors introduce a general framework based on one-way homo-
morphisms to prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of the preimage of a group
homomorphism. They show that the Schnorr protocol [85] is an instance of this
general framework, using the exponentiation in groups in which the discrete
logarithm problem is hard. Our loyalty programs construction uses a variation
of this protocol, based on the exponentiation in bilinear groups in which the
discrete logarithm problem is assumed hard.
2.6 Secure multiparty computation for set in-
tersection
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute func-
tions of their inputs in a secure way without requiring a trusted third party.
During the execution of the protocol, the parties do not learn anything about
each other’s input except what is implied by the output itself. There are two
main adversarial models: honest-but-curious adversaries and malicious adver-
saries. In the former model, the parties follow the protocol instructions but they
try to obtain information about the inputs of other parties from the messages
they receive. In the latter model, the adversary may deviate from the protocol
in an arbitrary way. Aumann and Lindell [10] introduced a new model, the
covert adversaries. A covert adversary may deviate from the protocol in an
attempt to cheat, but such deviations are detected by honest parties. In this
context, the parties may be considered rational, that is, acting according to
their interests. In game-theoretic terms, it is assumed that players only try to
maximize their utility functions; hence, all possible deviations from the correct
protocol execution have this goal.
13
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
We will restrict here to a two-party setting in which the input of each party
is a set, and the desired output is the cardinality of the intersection of both sets.
The intersection of two sets can be obtained by using generic constructions based
on Yao’s garbled circuit [96]. This technique allows computing any arithmetic
function, but for most of the functions it is inefficient. Many of the recent
works on two-party computation are focused on improving the efficiency of these
protocols for particular families of functions.
Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas [49] presented a more efficient method to
compute the set intersection, a private matching scheme, that is secure in the
honest-but-curious model. A private matching scheme is a protocol between a
customer C and a server S in which C’s input is a set X of size iC , S’s input is a
set Y of size iS , and at the end of the protocol C learns X ∩Y . The scheme uses
polynomial-based techniques and homomorphic encryption schemes. Next we
present an outline of the scheme in [49] that is secure in the honest-but-curious
model:
1. C computes the polynomial p(x) = ∏si=1(x− ai).
2. C sends Enc(p0), . . . , Enc(ps) to S, where pi is the coefficient of degree i
of p.
3. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ t, S picks a random element rj ∈ Zn and computes
Enc(rj · p(bj) + bj). Observe that these ciphertexts can be obtained from
Enc(p0), . . . , Enc(ps) and Enc(bj) by using the homomorphic properties
of the cryptosystem. Then S sends the ciphertexts to C.
4. C decrypts the t ciphertexts. The result of each decryption is an element
from X ∩ Y or a random element.
If the size of the domain of Enc is much larger than |X| the scheme computes
X ∩ Y with high probability.
Several variations of the private matching scheme were also presented in [49]:
an extension to the malicious adversary model, an extension of the multi-party
case, and schemes to compute the cardinality of the set intersection and other
functions. Constructing efficient schemes for set operations is an important
topic in MPC and has been studied in many other contributions. Several works
such as [16, 37, 57, 66, 92] present new protocols to compute the set intersection
cardinality.
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2.7 Paillier’s cryptosystem
In this cryptosystem, the public key consists of an integer n (product of two
RSA primes), and an integer g of order n modulo n2, for example, g = 1 + n.
The secret key is φ(n), where φ(·) is Euler’s totient function.
Encryption of a plaintext integer m, with m < n involves selecting a random
integer r < n and computing the ciphertext c as
c = Enc(m) = gm · rn mod n2 = (1 +mn)rn mod n2.
Decryption consists of first computing c1 = c
φ(n) mod n2 = 1 +mφ(n)n mod n2
and then m = (c1 − 1)φ(n)−1 mod n2.
The homomorphic properties of Paillier’s cryptosystem are as follows:
• Homomorphic addition of plaintexts. The product of two ciphertexts de-
crypts as the sum of their corresponding plaintexts:
D(E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) mod n2) = m1 +m2 mod n.
Also, the product of a ciphertext times g raised to a plaintext decrypts as
the sum of the corresponding plaintexts:
D(E(m1, r1) · gm2 mod n2) = m1 +m2 mod n.
• Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts. An encrypted plaintext raised
to the power of another plaintext will decrypt to the product of the two
plaintexts:
D(E(m1, r1)
m2 mod n2) = D(E(m2, r2)
m1 mod n2) = m1m2 mod n.
More generally, given a constant k, D(E(m1, r1)
k mod n2) = km1 mod n.
2.8 Bloom filters
Bloom filters, as proposed by Bloom [17], are probabilistic space-efficient data
structures that encode datasets while still allowing membership queries. The
latter queries have a false positive rate proportional to the number of encoded
elements. A Bloom filter consists of a bit array B = b0, . . . , bm−1 of length m,
with all bits initially set to 0, and is equipped with k different hash functions with
range [0, . . . ,m− 1] each of which maps some set element to one of the m array
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positions with a uniformly random distribution. Typically k  m. An element
e to be inserted is hashed with the k hash functions, and the corresponding bits
bh0(e), . . . , bhk−1(e) are set to 1. Accordingly, a membership query for element e
is performed by checking whether bh0(e) = · · · = bhk−1(e) = 1.
If a Bloom filter contains n elements, the probability of false positive (that
is, the probability of the membership query answering that an element not in
the set belongs to it) is given by(
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn)k
, (2.1)
that is the probability that the indices obtained by hashing the element with
the k hash functions are all set to 1, either by another single element (which is
unlikely, because it would mean that the k hash values of the second element
collide with those of the first one) or by a combination of other inserted ele-
ments. Note that Expression (2.1) is only an approximation, because it assumes
that a bit is set to 1 independently of the values of the other bits, which is a
simplification of reality [27].
The number of elements encoded in a Bloom filter (i.e. the cardinality of
the encoded set S) is approximated as
|S| ≈ −m
k
ln
(
1− H(BS)
m
)
, (2.2)
where BS is the bit array resulting from encoding S, H(·) is the Hamming
weight of a bit array (number of bits set to 1), m is the length of the Bloom
filter and k is the number of hashes [88].
2.8.1 Union and intersection of sets
The union and intersection of encoded sets can be easily computed by perform-
ing the bitwise ∨ (or) and ∧ (and) operations, respectively. If we assume the
sets A and B and their respective encodings BA and BB are of the same size
m, with BA and BB having both k hash functions, the Bloom filter
BA∩B = bA,0 ∧ bB,0, . . . , bA,m−1 ∧ bB,m−1
represents the encoding of the intersection set A ∩ B. Likewise, the union set
can be obtained by computing the bitwise ∨ operation.
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Note that a Bloom filter obtained by encoding A ∩ B or A ∪ B will not be
exactly equal to the Bloom filters obtained by performing the above operations.
This is due to the underlying probabilistic nature of Bloom filters, and may
cause some elements to be lost or the false positive rate to increase.
Finally, by applying Expression (2.2) to the resulting Bloom filters, we can
obtain estimates of the cardinalities of the union and the intersection of sets.
We plan to use the cardinality of the intersection of two sets to compute their
distance.
2.8.2 Security and privacy of Bloom filters
Gerbet et al. [51] give security definitions for Bloom filters, by deriving them
from the standard security properties of cryptographic hash functions.
Definition 9 (Support). The support of a vector B of size m, denoted as
supp(B), is the set of its non-zero coordinate indices:
supp(B) = {i ∈ [0, . . . ,m− 1], bi 6= 0}.
Definition 10 (Pre-image of a Bloom filter). Given a Bloom filter B, a pre-
image of the filter is a string y ∈ {0, 1}∗ with indices Iy = {h0(y), . . . , hk−1(y)} ⊆
supp(Bx).
In a pre-image attack, an adversary is given B. Finding pre-images becomes
easier as the support of the filter increases (as a consequence of the insertion
of more elements). In the extreme case in which the size of the support equals
the length m of the filter, finding a pre-image is trivial. This is why we define
a pre-image attack to be successful only if the attacker finds a pre-image y that
coincides with an element inserted in B. Even if the attacker does not know the
elements inserted in B, he may be able to recognize one when he hits it, due to
any redundancy in the element (for example, an URL is easy to recognize).
Definition 11 (Second pre-image of a Bloom filter). Given a Bloom filter Bx
containing an element x ∈ {0, 1}∗ with indices Ix = {h0(x), . . . , hk−1(x)}, a sec-
ond pre-image of the filter is another string y 6= x with Iy = {h0(y), . . . , hk−1(y)}
such that Iy ⊆ supp(B).
In a second pre-image attack, an adversary is given Bx and its element x.
The attack succeeds if the attacker finds a second pre-image y 6= x that also
passes the membership test.
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Definition 12 (Collision in a Bloom filter). Given a Bloom filter B, two strings
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and y ∈ {0, 1}∗, with x 6= y, Ix = {h0(x), . . . , hk−1(x)}, and Iy =
{h0(y), . . . , hk−1(y)} are a collision if both Ix ⊆ supp(B) and Iy ⊆ supp(B).
In a collision attack, an adversary is given B. The attack succeeds if the
adversary finds a collision.
In the system we propose, servers store the users’ profiles encoded as Bloom
filters. Therefore:
• In order to preserve the privacy of the users, it is important that the server,
or any attacker with access to the server, cannot obtain the profiles of the
users from their encoded versions. Thus, we need Bloom filters to resist
pre-image attacks in order to ensure the privacy of the users.
• On the other hand, resistance to second pre-image attacks is needed to
ensure that the server or any attacker cannot replace a known legitimate
profile by a fabricated profile that also passes the authentication test.
• Finally, resistance to collision attacks is needed to ensure that it is not easy
for the attacker to find a random profile that passes the authentication
test as if it was some legitimate profile (unknown to the attacker).
Gerbet et al. [51] also provide the computational complexities of pre-image
and second pre-image attacks against Bloom filters, and point out that typical
implementations of Bloom filters use non-cryptographic hash functions for effi-
ciency reasons and are thus weak against these attacks. They recommend using
keyed hash functions, such as message authentication codes (e.g. HMAC) to
thwart attacks against Bloom filters. Using HMAC does not only increase the
domain of the hash function (the HMAC input is augmented with the key), but
also makes the computation slower, which is a desirable property to keep hash
functions secure against brute-force search.
2.8.3 Secure instantiation of the Bloom filters
We follow the construction in Kirsch and Mitzenmacher [65] to build our Bloom
filters. Basically, the k hash functions hi(x) are constructed from two indepen-
dent hash functions g1(x) and g2(x) as hi(x) = g1(x) + ig2(x) mod m. This
strategy reduces the computing time to encode the sets, while maintaining the
false positive rate as low as if k independent hash functions were used. In addi-
tion, to ensure that the domain of the hi(x) is large, we take g2(x) to be keyed,
that is, g2(x, key), so that hi(x) is also keyed, that is, hi(x, key).
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The optimal values for m and k can be computed as a function of the max-
imum number N of allowed element insertions, and the maximum acceptable
false positive rate ρ [51]:
m = −N ln ρ
(ln 2)2
, k =
m
N
ln 2. (2.3)
2.8.4 Bloom filters in privacy-preserving data mining
In Dong et al. [44], the authors propose a private matching scheme based on
garbled Bloom filters and oblivious transfer that overcomes the scalability prob-
lem of previous proposals. In this protocol, the datasets are encoded as garbled
Bloom filters (an extension of Bloom filters). The parties then engage in an
oblivious transfer protocol to compute a new Bloom filter that encodes the in-
tersection of the original sets. Pinkas et al. [77] improve on the efficiency of
the previous protocol. The mechanism described in Kerschbaum [64] uses the
homomorphic properties of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem to test mem-
bership of elements in encrypted Bloom filters (the Bloom filter is encrypted bit
by bit). Schnell et al. [84] also use Bloom filters to link records from vertically
partitioned data with encrypted identifiers.
Bloom filters have been used in other applications of privacy-preserving data
mining; for example, to implement a secure dot product protocol to derive
association rules from vertically partitioned data [62].
2.9 Anonymous payment mechanisms
Throughout this work, and specifically when dealing with group and loyalty
discount protocols, we will reach stages in which users have to pay. It would
certainly be pointless to use any kind of non-anonymous payment mechanism,
such as a credit card or PayPal, after engaging in protocols that strive to preserve
the anonymity of users.
Therefore, we recall available payment methods that preserve the payer’s
anonymity. We do not intend to offer an exhaustive list, but merely to show
that there are several options.
The simplest option for an anonymous payment method is to use cash if
the application and the service provider allow it. Unfortunately, this will not
always be the case, and other payment methods have to be taken into account.
Electronic cash protocols such as [32] are good candidates for this role. Nowa-
days, Bitcoin [72] is a well-established electronic currency and, although it is
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not anonymous by design [81], it can be a good solution if accompanied by care-
ful key management policies. Also, extensions of the original protocol such as
Zerocoin [71] provide anonymity by design.
For completeness, we propose in this work to resort to a much simpler ap-
proach, based on prepaid scratch cards that users can buy at certain points
of sale using cash (for maximum anonymity). Each such card contains a code
Pay.Code which the card provider will associate with a temporary account hold-
ing a fixed amount specified by the card denomination. A well-known example
of this type of prepayment system that can be used to buy on-line services and
products at a variety of vendors worldwide is Paysafecard [76].
2.10 Short-range communication technologies
Our group accreditation mechanism requires communication among the mem-
bers (their devices) of a group. Additionally, at least one of the group members
has to be able to communicate with the automated verifier. The choice of the
communication technologies heavily depends on the kind of service our accredi-
tation mechanism is used for. For example, deploying our method in an on-line
store has different communication requirements (and probably different func-
tional requirements) than deploying it in a toll station. Moreover, if the verifier
wants to learn not only the number of group members, but also if they are
physically together, the choice of communication technologies becomes more
restricted.
In the on-line setting, we propose to use anonymous communication chan-
nels, such as the Tor network, to communicate with the verifying entity. Since
physical closeness is not very relevant in the on-line world, our accreditation
method needs only to be used to prove the size of the group.
The full potential of our mechanism can be leveraged in a physical setting,
such as a toll station in high-occupancy lanes, where, beyond verifying the
group size with our method, the choice of communication technologies can help
verifying that the group members are physically together. For these cases,
short-range communication technologies, such as NFC, Bluetooth or WiFi, are
suitable. It is desirable that communication establishment be fast and not too
cumbersome to the user.
We propose using Bluetooth, and in particular Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE,
[18]) to communicate with the verifying device. BLE solves some of the main
limitations of traditional Bluetooth, i.e. it reduces detection and bonding times,
requires much less work by the user than NFC and has a shorter range than
20
2.10. SHORT-RANGE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
both Bluetooth and WiFi, which is desirable in a method like ours. Specifically,
while a Bluetooth connection can reach as far as 100 m if using Class 1 chips,
smartphones carry Class 2 Bluetooth chips, which provide ranges of about 10
m. Furthermore, Bluetooth is heavily affected by physical obstacles and the
effective ranges will typically be less than 10 m. Such a range is appropriate
for smartphones to communicate with the verifying device without suffering
interference from any smartphone that is not in the very close vicinity (e.g.,
that is not in the car in the case of toll discounts). As far as availability is
concerned, BLE is implemented by most major smartphone manufacturers.
Regarding communication between the smartphones of group members, we
propose to rely on NFC. Given the effective range of NFC (about 2 to 5 cm in
smartphones), group members cannot collaborate in the protocol unless they
are very close to each other (i.e. they have to sit in the same car in the case of
toll discounts).
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Group Size Accreditation
Method
3.1 Introduction
Group discounts are offered by vendors and also public authorities to encourage
consumers (or citizens) to cluster in groups when using services. Dealing with
groups of consumers (rather than with a single consumer at a time) can lead to
a more efficient use of the available resources, less impact on the environment
or other specific benefits. Two representative examples of group discounts are
the following: 1) group tickets for museums, stadiums or leisure parks, which
may allow service providers to plan activities more efficiently ahead of time; 2)
discounted highway tolls or parking fees for high-occupancy vehicles (HOVs),
which aim to reduce traffic congestion and pollution.
Although it is common and simplest for vendors to require all group mem-
bers to identify themselves, we observe that the privacy loss this inflicts on
consumers is not really justified in most applications. We make the assump-
tion that normally the only relevant feature about a group is the number of
its members, rather than their identities or other features. Other features that
might sometimes be of interest are the age of the participants, their location or
whether they are physically together or not.
Certifying that a group of people is of a minimum size, along with other
features of the group, such as its members being physically close to each other,
is trivial in a face-to-face setting with a human verifier who can see that the
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required minimum amount of people is present (although even in this case the
human verifier could be tricked by colluding groups). However, checking the size
of a group becomes far from obvious for an automatic verifier or in an on-line
setting, especially when considering the anonymity of group members.
3.1.1 Contributions
In this Chapter, we describe a method to certify the number of members in a
group formed on the fly, while preserving the anonymity of the members and
with no specific dedicated hardware requirements. Namely, our mechanism only
requires every group member to have a computing device with some communi-
cation capabilities, e.g. a smartphone. Also, we explore the option to include
payment in our proposed system, which is necessary for group discounts. We
complete the description of our method with a possible anonymous payment
mechanism, based on scratch cards.
Our group size accreditation method is based on an identity-based dynamic
threshold (IBDT ) signature scheme, namely a variant of the second protocol
proposed in [56], but adapted to the asymmetric pairing setting. The protocol
suite introduced here is a generalization of a specific protocol for high-occupancy
vehicle toll discounts for which we filed patent [42].
The contributions in this Chapter have been published in [41]. An extended
version has been submitted to a journal.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly recalls past works
related to group size accreditation mechanisms. Section 3.3 describes the new
IBDT primitive; its security requirements are identified and a proof of its secu-
rity is given. Section 3.4 introduces the key management scheme used in our
proposal. Section 3.5 describes our group size accreditation method, including
the required entities and protocols. The security and the privacy of our method
are analyzed in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, we give a complexity estimation of
our approach and describe precomputation optimizations. Section 3.8 presents
simulation results. Section 3.9 describes a use case implementation of our sys-
tem, focused on parking tolls for high-occupancy vehicles. Finally, Section 3.10
summarizes conclusions of this Chapter.
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3.2 Related work on group size accreditation
methods
A group size accreditation method is a system by which the members of a group
of users can be counted reliably, usually as a requisite to grant them group
discounts or other special service conditions. Such a system must be robust
against cheaters, because cheating endangers the benefits of group discounts
outlined in the previous section. The traditional solution is to have an employee
count the number of members in each group. This approach may be good in
some cases, such as small events, but when lots of people participate and/or a
short response time is needed, such as in HOV lanes, automated mechanisms
are essential.
Automated mechanisms may involve using cameras, detecting the users’ mo-
bile devices, etc. Unfortunately, most of these systems are not privacy-aware:
beyond counting members, they allow identifying them. Worse yet, some tech-
nologies that invade privacy, such as camera-based ones, can still fail to identify
cheaters [30]. A mechanism that is highly effective against cheaters is described
in [35], in which dedicated devices installed in cars count and recognize drivers
and passengers by measuring the strength of the Bluetooth or WiFi signal of
their mobile devices. In this case, counting the occupants of vehicles is done to
grant access to HOV lanes. This mechanism, though, requires installing special
hardware in cars and identifies the occupants of the vehicle. So, while it does
prevent cheating, it still poses a privacy risk to the users.
To the best of our knowledge, no mechanisms have been proposed that ef-
fectively and unequivocally ascertain the number of members of a group while
preserving member anonymity and not requiring specific hardware.
3.3 Identity-based dynamic threshold signatures
We present here our new cryptographic primitive that combines dynamic thresh-
old signatures and identity-based signatures. An identity-based dynamic thresh-
old signature IBDTS = (IBDT.Setup, IBDT.Keygen, IBDT.Sign, IBDT.Comb,
IBDT.Verify) consists of five probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms:
• IBDT.Setup(1λ, ID, n) is the randomized trusted set-up algorithm taking
as input a security parameter λ, a universe of identities ID and an integer
n ∈ poly(λ) which is an upper bound on the size of the threshold policies.
It outputs a set of public parameters pms (which contains λ, ID and n),
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as well as a master secret key msk and the corresponding master public
key mpk. An execution of this algorithm is denoted as (pms,mpk,msk)←
IBDT.Setup(1λ, ID, n).
• IBDT.Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id) is a key extraction algorithm that takes
as inputs the public parameters pms, the master keys mpk and msk, and
an identity id ⊂ ID. Since in what follows we use only one identity-
based public key per user, we can assimilate this key to the user’s iden-
tity and denote it as id; from Section 3.3.5 onwards, we will attribute
more than one identity-based public key to each user and we will need
to denote the identity-based public keys in a different way. The out-
put of the key generation algorithm is a secret key SKid. We write
SKid ← IBDT.Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id) to denote an execution of this
algorithm.
• IBDT.Sign(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ) is a randomized signing algorithm which
takes as input the public parameters pms, the master public key mpk, a
secret key SKid, a message Msg and a threshold signing policy Γ = (t, S)
where S ⊂ ID and 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| ≤ n. It outputs a partial signature σid.
We denote an execution of this algorithm as σid ← IBDT.Sign(pms, mpk,
SKid, Msg, Γ).
• IBDT.Comb(pms,mpk,Msg,Γ, {σid}id∈St) is a deterministic signing algo-
rithm which takes as input the public parameters pms, the master public
key mpk, a message Msg, a threshold signing policy Γ = (t, S) and the par-
tial signatures of some set St ⊂ S, |St| ≥ t and computes a global signature
σ. It outputs a signature σ. We denote the action taken by the signing
algorithm as σ ← IBDT.Comb(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ, {σid}id∈St).
• IBDT.Verify(pms,mpk,Msg, σ,Γ) is a deterministic verification algorithm
taking as input the public parameters pms, a master public key mpk, a
message Msg, a signature σ and a threshold predicate Γ = (t, S). It
outputs 1 if the signature is deemed valid and 0 otherwise. We write b←
IBDT.Verify(pms,mpk,Msg, σ,Γ) to refer to an execution of the verification
protocol.
For correctness, for any λ ∈ N, any integer n ∈ poly(λ), any universe ID, any
set of public parameters and master key pair (pms,mpk,msk)← IBDT.Setup(1λ,
ID, n), and any threshold policy Γ = (t, S) where 1 ≤ t ≤ |S|, it is required
that
σ ← IBDT.Comb(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ, {σid}id∈St)
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IBDT.Verify
(
pms,mpk,Msg, σ
)
= 1
whenever: a) the values pms, mpk and msk have been obtained by properly ex-
ecuting the algorithms IBDT.Setup, b) |St| ≥ t, and c) for each id ∈ St, σid ←
IBDT.Sign
(
pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ
)
and SKid← IBDT.Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id).
3.3.1 Related cryptographic techniques
We address the problem of a dynamic group of users (formed on the fly) proving
its size t in an anonymous way, where t is some publicly declared value. In
our system, users have unique identifiers (e.g. their national ID card numbers).
When a group of users accredits its size using our protocol, the only information
that is revealed about the group members is the set of the j-th digits of their
unique identifiers, which are all different, for some j, as well as the value j.
Assuming the unique identifiers are ` decimal digits long, there are up to 10`−1
users sharing a certain value of the j-th digit, so anonymity is well preserved.
More specifically, the probability to identify a group of t users given that only
the j-th digits of their identifiers are known and all these j-th digits are different
is 10−(`−1)t. The reason is that, when the j-th digits of the t group members
are fixed, known and all different, there are 10(`−1)t possible assignments for
the remaining (` − 1) × t digits of the t identifiers, and each assignment yields
a different set of t identifiers (there are no repeated identifiers, since the j-th
digits are all different).
To achieve the goals in the previous paragraph, we make a special use of an
IBDT signature scheme (see Section 3.3.3 for a description of it and Section 3.4
on how we use it in our protocol). There are other cryptographic techniques
offering some of the three desirable features mentioned above (member counting,
anonymity and dynamicity), which we discuss below.
• Our same IBDT signature scheme could be used in a different way, to
directly prove that t out of n possible signers have collaborated to sign a
document, where the group of n possible signers is dynamically chosen.
The shortcoming is that IBDT signatures reveal the set of n signers who
can collaborate to produce a signature. Therefore, the anonymity level
is at best
(
n
t
)−1
(this best case occurs when the subgroup of t signers is
not leaked, which is an additional security feature that is not satisfied by
every IBDT signature scheme).
• Threshold ring signatures also allow making sure that at least t users
out of n have collaborated to compute a signature. However, the public
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keys of the users are not identities, which makes key management more
complicated. Identity-based threshold ring signatures would be a better
solution, but again the anonymity level achieved would be at most
(
n
t
)−1
.
• Zero-knowledge proofs could be used to prove knowledge of t-out-of-n se-
cret keys out of a group of n keys. There are several alternatives to prove
this under different assumptions, but to the best of our knowledge, they
are all linear in n. Indeed, one alternative is to prove this using Groth-
Sahai NIZK proofs [55] in bilinear groups and improvements thereof which
specifically try to improve GS proofs for this type of ”threshold state-
ment” [80, 53]. In this case, all the proofs are linear in n. On the other
hand, we note that the recent extremely efficient quasi-adaptive NIZK
proofs in bilinear groups ([60], and improvements thereof [61, 68]) allow
only proving membership in linear spaces of a discrete-logarithm group G
or are designated-verifier [5], and we do not know how to use them to prove
this type of threshold statement (or more generally, to prove ”knowledge”
of a witness). Further, approaches in the random oracle model, like the
sigma protocol to prove threshold statements of [34], also result in a linear
proof. Finally, one could use succint non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge (SNARKs) to prove such statement in constant size, but these are
based on very strong and controversial hardness assumptions (knowledge-
of-exponent type of assumptions) which we prefer to avoid. In summary,
with zero-knowledge proofs, the proof size would be linear in n and the
anonymity level would be also at best
(
n
t
)−1
.
• Distributed group signatures do offer anonymity. However, the groups in
such signatures cannot be created on the fly (rather, each group has a
manager). Note that although in the literature of group signatures one
can find solutions in what is called a “dynamic group setting” [11, 67],
the groups are always controlled by a manager who distributes the keys
to group members. In this context, the term dynamic refers to the fact
that users may join or leave the group after setup, while we want groups
to be created on the fly by the users themselves.
Hence, direct application of any of the above cryptographic techniques pro-
vides at best an anonymity level
(
n
t
)−1
. For this level to match the one offered by
our scheme
(
n
t
)
should be as large as 10(`−1)t, which demands a large n. While
choosing a large n is good for privacy, it takes a heavy toll on the efficiency of
any of these solutions. Indeed, in the public-key setting, the verifier must have
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access to at least the n public keys that define the ring, plus the corresponding
certificates. On the other hand, identity-based solutions avoid the public key
and certificate management problem but, in all of their instantiations in the lit-
erature, the public parameters define some upper bound on n, called hereafter
n′, so that a) either the size of the signature (or the size of the zero-knowledge
proof) is at least linear in n′ —which makes verification slow—, or b) the size
of the secret key is at least linear in n′1.
Although we run into a similar problem when using as a building block
an IBDT signature scheme (our IBDT signature scheme has a constant-size
signature but the size of the secret keys depends on n′), by using a more complex
key management, we can set n′ to be equal to the largest group size t′ that makes
sense in the specific application under consideration. In most applications, the
largest possible group size t′ is much smaller than the total number of possible
signers (in the vehicular application, t′ is the maximum number of people that
can travel in a vehicle).
The reason why in our solution we can choose n′ to be independent of the
privacy level is that we obtain anonymity not from the cryptographic primitive
itself but by defining the protocol in such a way that it only reveals one digit of
the signers’ identity, as sketched in the first paragraph of this section.
Finally, we justify the use of an IBDT signature instead of t copies of a
normal identity-based signature, each separately computed by a different user.
The downside of the latter option is that it is more costly for the verifier. In-
deed, each signature verification involves computing pairings, which are very
expensive operations. Hence, with t separate signatures, the number of pairings
to be computed is linear in t, whereas it is constant when verifying one IBDT
signature.
3.3.2 Security model of IBDTs
An IBDT signature scheme must satisfy the usual property of unforgeability.
We consider a relaxed notion where the attacker selects the signing policy Γ? =
(t?, S?) that he wants to attack at the beginning of the game (here Γ? means
that a signature is valid if jointly produced by at least t? signers from a set S?
of possible signers). However, the message Msg? whose signature is eventually
forged is not selected in advance. The attacker can ask for valid signatures
for messages and signing policies of his adaptive choice. The resulting property
1Even if there are ring signatures of constant size [40], we are not aware of constant-size
identity-based threshold ring signatures.
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of selective-predicate and adaptive-message unforgeability under chosen-message
attacks (sP-UF-CMA, for short) is defined in terms of the following game.
Definition 13. Let λ be an integer. Consider the following game between a
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary F and its challenger.
Initialization. The challenger begins by specifying a universe of identities ID
as well as an integer n ∈ poly(λ), which are sent to F . Then, F selects
a subset S? ⊂ ID of signers such that |S?| ≤ n and a threshold t? ∈
{1, . . . , |S?|}. These define a threshold predicate Γ? = (t?, S?).
Setup. The challenger runs (pms,mpk,msk) ← IBDT. Setup(1λ, ID, n) and
sends pms,mpk to the forger F .
Queries. F can interleave secret key and signature queries.
Secret key queries. F can adaptively request the secret keys of any iden-
tity id under the restriction that the total number of queried identities
in the set S? is strictly less than t?. As an answer to such a query,
the adversary receives SKid ← IBDT.Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id).
Signature queries. F adaptively chooses a pair (Msg, Γ) consisting of
a message Msg and a threshold predicate Γ = (t, S) such that 1 ≤ t ≤
|S| ≤ n. The challenger replies with a valid signature for Msg and
the policy Γ.
Forgery. At the end of the game, F outputs a pair (Msg?, σ?). We say that F
is successful if:
• IBDT.Verify(pms,mpk,Msg?, σ?,Γ?) = 1, and
• F has not made any signature query for the pair (Msg?,Γ?).
The forger’s advantage in breaking the sP-UF-CMA security is defined as
SuccsP-UF-CMAF,IBDT (λ) = Pr[F wins].
An identity-based dynamic threshold signature IBDTS is selective-predicate adap-
tive-message unforgeable (or sP-UF-CMA unforgeable) if, for any PPT adver-
sary F , SuccsP-UF-CMAF,IBDT (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
3.3.3 An instance of an IBDT signature scheme
We instantiate an IBDT signature scheme by adapting the threshold attribute-
based signature scheme of [56], which builds on the attribute-based encryption
scheme of [9]. If one identifies attributes with identities, threshold attribute-
based signature schemes are closely related to identity-based dynamic threshold
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signature schemes, except that the former have an additional property called
collusion resistance. Collusion resistance means that two users who individually
do not satisfy a signing policy (t, S) but such that the sum of their attributes
does, cannot combine their secret keys to sign a message for the policy (t, S).
For identity-based threshold signature schemes, we require precisely the op-
posite, namely that users can combine the secret keys. To achieve collusion
resistance, the scheme of [56] used a different polynomial Q to derive the secret
key of each different user. To adapt it to an IBDT signature scheme, we define
a single polynomial Q to derive the secret keys of all users that are associated
to the same digit position of their identifiers; more specifically, in the adapta-
tion of IBDT described in Section 3.3.5, a set of polynomials {Q1, . . . , Q`} is
defined, where polynomial Qj is used to derive the secret keys of all users that
are associated to the j-th digit or group of digits of the users’ identifiers.
Another change with respect to [56] is that our scheme is designed to work
in groups with an asymmetric bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT . For this
reason, we need to embed the image of the hash function H in the groups G1
and G2. This could be done in the standard model using two different copies of
a Waters’ hash function [95] in different groups, but the resulting scheme has
very large parameters. Instead, we define a hash function which maps strings
to elements of Zp and we then embed the image of H in each of the groups with
an affine function, inspired by [21]. For the security analysis, we treat H as a
random oracle.
Additionally, we note that, for the group discount application, we only need
s-out-of-s threshold policies in our IBDT signature scheme. This results in a
slightly simpler scheme. Further, we define the space of identities ID as the set
of all integers in the interval [1, . . . , p/2], where p is the order of the group in
which the signature is defined.
I Setup (1λ, ID, n): The algorithm chooses bilinear groups G = (g1, g2,G1,G2,
GT ) of prime order p > 2λ, where gi is a generator of Gi and a collision-
resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. The resulting public parameters
are pms = (ID, n, λ, G, H), where the space of identities ID is the set
of all integers in [1, p/2]. Then the algorithm randomly chooses α, α0 ← Zp,
~α = (α1, . . . , αN )
> ← ZNp , where N = n + 1. It then computes e(g1, g2)α,
h0 = g
α0
1 , f0 = g
α0
2 ,
~H = (h1, . . . , hN )
> = g~α1 and ~F = (f1, . . . , fN )
> = g~α2 .
Further, it defines a polynomial Q[X] := α + β1X + · · · + βn−1Xn−1 where
β1, . . . , βn−1 ← Zp. It also chooses n−1 arbitrary integers D = {d1, . . . , dn−1} ∈
[(p+ 1)/2, p− 1], for example, di := (p+ 1)/2 + (i− 1). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
Di denotes the first i elements in D.
31
CHAPTER 3. GROUP SIZE ACCREDITATION METHOD
Finally, the algorithm picks u˜0, u˜1 ← Zp and defines ~U := (gu˜01 , gu˜11 ) and ~V :=
(gu˜02 , g
u˜1
2 ).
The master secret key is defined to be msk = (gα1 , Q) and the master public key
is
mpk =
(
e(g1, g2)
α, h0, f0, ~H, ~F ,D, ~U, ~V
)
.
I Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id): This algorithm generates a key component SKid =
(Did,1, Did,2,Kid,1, . . . ,Kid,N−1, {Did,j,1, Did,j,2,Kid,j,1, . . . ,Kid,j,N−1}j=1...n−1)
by picking fresh random elements rid, rid,1, . . . , rid,n−1 ← Zp and setting
Did,1 = g
Q(id)
1 · hrid0 ,
Did,2 = g
rid
1 ,{
Kid,i =
(
h−id
i
1 · hi+1
)rid}
i=1,...,N−1
,{
Did,j,1 = g
Q(dj)
1 · hrid,j0 , Did,j,2 = grid,j1 ,{
Kid,j,i =
(
h
−dij
1 · hi+1
)rid,j}
i=1,...,N−1
}
j=1,...,n−1
. (3.1)
I Sign(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ, id): To partially sign Msg ∈ {0, 1}∗ w.r.t. the
policy Γ = (s, S), where S is a set of identities of size s = |S| ≤ n, the algorithm
first computes M = H(Msg,Γ). It defines ~Y = (y1, . . . , yN )
> as the vector
containing the coefficients of the polynomial
PS(Z) =
N∑
i=1
yiZ
i−1 =
∏
id∈S
(Z − id)
∏
d∈Dn−s
(Z − d). (3.2)
Since PS(Z) is of degree n, it has at most N = n+1 non-zero coefficients. Then
the algorithm sets
D′id,1 = Did,1 ·
N−1∏
i=1
K
yi+1
id,i = g
Q(id)
1 ·
(
h0 ·
N∏
i=1
hyii
)rid . (3.3)
Let M = H(Msg,Γ) ∈ Zp. Choose zid, wid ← Zp and compute
σid,1 = D
′
id,1 ·
(
h0 ·
∏N
i=1 h
yi
i
)wid · (uM0 · u1)zid ,
σid,2 = Did,2 · gwid1 , σid,3 = gzid1 .
Return the signature σid = (σid,1, σid,2, σid,3) ∈ G31.
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I Comb(pms,mpk,msk, {σid}id∈S ,SKid′): Given his secret key SKid′ = (Did′,1,
Did′,2, Kid′,1, . . . ,Kid′,N−1, {Did′,j,1, Did′,j,2,Kid′,j,1, . . . ,Kid′,j,N−1}j=1,...,n−1),
the combiner does the following operations:
1. For each j = 1, . . . , n− s, compute:
σ′id′,j := Did′,j,1 ·
N−1∏
i=1
K
yi+1
id′,j,i.
2. Then compute:
σ1 =
∏
id∈S
(
σid,1
)∆S∪Dn−sid (0) n−s∏
j=1
(
σ′id′,j
)∆S∪Dn−sdj (0)
= gα1 · (h0 ·
N∏
i=1
hyii )
r · (uM0 · u1)z,
σ2 =
∏
id∈S
(
σid,2
)∆S∪Dn−sid (0) n−s∏
j=1
(
Did′,j,2
)∆S∪Dn−sdj (0) = gr1,
σ3 =
∏
id∈St
(
σid,3
)∆S∪Dn−sid (0) = gz1 ,
where r =
∑
id∈S ∆
S∪Dn−s
id (0) · (rid +wid) +
∑n−s
j=1
(
∆
S∪Dn−s
dj
(0) · rid′,j
)
and
z =
∑
id∈S ∆
S∪Dn−s
id (0) · zid.
Return the signature σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ G31.
I Verify(pms,mpk,Msg, σ,Γ): This algorithm parses Γ as a pair (s, S). It com-
putes M = H(Msg,Γ). Then, it defines the vector ~Y = (y1, . . . , yN )
> from the
polynomial PS(Z) as per Equation (3.2). The algorithm accepts the signature
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) as valid and thus outputs 1 if and only if
e(g1, g2)
α ?=
e(σ1, g2)
e
(
σ2, f0 ·
∏N
i=1 f
yi
i
) · e(σ3, (vM0 · v1)) . (3.4)
3.3.4 Security of the IBDT instance
Theorem 1. The IBDT signature scheme of Section 3.3.3 is selective-predicate
and adaptive-message unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if H is collision-
resistant and if the asymmetric (n + 1)-DHE assumption holds in the bilinear
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group G, where n is an upper bound of the number of signers s in any threshold
policy.
Proof
We show that a forger F implies either a collision-finder for H or an algorithm
B that computes gγN+1 from (g1, g2, gγ1 , . . . , gγ
N
1 , g
γN+2
1 , . . . , g
γ2N
1 , g
γ
2 , . . . , g
γN
2 ),
where N = n+1. In the following, we denote by ~γ the vector ~γ := (γ, γ2, . . . , γN )
and by zi the value zi := g
γi
1 , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}. Also, we assimilate a
user’s identity-based public key with her identity and denote it as id.
At the outset of the attack game, F declares the challenge set Γ? = (s?, S?).
Then B prepares the public parameters pms and the master public key mpk
as follows: it selects a set D of n dummy signers and computes the vector ~Y
associated with the polynomial PS?(Z) according to Expression (3.2) using the
set Dn−s? of the first n−s? dummy signers. More precisely, B picks θ0, δ0 ← Zp
and a random vector ~θ ← ZNp and computes ~H = (h1, . . . , hN )> = g~γ1 · g~θ1 ,
~F = (f1, . . . , fN )
> = g~γ2 ·g~θ2 (which implicitly sets ~α = ~γ+~θ), h0 = gθ01 ·g−〈~γ,
~Y 〉
1 ,
f0 = g
θ0
2 ·g−〈~γ,
~Y 〉
2 and e(g1, g2)
α = e(zN , g
γ
2 )
δ0 ; the master secret key (implicitly)
is set to gα1 = z
δ0
N+1. In addition, B selects a collision-resistant hash function H
which will be treated as a random oracle. It chooses some value M† ← Zp and
stores it to answer random oracle queries. It also defines u0 := z
t0
1 , v0 := (g
γ
2 )
t0 ,
u1 := z
−M†t0
1 g
t1
1 , v1 := (g
γ
2 )
−M†t0gt12 for t0, t1 ← Zp. The master public key
mpk =
(
e(g1, g2)
α, h0, f0, ~H, ~F , ~U, ~V ,D, H
)
is given to F .
In the following, for any ω ∈ Zp, we define the vector ~Xnω = (1, ω, . . . , ωn−1)>.
We note that, given any set S ⊂ Zp of cardinality less than n, the vectors
{ ~Xnω}ω∈S are linearly independent.
Random oracle queries: We assume that the number of random oracle
queries of an adversary is bounded by some natural number qH . Algorithm
B chooses a random index i? ∈ [qH ] and answers the i?-th query with the value
M† ∈ Zp, and the other queries with randomly chosen elements in Zp.
Secret key queries: F can obtain secret keys for any identity-based public
key, provided that the set of queried identities Ω is such that |Ω ∩ S?| < s?.
Since |Ω ∩ S?| < s?, and S? and D are disjoint sets of identity-based public
keys (just like Ω and D), the cardinality of (S?∩Ω)∪Dn−s? is strictly less than
n. Consequently, the vector ~Xn0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
> cannot be in the span of the
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vectors { ~Xnω}ω∈(S?∩Ω)∪Dn−s? . Pick µ ← Z∗p. We conclude that there exists an
efficiently computable vector ~τ which is uniform conditioned on 〈 ~Xnω , ~τ〉 = 0 for
any ω ∈ (S? ∩ Ω) ∪ Dn−s? and 〈 ~Xn0 , ~τ〉 = µ 6= 0 (according to Proposition 1 in
[54]).
To construct a secret key, B has to define a random vector ~u which satisfies the
constraint 〈 ~Xn0 , ~u〉 = α, i.e. ~u = (α, β1, . . . , βn−1)>. This vector defines the
coefficients of Q[X]. To this end, B proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 3 in
[54], by implicitly setting ~u as ~u = ~v + ψ · ~τ , where ~v = (v1, . . . , vn)> ∈ Znp is a
randomly chosen vector and ψ = (α− v1)/µ, so that 〈 ~Xn0 , ~u〉 = α. The task of
B is thus to compute (without knowing the vector ~u) a secret key component(
Did,1, Did,2, {Kid,i}N−1i=1
)
=
(
g
Q(id)
1 · hrid0 , grid1 , {h−id
i
1 hi+1}N−1i=1
)
,
and
{Did,j,1, Did,j,2, {Kid,j,i}N−1i=1 }j=1...n−1 =
= {gQ(dj)1 · hrid,j0 , grid,j1 , {h
−dij
1 hi+1}N−1i=1 }j=1...n−1,
where Q(ω) = 〈 ~Xnω , ~u〉, for any ω ∈ Ω ∪ D.
We first explain how to compute the first row of each secret key, i.e.
(
Did,1,
Did,2, {Kid,i}N−1i=1
)
.
1. For each id ∈ S∗, we have Q(id) = 〈 ~Xnid, ~u〉 = 〈 ~Xnid, ~v〉 which is efficiently
computable by B. Hence, B can simply pick rid ← Z∗p and define
Did =
(
Did,1, Did,2, {Kid,i}N−1i=1
)
=
(
g
Q(id)
1 · hrid0 , grid1 , {(h−id
i
1 hi+1)
rid}N−1i=1
)
.
2. For each id ∈ Ω\{S∗}, B can construct a valid key tuple (Did,−1, Did,2,
{Kid,i}N−1i=1
)
in two steps. The first step consists in building a tuple of the
form(
D∗id,1, D
∗
id,2, {K∗id,i}N−1i=1
)
=
(
gα1 · hr˜id0 , gr˜id1 , {(h−id
i
1 hi+1)
r˜id}N−1i=1
)
using the fact that id is not in S? ∪Dn−s? . To this end, B proceeds as in
[25]. LetMid ∈ ZN×(N−1)p be the matrixMid =
(
−id −id2 ··· −idN−1
IN−1
)
.
Pick ξ1 ← Z∗p and define ~ξ = ξ1 · (1, id, . . . , idN−1)>, which satisfies
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~ξ >Mid = ~0 while 〈~Y , ~ξ〉 = ξ1 · PS?(id) 6= 0. The simulator B computes(
D∗id,1, D
∗
id,2
)
=
(
gα1 · hr˜id0 , gr˜id1
)
and
(
K∗id,1, . . . ,K
∗
id,N−1
)>
= g
r˜idM
>
id~α
1 , (3.5)
with ~α = (α1, . . . , αN )
> and where the exponent r˜id is defined as r˜id =
r + δ0〈(γN , γN−1, . . . , γ)>, ~ξ〉/〈~Y , ~ξ〉 for some r ← Zp chosen by B. Since
gM
>
id~α = (h−id1 h2, . . . , h
−idN−1
1 hN )
>, if we can argue that both expressions
in (3.5) are computable by B, we will have concluded the first step.
For any ~x ∈ ZNp , the coefficient of γN+1 in the product r˜id〈~x,~γ〉 is
δ0〈~x, ~ξ〉/〈~Y , ~ξ〉. The reason why B can compute the second factor of
D∗id,1 in (3.5) is that the coefficient of g
γN+1 in D∗id,1 is 0. Indeed,
D∗id,1 = g
α · hr˜id0 = zδ0N+1 ·
(
gθ0 · g−〈~γ,~Y 〉)r˜id and the coefficient of γN+1 is
−δ0 in the product −r˜id〈~γ, ~Y 〉, as we can see by applying the observation
above in the case ~x = ~Y . Since M >id ~ξ = ~0, by applying the above obser-
vation to the case where ~f> is successively set as the rows of M>id, we find
that zN+1 = g
γN+1
1 does not appear in g
r˜j ·M>id~α
1 , which is computable.
This concludes the first step of the key generation process. In the second
step, we just have to turn
(
D∗id,1, D
∗
id,2, {K∗id,i}N−1i=1
)
into a suitable key
component. Note that
〈 ~Xnid, ~u〉 = 〈 ~Xnid, ~v〉+ ψ · 〈 ~Xnid, ~τ〉
=
n∑
j=1
idj−1
(
vj +
(α− v1)
µ
· τj
)
= κ1 · α+ κ2,
where κ1 = (
∑n
j=1 id
j−1τj) · µ−1 and κ2 = µ−1 ·
∑n
j=1 id
j−1(µvj − v1τj)
are computable, so that B can obtain a well-formed tuple (Did,1, Did,2,
{Kid,i}N−1i=1 ) by picking r′j ← Zp and setting
SKid =(Did,1, Did,2, {Kid,i}N−1i=1 )
=
(
D∗id,1
κ1 · gκ21 · hr
′
id
0 , D
∗
id,2
κ1 · gr′id1 , {K∗id,iκ1 · (h−id
i
1 · hi+1)r
′
id}N−1i=1
)
.
Finally, we just have to argue how to compute, for each id ∈ Ω and for each
dj , j = 1, . . . , n − 1, the rest of the components of the secret key, namely:
{Did,j,1, Did,j,2, {Kid,j,i}N−1i=1 }j=1,...,n−1. The analysis is the same as before,
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namely, for each j = 1, . . . , n − s∗, the tuple is computed as in the first item
(i.e. as in the case where id ∈ S∗) and for each j = n− s∗ + 1, . . . , n− 1 as in
the second item (using independent randomness for each id).
Signing queries: At any time, F is also allowed to obtain signatures on ar-
bitrary messages. At each signing query, F supplies a message Msg and a
threshold access policy Γ = (s, S), where S is a set of identities of size s ≤ n.
To answer such a query, B computes M = H(Msg,Γ) ∈ Zp by checking the list
of its random oracle queries and aborts if M = M†. Else, B constructs the vec-
tor ~Y = (y1, . . . , yN )
> whose coordinates are the coefficients of the polynomial
PS(Z) which is obtained following Expression (3.2), by augmenting S with n−s
dummy signers. Recall that B has to generate a signature of the form
σ1 = g
α
1 ·
(
h0 ·
N∏
i=1
hyii
)r · (uM0 · u1)z˜, σ2 = gr1, σ3 = gz˜1 , (3.6)
for some r, z˜ ← Zp. To this end, B uses the usual technique (which dates back
to [21]) consisting in implicitly defining z˜ = z +
γN · δ0
t0 · (M −M†) , for a randomly
chosen z ← Zp, and computing
σ1 =
(
uM0 · u1
)z · z t1δ0t0(M−M†)N · (h0 · N∏
i=1
hyii
)r
,
σ2 = g
r
1, σ3 = g
z
1 · z
δ0
t0·(M−M†)
N ,
for a random r ← Zp. Since α is implicitly defined as α = γN+1 · δ0, the above
triple is easily seen to have the required distribution (3.6).
Forgery: The adversary eventually outputs a forgery σ? = (σ?1 , σ
?
2 , σ
?
3) for
some message Msg? and the target access policy Γ? = (s?, S?). At this step, B
computes M† = H(Msg?,Γ?) by checking its list of oracle queries. It aborts if
it holds that either:
1. The hash value M? = H(Msg?,Γ?) is not equal to M†;
2. F made a signing query (Msg,Γ) such that (Msg,Γ) 6= (Msg?,Γ?) and
H(Msg,Γ) = H(Msg?,Γ?).
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Case 2 cannot occur under the assumption that H is collision-resistant. Condi-
tioned on Case 2 not occurring, the complementary event of Case 1 occurs with
probability 1/qH .
Assuming the adversary B does not abort, it can compute zN+1 = gγ
N+1
1
as follows. Since the vector ~Y = (y1, . . . , yN )
> derived from Γ? is such that
f0 ·
∏N
i=1 f
yi
i = g
θ0+〈~θ,~Y 〉
2 , v
M
0 · v1 = vM
†
0 · v1 = gt12 , and σ? satisfies Equation
(3.4), we must have
e(g1, g2)
(γN+1)·δ0 =
e(σ?1 , g2)
e(σ?2 , g
θ0+〈~θ,~Y 〉
2 ) · e(σ?3 , gt12 )
.
This implies that zN+1 =
(
σ?1
(σ?2 )
θ0+〈~θ,~Y 〉·(σ?3 )t1
)1/δ0
, which is computable by B.
3.3.5 Choice of parameters for implementation
We discuss here how to choose parameters for the above IBDT signature scheme
in the context of its application to group discounts and, more specifically, high-
occupancy vehicle toll discounts:
• Choice of λ: this is just the security parameter, which should specify the
size of the bilinear group (see recommendations in [69]).
• Choice of n: this corresponds to the maximum number of group members.
In the case of HOVs, it would be the maximum number of passengers that
can travel in a car (that is, typically n is around 9 or 10).
• Each identity-based public key used in the IBDT signature scheme is de-
rived from a group of η digits in the national identity card (or another
identifier) of a user id. As discussed in Section 3.4 below, η is a parameter
that trades off accomodating larger values of n against anonymity (the
larger η, the larger n can be, but the less anonymity).
As we announced, we will make a particular use of an IBDT signature
scheme, linked to a special key management which will provide anonymity and
which is explained in the next section. We begin by splitting the identity space
ID into ` disjoint subspaces whose respective elements are clearly recognizable
as belonging to a certain subspace only, i.e. ID = ID1 ∪ . . . ∪ ID`, where `
is a functionality and anonymity parameter (related to the length of the users’
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identifiers, see Section 3.4), and IDj is the subspace associated to the j-th
group of η digits in the users’ identifiers, for j = 1, . . . , `. In our use of an
IBDT scheme for the group discount application, every user id receives the se-
cret keys associated with a vector of identity-based public keys {ikid1 , . . . , ikid` },
with ikidj ∈ IDj , unlike the straightforward approach of previous sections in
which a user was assigned a single identity-based public key denoted just id
like the user’s identifier. Thus, in our protocol, to sign a message on behalf of
s users id1, . . . , ids, they must all agree on an index j in {1, . . . , `} and sign
using ikid1j , . . . , ik
ids
j (the whole discussion on how to do this can be found in
Section 3.4 below). As a consequence, the IBDT has to be tuned to fit this
special key management structure. The modification is straightforward and is
fully discussed below.
Given a user id who requests the secret keys for a set of identity-based public
keys IKid = {ikid1 , . . . , ikid` }, the secret keys that he receives are essentially just
` secret keys of the original IBDT scheme, except that the keys are randomized
to make sure that the secret key for identity-based public key ikidj , for any
j = 1, . . . , ` can only be used with secret keys for the j-th identity-based public
keys of other users. A straightforward application of this idea would mean that
each user receives a secret key which is ` times the size of a single IBDT key.
To increase efficiency, some parts of the keys are reused. More specifically,
below we give a detailed account on how to adapt the IBDT scheme to our key
management design when ` > 1.
Note that we implicitly assume that, for all j 6= j′, the values of the j-th
and the j′-th component of vector IKid are taken from two disjoint and easily
recognizable sets. This is the case for instance if the j-th component of IKid is
of the form j||dj , as we suggested.
I Setup (1λ, ID, n,`): The only change here is that now identities are `-
dimensional vectors of elements in [p−1/2], denoted by IDid, and that the
master secret key is msk = (gα1 , Q1, . . . , Q`), where Qi[X] are polynomials
in Zp[X] of degree n − 1 chosen uniformly independently and uniformly
at random subject to Qi(0) = α. Note that mpk is unchanged.
I Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, IKid): This algorithm generates a key com-
ponent SKid := ({Did,1,k}`k=1, Did,2,Kid,1, . . . , Kid,N−1, {{Did,j,1,k}`k=1,
Did,j,2,Kid,j,1, . . . ,Kid,j,N−1}j=1...n−1) by picking fresh random elements
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rid, rid,1, . . . , rid,n−1 ← Zp and setting:
{Did,1,k = gQk(id)1 · hrid0 }`k=1,
Did,2 = g
rid
1 ,{
Kid,i =
(
h−id
i
1 · hi+1
)rid}
i=1,...,N−1
,{
{Did,j,1,k = gQk(dj)1 · hrid,j0 }`k=1, Did,j,2 = grid,j1 ,{
Kid,j,i =
(
h
−dij
1 · hi+1
)rid,j}
i=1,...,N−1
}
j=1,...,n−1
. (3.7)
Algorithm Sign is the same as specified in Section 3.3.3 except that messages are
signed not for the whole vector of identity-based public keys IKid = {ikid1 , . . . ,
ikid` } but for one single component ikidj . Similarly, algorithm Comb is the same
as in the original IBDT, except that it takes as input a set of signatures for
some identities ikid1j1 , . . . , ik
ids
js
and combines them in a single signature in case
j1 = . . . = js and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Note that in terms of efficiency, with respect to the original IBDT scheme,
users have to store 2(`−1) additional group elements as part as their secret key.
The size of the public parameters and the cost of the signing and combining
algorithms are unchanged.
The security proof of the original IBDT scheme can be trivially modified
to prove the security of this scheme. Indeed, it suffices to define in the new
proof Q1[X] := Q[X] and the rest of the polynomials Qj [X] as Qj := Q1 +Rj ,
for some polynomial Rj chosen uniformly at random subject to Rj(0) = 0.
Since adversary B can choose the polynomials Rj on his own, it is obvious
that B can simulate the secret keys for any vector of identity-based public keys
IKid = {ikid1 , . . . , ikid` } for all IKid not in the challenge set S∗ in the same way
B simulated the secret keys for all identities not in S∗ in the original IBDT
proof.
3.4 Key management
Our accreditation mechanism provides anonymity to group members by employ-
ing specially crafted key generation and management protocols. Leaning on the
properties of identity-based cryptography, that is, the possibility to use arbitrary
strings as public keys, we develop a key generation and management protocol
which renders users indistinguishable from many other users when signing with
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an IBDT signature scheme. The amount of users from whom any single user is
indistinguishable is determined by a system parameter η, described below.
In our protocol, every user idi is given an ordered list of identity-based
public keys IKidi that depends on a unique identifier of the user, such as her
national identity card number, her phone number, the IMEI (international mo-
bile equipment identity) of her mobile device or a combination of any of them.
This identifier is denoted as idi = d
i
kd
i
k−1 . . . d
i
1 of length k, where d
i
j is the j-th
last digit of idi and typically ranges from 0 to 9.
The procedure to generate a list of identity-based public keys associated to
an identifier idi is as follows: first, choose a value ` < k and take the ` last digits
of idi. Then for every digit d
i
1, . . . , d
i
`, build an identity-based public key ik
dij
j
as an encoding of the digit dij and the position it occupies in idi, for example
ik
dij
j = j || dij , where || is the concatenation operation. This results in a vector of
identity-based public keys
IKidi =
{
ik
di1
1 , . . . , ik
di`
`
}
.
To illustrate this process, imagine idi = 12345678 and ` = 4. The resulting
public key list would be IKidi = {18, 27, 36, 45} .
Once the identities are generated, the certification authority (or any other
trusted entity) generates and sends to each user idi the secret keys corresponding
to the set of identity-based public keys IKidi generated with a modification of
the IBDT scheme explained in Section 3.3.5.
To prove the number of members in a group, the members will choose a
common integer j ∈ {1, . . . , `} so that the j-th digits in their identifiers (and
hence their j-th identity-based public keys) are different for all of them. Then
they will use the IBDT signature scheme, using the corresponding secret keys,
to certify the size of their group.
Assuming that the values of the digits range from 0 to 9, this would provide
anonymity to each of the users, since on average 10% of people will share a
certain value of the j-th digit for some value of j.
This approach limits the size of the groups that can be certified with our
method to a maximum of 10, since it is impossible for more than 10 users to
find an index j so that all digits in the j-th position are different. Moreover,
intuition tells us that the closer the size of the group to this maximum size,
the more difficult it becomes to find a value of j. Additionally, by the birthday
paradox, the probability of finding colliding digits will be high even for group
sizes far from the maximum size. The probability that our protocol fails depends
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on the number of keys each user is given, `, and the size of the group n; more
specifically, for n ≤ 10:
F (`, n) =
(
1− 10(10− 1) . . . (10− n+ 1)
10n
)`
,
that is very close to 1 for values of n close to 10.
This limitation can be partially solved by assigning η ≥ 2 digits of idi to
each of the ` public keys, instead of just one digit. By doing this, the maximum
value for the size of the groups becomes 10η, and the probability of failure, for
values of n ≤ 10η, is
F (`, n, η) =
(
1− 10
η(10η − 1) . . . (10η − n+ 1)
10ηn
)`
.
However, the price to be paid for choosing a larger η is a loss of anonymity,
since, if more digits are associated to each identity-based public key, less users
share that public key. For example, for η = 2 a user would share each of his
identity-based public keys with only 1% of the total number of users.
The parameters ` and η, which impact on the number of keys each user
stores and the anonymity level of users, are system parameters that the service
provider can adjust as required.
We note that, with our scheme, two users id1, id2 can pool the sets of se-
cret keys corresponding to their respective vectors of identity-based public keys
IKid1 and IKid2 to create the secret keys corresponding to a vector of identity-
based public keys IKid3 . To do this, they only need to combine the secret keys
corresponding to some of the identities of id1 and some of the identities of id2.
However, this does not allow id1 and id2 to prove that at least three users have
collaborated to create a signature, because there is no index j such that the j-th
identity-based public key in IKid1 , IKid2 and IKid3 takes more than two dif-
ferent values. More generally, if t users pool their sets of secret keys to fabricate
a t+ 1-th vector of identity-based public keys, they cannot prove that they are
at least t+1 users, because there is no index j such that the j-th identity-based
public key in the t+1 vectors takes more than t different values. Hence, this key
pooling attack is harmless for the purpose of our system, because it does not
allow any group of users to prove that they are more people than they actually
are.
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3.5 Method to accredit the size of a group
The following elements are needed in order to implement our accreditation
method:
• A smartphone application Appid published by a service provider (SP),
who, after some registration process, also distributes the public parameters
and keys of an IBDT signature scheme Π to each user id. Specifically, the
Appid of user id must provide the following functionalities:
– to compute signatures with Π on behalf of id;
– to compute ciphertexts with a public-key encryption scheme Π′ se-
lected by SP, under SP’s public key pkSP ;
– to be able to run in master or slave mode, which affects the role Appid
plays in the accreditation protocol;
– to include some certificate that allows checking the validity of pkSP ;
– to be able to interact with the applications of the rest of the group
members and the verifying devices using short-range communication
technologies (specifically NFC with the rest of group members and
Bluetooth with the verifying device).
• Prepaid scratch cards available at stores, to be used for payment. Each
card includes a code Pay.Code that the SP associates with an account
holding a fixed credit specified by the card denomination.
• Verifying devices located at suitable places in SP’s infrastructures that
can:
– verify signatures with Π;
– hold SP’s certificates as well as the keys needed to decrypt ciphertexts
produced with Π′ under pkSP ;
– communicate within short range with the users’ devices.
• A procedure to thwart or punish system misuse.
Next, we describe the accreditation protocol:
Protocol 1. System set-up protocol.
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1. SP publishes the service terms and conditions, along with the registration
procedure, which describes what user identifier is to be used as id and the
values for ` and η.
2. SP computes the public parameters pms, the master public key mpk and the
master secret key msk of an IBDT signature scheme Π as per Algorithm
IBDT.Setup. SP makes pms and mpk available.
3. SP generates the parameters of a public-key encryption scheme Π′ and
makes them publicly available.
Protocol 2. Registration protocol.
1. A user with identifier id authenticates to the service provider, face-to-face
or otherwise. id is given a PIN code pinid.
2. SP associates a vector of public keys of Π, say IKid, with id, in the way
explained in Section 3.4.
3. SP computes the secret keys associated to IKid as per Algorithm IBDT.
Keygen:
SKid =
(
sk
did1
1 , . . . , sk
did`
`
)
.
4. id downloads the smartphone app Appid and, using pinid, completes the
registration and obtains the system parameters and keys, as well as the
public key pkSP .
Protocol 3. Credit purchase.
1. A user buys a prepaid scratch card for the system at a store.
2. The card contains a code Pay.Code to be introduced in the smartphone app.
Protocol 4. Group set-up protocol.
1. Some user id∗ in the group of users {id1, . . . , idt} who want to use the
service takes the leading role. id∗ will be responsible for communicating
with the verifying device. id∗ sets his smartphone application to run in
master mode and the other users in the group set their smartphones to
run as slaves.
2. The users agree on an index j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} such that the value of the
j-th identity-based public key in their respective vectors IKid1 , . . . , IKidt
is different for every user. Let these t different public keys be ik
d1j
j , . . . , ik
dtj
j .
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Protocol 5. Group size accreditation protocol.
1. The master user id∗’s device detects some verifying device and establishes
a secure communication channel (the system may require the verifying
device to authenticate to the user).
2. The verifying device sends to the master user id∗ a unique time-stamped
ticket T that may include a description of the service conditions and op-
tions.
3. The master user id∗ distributes the ticket T along with the group param-
eters, namely the policy Γ (decided in the group set-up protocol) to the
group members.
4. Each user idi runs Algorithm IBDT.Sign to compute a partial signature
with Π under his secret key sk
dij
j on message
Msg =
〈
T || ikd
1
j
j || . . . || ik
dtj
j
〉
,
for the threshold predicate Γ = (t, {ikd
1
j
j , . . . , ik
dtj
j }). idi sends the resulting
partial signature σi to id
∗.
5. After receiving (σ1, . . . , σt), id
∗ runs Algorithm IBDT.Comb to combine
these partial signatures and output a final signature σ on behalf of id1, . . . ,
idt. id
∗ sends
Msg′ = 〈Msg, σ〉
to the verifying device.
6. The verifying device checks the signature validity by running
IBDT.Verify(Msg, σ, ik
d1j
j || . . . ||ik
dtj
j , t).
Note that this signature will only be valid if all users id1, . . . , idt have
collaborated to compute it, and thus it proves that the group consists of
at least t users. If the signature turns out to be invalid, the group will be
punished in a way dependent on the particular application, e.g. by being
denied access, being denied a group discount, etc. Otherwise, the service
provider serves the group of users and tells the group the amount amountt
they have to pay depending on the group size.
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Figure 3.1: Group size accreditation protocol
Protocol 6. Payment.
1. Each group member id in the (sub)set P of those who are willing to con-
tribute paying the bill sends via Bluetooth to the verifying device his pay-
ment code encrypted under the public key of SP:
Cid = EncpkSP (T||Pay.Codeid),
where Pay.Codeid is the code that id obtained from his prepaid scratch card
and Enc is the public-key encryption algorithm of scheme Π′.
2. The verifying device obtains the payment codes of the users who will pay
by decrypting the ciphertexts {Cid : id ∈ P}; then, the verifying device
deducts the amount amountt divided by |P | (number of users who are col-
laborating in the payment) from the accounts associated with the received
payment codes.
3.6 Security and privacy
Our mechanism offers security and privacy by design:
• As stated by Theorem 1, the chosen IBDT scheme is selective-predicate
and adaptive-message unforgeable. In plain words, for any t ≥ 2, no
group of less than t buyers can cheat the service provider by producing a
threshold signature with threshold t.
46
3.6. SECURITY AND PRIVACY
• During the protocol execution, the service provider learns only the pseudo-
nyms and the number of group members. Buyers preserve their anonymity
within those buyers that share the same public key by virtue of the key
management scheme described in Section 3.4. For instance, if each public
key is associated with a combination of η decimal digits of the users’
unique identifiers, then on average this public key is shared by a fraction
10−η × 100% of the total number of users.
• By using a fully anonymous payment system, the anonymity level achieved
by key management, whatever it is, is preserved after payment. In our
case, payment anonymity is ensured by preventing Pay.Code from being
linkable to any specific buyer. This can be achieved, for example, if the
scratch card containing the Pay.Code is purchased using cash.
On checking physical closeness
In some applications, the verifier wants to check not only that the group consists
of t or more members, but also that the members are physically close. For
example, this is the case in HOV toll discounts, where all group members should
be in the same car. The most viable solutions to check proximity are technology-
based. One option is for the verifying device to check that at least t user devices
(say smartphones) are Bluetooth-visible within a, say, 5 m range (note that in
general seeing Bluetooth identifiers does not leak the identities of the device
owners). Alternatively (or in addition), if trust can be placed on the app running
the protocol in each user’s smartphone, one can rely on the app checking that it
is actually running in a real smartphone (this is actually checked by most apps)
and that the smartphone is located near the verifying device (e.g. because it
sees the verifying device). Other, more sophisticated security measures can
be imagined to prove nearness, but the typical amount that can be earned by
cheating the system (group discounts at tolls or museums) is too small to require
that security level.
On cheating with multiple devices per user
If one or more group members carry multiple devices, the group could cheat by
proving a size greater than its actual size. However, as said above, the typical
amount that is at stake in a transaction of our protocol is small (a group dis-
count, for example). Hence, maintaining and regularly carrying several smart-
phones to win that amount is probably not worth it. Also, if the registration
process and key generation are based on the user’s national ID card or social
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security number (rather than on the phone number), a user cannot obtain more
than one set of keys.
3.7 Performance analysis
Our proposed mechanism is designed to be executed by heterogeneous devices,
such as servers, dedicated verifiers and users’ smartphones. For this reason,
and keeping in mind that the users’ devices may be limited in computing power
and often reliant on batteries, it is important that the computations of the
underlying IBDT signature scheme be as fast as possible.
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of the complexity of the
underlying IBDT signature scheme. We assess complexity by counting the
number of point multiplications, point exponentiations and pairings, which are
the costliest operations.
Table 3.1 shows the number of operations for each algorithm in the IBDT
signature scheme. Operation counts are given in terms of the maximum number
n of possible signature participants and the size t of the signing group. Like
said above, t ≤ n.
Table 3.1: Operations required per algorithm. Mul stands for multiplications
and Exp for exponentiations.
Mul G1 Mul G2 Exp G1 Exp G2 Pairings
Setup 0 0 n+ 5 n+ 4 1
Keygen n2 + n 0 n2 + 3n 0 0
Sign 2n+ 7 0 2n+ 6 0 0
Comb n2 +(3− t)n+2 0 n2 + (2− t)n+ t 0 0
Verify 0 n+ 3 0 n+ 2 3
Admittedly, the Sign and Comb algorithms, which are to be run in the users’
smartphones, seem to require a high number of operations. This is certainly a
potential drawback, because Sign and Comb need to be executed in every group
accreditation attempt by the user’s smartphones, whose computing power and
energy are likely to be limited. Besides, lengthy smartphone computations may
be outright unaffordable in some application settings: take for example a very
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busy toll road, where toll stations become congested if takes too long for cars to
pay. In contrast, the amount of computation is not a critical issue for the rest
of the algorithms, since they will be run less frequently, or with no real-time
constraints. Moreover, Setup, Keygen and Verify are typically run on devices
with more resources than the users’ devices.
We propose to precompute as many parts of the Sign and Comb algorithms
as possible, and provide alternative descriptions for both of these algorithms.
The Sign algorithm is a probabilistic protocol; hence, not all of its operations
can be precomputed. However, most operations depend on static values, e.g.
keys and threshold policies Γ. Threshold policies contain the number of signers
that will participate in a signature and their public keys. If we can assume that
groups of users are relatively stable, i.e. if users generally use services together
with the same group members or at least with a limited set of different groups,
we can precompute operations that only depend on static values and threshold
policies. Examples of values that could be precomputed are those in Expressions
(3.2) and (3.3), among others.
The Comb algorithm depends on the output of the execution of Sign by all
group members, but it is a deterministic algorithm, and most of its operations
depend on the user’s private key, the master public key, the public parameters,
or the threshold policies, which are all known in advance. Therefore, by the
same assumption as before, we can precompute some of the operations.
The precomputation approach splits Sign and Comb into two phases each,
one for precomputing values, that can be executed during the group set-up pro-
tocol (Protocol 4), and a second phase executed during the group size accredi-
tation protocol (Protocol 5) itself. The complexity of the resulting algorithms
is presented in Table 3.2, where SignPrecomputation and CombPrecomputation
are the respective precomputation phases, and FastSign and FastComb are the
respective interactive phases run during Protocol 5.
3.8 Experimental results
We have written a Java library implementing the IBDT signature scheme to
obtain experimental execution times. We have also implemented the entire
accreditation method and tested it in a real scenario.
Performance tests have been run on an Ubuntu 15.04 x64 system with an
Intel Core i7-3517U @ 1.90GHz and 8GB of DDR3 memory @ 1600MHz. The
signature scheme has been implemented in Java7, using the java-7-openjdk-
i386 environment and the java Pairing-Based Cryptography library [36]. Our
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Table 3.2: Splitting of operations when precomputing the Sign and Comb algo-
rithms. Mul stands for multiplications and Exp for exponentiations.
Mul G1 Exp G1 Pairings
SignPrecomputation 2n+ 3 2n+ 1 0
FastSign 4 5 0
CombPrecomputation n2 + (3− t)n− 3t n2 + (2− t)n− 2t 0
FastComb 3t+ 2 3t 0
choice of elliptic curve was a Type F curve, with |r| = 160 bits, which makes
elements in Z?q 160 bits long, elements in G1 320 bits long and elements in G2
640 bits long. This should be enough to defeat attacks to the discrete logarithm
problem, while keeping keys as short and operations as efficient as possible. The
description of curve types and recommendations on how to choose curves and
related parameters can be found in [69].
The rest of this section shows and discusses the execution times of our ac-
creditation method, considering the times obtained with and without precom-
putation. We use the same notation for each of the algorithms as in the previ-
ous section, dividing the Sign and Comb algorithms into two-phase algorithms
(SignPrecomputation, FastSign) and (CombPrecomputation, FastComb), respec-
tively. Moreover, the protocol has been tested for multiple values of n and
t.
Execution times of the algorithms, without precomputation, are shown in
Figure 3.2. Setup times range between 650 and 1100 milliseconds, increasing lin-
early with n, as expected from the theoretical analysis conducted in the previous
section. The value of t has no effect in the execution time of this algorithm.
The generation of the curve parameters takes a constant time of approximately
300 ms. The Keygen algorithm is again independent from the value of t and
grows polynomially with n. This is the expected behavior, as the size of the
signing group does not influence the key generation procedure. Actually, this is
one of the advantages of using a dynamic threshold scheme. The Sign algorithm
shows again a behavior consistent with the theoretical analysis performed in
the previous section, and does not depend on the size t of the group. This may
sound counterintuitive, but the group size affects the Comb algorithm, rather
than Sign. Finally, the Verify algorithm execution times are highly dominated
by the 3 pairing operations it has to compute.
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Figure 3.2: Execution times of the protocol without precomputation for different
values of n and t
Figure 3.3 shows the execution times of the Sign and Comb algorithms when
precomputation is performed. Thus, these algorithms are shown split as (Sign-
Precomputation, FastSign) and (CombPrecomputation, FastComb).
Figure 3.3: Execution times of the protocol with precomputation for different
values of n and t
It is worth noting that the sum of the execution times of SignPrecomputation
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and FastSign is very similar to the execution time of Sign. This shows that per-
formance is at least as good as when not splitting operations. Moreover, the
FastSign algorithm has a constant and very small execution time of around 10
ms. This demonstrates that the addition of precomputation phases is very ef-
fective to speed up the interactive phase of our method. Although the execution
times of SignPrecomputation are a bit higher, this is of no concern, because this
algorithm can be executed off-line and/or as a background process when the
group is formed.
In the case of the CombPrecomputation and FastComb, we see that the pre-
computation phase is not as beneficial. Although the total execution time is still
the same as the one of the original Comb algorithm, and thus precomputation
does not penalize performance, the execution times are more evenly divided be-
tween the precomputation phase and the interactive phase. This could somehow
be expected, as FastComb has more dependencies than FastSign: as predicted in
Section 3.7 and Table 3.2, it depends on t (the larger t, the longer it takes). On
the other hand, CombPrecomputation depends on n− t, rather than separately
on n and t; the larger n− t, the longer CombPrecomputation takes. The above
dependencies are further explored in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Comb times as a function of (n− t)
3.9 High-occupancy vehicles use case
In order to assess the applicability of our proposed mechanism, we carried out
a pilot experiment related to HOVs. Our pilot application allows HOVs to
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find and use parking spots especially designated for them and get reduced fees
depending on the number of car passengers. These parking spots for HOVs are
located in parking lots guarded by an automatic barrier.
The pilot is composed of:
• a passenger Android application to be run by the smartphone of each car
passenger with the functionalities described in Section 3.5;
• a verifier application that runs in the automatic barrier of the parking lot.
We take the telephone number as the passenger identifier and we set the pro-
tocol parameters to η = 1 and n = 5, as we want to accredit groups ranging
from 2 to 5 passengers in each car. The communication between passenger ap-
plications, needed to compute IBDT signatures, is performed using NFC while
the communication between the leading passenger application and the verifier
application running in the barrier is performed using Bluetooth only.
Figure 3.9 shows screenshots taken from the passenger application. In the
left-hand side screenshot, the application shows to the passenger where free
HOV parking spots can be found within a nearby parking lot. In the central
screenshot, the leading passenger application chooses a slot and starts the group
size accreditation protocol at the parking lot barrier. In the right-hand side
screenshot, after combining partial signatures of two passengers (Alberto and
Test), a group size of two passengers is accredited to the barrier verifier.
The pilot includes access control to the parking lot and the accreditation
mechanism. However, while it calculates the parking fee according to the num-
ber of passengers, at the moment no specific payment system is embedded in
the pilot. Payment will be incorporated in case of commercial deployment.
3.10 Summary
We have presented a mechanism to accredit the size of a group (for example,
in order to obtain a group discount) that is compatible with the anonymity of
its members and with dynamic group formation. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first mechanism that allows cryptographically proving the number
of members of a group in an anonymous way and without the need of dedi-
cated hardware. Our protocol suite is built upon a new cryptographic primitive
called IBDT signature scheme, a novel key generation and management solu-
tion, short-range communication technologies and, in case payment is needed,
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Figure 3.5: HOV pilot passenger application. Left, locating free HOV spaces.
Center, booking a space and starting group size accreditation. Right, completing
accreditation of a group of two passengers.
anonymous payment mechanisms. The reported complexity analysis and sim-
ulations, as well as the pilot experiment we have deployed in a real scenario,
show that our system is usable in practice.
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Loyalty Programs
4.1 Introduction
Any vendor is extremely interested in establishing lasting relationships with
consumers. For some companies (like public utilities or banks) long relation-
ships are the rule rather than the exception, whereas for other companies (like
retailers) consumer loyalty is much harder to obtain without specific incentives.
Loyalty programs are instruments whereby vendors try to provide such incen-
tives. In a loyalty program, the vendor pursues two main goals: i) to encourage
the consumer to make more purchases in the future (returning customer); ii)
to allow the vendor to profile the consumer in view of conducting market re-
search and segmentation (profiled customer). In order to lure consumers into a
loyalty program, the vendor offers them rewards, typically loyalty points that
consumers can later exchange for discounts, gifts or other benefits offered by
the vendor. Normally, enrollment to loyalty programs involves some kind of
registration procedure, in which customers fill out a form with their personal
information and are granted a loyalty card, be it a physical card (magnetic
stripe or smartcard) or a smartphone application.
Market analysis and customer segmentation are carried out by building pro-
files of individual customers based on their personal information, which cus-
tomers supply to the vendor during enrollment to the loyalty program, and their
purchase records, collected every time customers present their loyalty cards. The
profiles thus assembled are used in marketing actions, such as market studies
and targeted advertising.
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Although loyalty programs have become widespread, they are experiencing
a loss of active participants and they have been criticized by business experts
and consumer associations. Criticism is mainly due to privacy issues, because it
is not always clear whether the benefits vendors offer in their loyalty programs
are worth the loss of consumer privacy caused by profiling [78, 91, 1, 45].
Loyalty programs can offer clear advantages to both vendors and consumers,
like returning customers and special discounts, respectively. However, privacy
concerns regarding buyer profiling affect more and more the acceptance of such
programs, as the public awareness on the dangers of personal information dis-
closure is increasing.
4.1.1 Contributions
In this Chapter we propose a protocol for privacy-aware loyalty programs that
allows vendors and consumers to enjoy the benefits of loyalty, while preserving
the anonymity of consumers and empowering them to decide how accurately
they reveal their profile to the vendor. In order to encourage customers not
just to return but also to disclose more of their profile, the vendor must offer
additional rewards to consumers. Thus, vendors pay consumers for their private
information. On the other hand, consumers become aware of how much their
personal data are worth to vendors, and they can decide to what extent they
are ready to reveal such data in exchange for what benefits.
To empower consumers as described above, we provide them with a mecha-
nism that allows them to profile themselves, generalize their profiles and submit
these generalized profiles to the vendor in an anonymous way. There are some
technical challenges to be overcome:
• The proposed mechanism should prevent vendors from linking the gener-
alized profiles to the identity of buyers, to particular transactions or to
particular loyalty points submitted for redemption.
• To prevent straightforward profiling by the vendor, payment should be
anonymous. In online stores, to completely achieve anonymity, the buyers
should use some kind of anonymous payment system, such as Bitcoin [72],
Zerocoin [71], some other form of electronic cash [32], or simply scratch
cards with prepaid credit anonymously bought, say, at a newsstand. In
physical stores, it would be enough to pay with cash.
• Consumers should not be able to leverage their anonymity to reveal forged
profiles to the vendor, which would earn them rewards without actually
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revealing anything on their real purchase pattern.
Our proposed mechanism, thus, needs to take care of the two main aspects
of loyalty programs. First, it has to provide a way to obtain and submit loyalty
points in an anonymous and unlinkable way; that is, a customer should be
able to submit a particular loyalty point to a vendor, but the vendor should
not be able to link that particular loyalty point to the transaction in which it
was issued. Second, our mechanism must allow customers to build their own
generalized profiles from their respective purchase histories, but it must prevent
customers from forging false profiles and vendors from linking the generalized
profiles to particular customers. We will show later that these two aspects can
be tackled in a similar way.
The contributions in this Chapter have been published in [13, 14].
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly recalls past works
on this subject. Section 4.3 starts recalling the functionalities of a conventional
loyalty program; then it formalizes the notion of privacy-aware loyalty program;
after that, it goes on to present the security and functionality requirements that
our new privacy-aware protocol suite should satisfy. In Section 4.4, we explain
how we use generalization of purchase receipts while preventing the existence
of several generalizations of each purchase receipt from being abused to submit
the receipt more than once to get loyalty points. In Section 4.5 we introduce
anonymous tokens with controlled linkability based on partially blind signatures.
In Section 4.6 we present our privacy-aware loyalty program protocol suite, that
builds on the tools described in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. In Section 4.7 we analyze
the computational complexity and the security of the suite. In Section 4.8 we
present experimental results, including an implementation on smartphones and
an analysis of deployability in physical and online stores. Section 4.9 presents
an extension of our construction that guarantees untransferability of purchase
receipts and/or loyalty points. Finally, Section 4.10 summarizes conclusions.
4.2 Related work on loyalty programs
Our method aims to offer all the functionalities of loyalty programs; that is, to
allow vendors to reward returning customers with loyalty points and to profile
returning customers based on their purchase histories. The novelty is that our
scheme empowers customers with the ability to decide how accurately they
disclose their purchase histories to vendors.
A simple and perhaps the most widespread approach to implement a loyalty
program is to have a centralized server, owned and operated by some vendor
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V, that stores the information on the program participants. This information
includes all the personal data the participants gave to the vendor when they
enrolled to the program, their balance of loyalty points, and their history of
purchases. Each customer is given a loyalty card which contains the identifier
of her record in the server’s database. Each time a customer buys at a store and
presents her loyalty card, her record in the server is updated, by adding to it
the items she bought and modifying her balance of loyalty points if needed. In
this way, all transactions by each customer can be linked to each other using the
customer’s identifier. Even if the customer provided false information when she
enrolled to the loyalty program, all of her transactions would be linked anyway.
Hence, discovering the customer’s identity in one individual transaction (e.g.
through the credit or debit card used for payment) would allow linking her
entire profile to her real identity.
If control over profiling and purchase histories is to be left to customers,
a centralized approach does not seem a good solution. Moreover, we should
also ensure that individual transactions cannot be linked to each other unless
desired by the customer. To do so, we will let each customer manage locally
and anonymously her own balance of loyalty points and history of purchases.
To the best of our knowledge, no work on privacy-preserving loyalty pro-
grams other than ours has been published to this date. However, if we focus on
privacy-preserving customer profiling, there are certainly other works in which
a service provider collects information on her user base in a privacy-preserving
way. For example, the authors from [79] propose a scheme to collect location-
based aggregate statistics. In that contribution, drivers provide location-based
information (e.g. their speed), to a centralized server that can aggregate this
information. The information they provide is always encrypted, using some ho-
momorphic encryption scheme. The data they deal with is only numeric, and
the computations that can be done are defined beforehand (they depend on the
homomorphic encryption scheme in use). In our contribution, however, data
do not need to be numeric, and we protect them by generalization rather than
encryption; note that, unlike homomorphic encryption, generalization does not
restrict computations that can be carried out on the protected data.
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4.3 Definition of privacy-preserving loyalty pro-
grams
Our proposed mechanism follows the decentralized approach. To allow local
management of loyalty points and purchase receipts by the customer, we treat
points and receipts as anonymous electronic cash, in the sense that: i) they are
one-time certified tokens of information; ii) they are issued by vendors and they
can only be redeemed at the same vendor who issued them, but issued tokens
and redeemed tokens should remain unlinkable. However, unlike in anonymous
electronic cash schemes, in our scheme the entity issuing certified tokens of in-
formation is not a trusted third party: indeed, the issuer in our scheme is the
vendor, and placing complete trust in the vendor would allow him to profile the
users. Moreover, the concrete implementation of the loyalty program should dis-
courage customers from transferring loyalty points and purchase receipts among
them. Purchase histories will be built by the vendor from the individual pur-
chase receipts of all products purchased by each customer that the customer
allows the vendor to link together; furthermore, the customer can decide how
generalized/coarsened are the product descriptions in the purchase receipts she
allows the vendor to link to one another.
Definition 14 (Privacy-aware Loyalty Program). A Privacy-aware Loyalty
Program scheme has three participants: a key dealer or certification authority
CA, a vendor V, and a customer C. V keeps a set DB of submitted tokens that
is initially empty. The scheme consists of seven protocols (Setup, VendorSetup,
Enroll, Buy, Submit, Issue, Redeem):
• Setup is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm run by CA in which, on
input a security parameter γ, outputs (and publishes) the system parame-
ters params.
• VendorSetup is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm.
V is certified as a legitimate vendor and obtains params and a key pair
(pkV , skV) from CA.
• Enroll is a protocol run by C whereby C obtains access to the loyalty pro-
gram, typically by registering and obtaining params and pkV .
• Buy is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive protocol run between V
and C. The public inputs of both C and V contain a product name p. The
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private input of C contains a message y, and that of V contains the private
key skV . When the protocol finishes, the private output of C contains either
fail or a list of receipt tokens (Ri)i=1,...,n.
• Submit is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes pkV , a receipt token R
and DB as inputs. Submit outputs either accept if the signature on the
token R is valid and R 6∈ DB or reject otherwise. An accepted submitted
token is thereafter invalidated by adding it to DB.
• Issue is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive protocol run between
V and C. The public inputs of both C and V contain a value c of loyalty
points. The private input of C contains a message y, and that of V contains
a private key skV . When the protocol finishes, the private output of C
contains either fail or a loyalty points token P .
• Redeem is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes pkV and loyalty points
token P and DB as inputs. Redeem outputs either accept if the signature
on the token P is valid and P 6∈ DB or reject otherwise. A redeemed
token is then invalidated by adding it to DB.
4.3.1 Requirements
Definition 15 (Correctness and security). A Privacy-aware Loyalty Program
is considered correct and secure if, given params ← Setup(γ), (pkV , skV) ←
VendorSetup(params), it fulfills the following properties:
• (Correctness) For any product name p, any private input y of C, a private
key skV , and a receipt token R ← Buy(p, y, skV) such that R 6∈ DB, the
execution of Submit(pkV , R,DB) must return accept with overwhelming
probability. Likewise, for any value c, any private input y of C, a pri-
vate key skV , and a loyalty points token P ← Issue(c, y, skV) such that
P 6∈ DB, the execution of Redeem(pkV , P,DB) must return accept with
overwhelming probabiliy.
• (Unforgeability) Receipt tokens R and loyalty points tokens P should be
unforgeable against one-more forgery under chosen-message attacks; that
is, for any integer `, no polynomial adversary A should be able to success-
fully submit `+1 receipt tokens after only ` executions of the Buy protocol,
nor redeem `+ 1 loyalty points tokens after only ` executions of the Issue
protocol.
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• (Anonymity) A vendor V should not be able to link a submitted receipt
token R to the particular execution of the Buy protocol in which the token
was produced. Likewise, V should not be able to link a submitted loyalty
points token P to the particular execution of the Issue protocol in which
the token was produced.
Beyond the above generic security properties, the proposed scheme should
provide the following two security properties related to token management:
• Controlled linkability. A customer C should be able to decide whether a
submitted receipt token R can be linked to other receipt tokens submitted
by the same C to the same vendor V.
• Untransferability. A customer C should not be able to obtain loyalty
points from V by submitting a purchase receipt issued to another customer
C′; transfer of purchase receipts among customers blurs their profiles and
hence is against the vendor’s interests. Note that transfer of purchase
receipts among customers implies that the transferring customer loses the
loyalty points she could get in exchange for that receipt, as submitted
receipt tokens are invalidated. On top of that, the customer who trans-
fers her receipt tokens loses some privacy w.r.t the customer to whom she
transfers them. If losing loyalty points and partially losing one’s privacy
can be assumed sufficient to discourage the transfer of receipts, no spe-
cific countermeasures are needed to ensure untransferability. For the case
where the above assumption does not hold, in Section 4.9 we provide an
extension of our protocol suite to enforce untransferability of both receipt
and loyalty points tokens.
4.4 Generalization of purchase histories
In our protocol, we allow the buyer to choose the level of generalization when
disclosing her purchase history to claim loyalty points; in this way, the buyer
is put in control of her privacy. To that end, the vendor provides the buyer
with receipts for all possible generalizations of each product purchased by the
buyer. However, the protocol must be designed in such a way that the buyer
cannot cheat by using different generalized receipts corresponding to the same
purchased product as if they were receipts of different purchased products, in
order to obtain more loyalty points.
To generalize receipts, a vendor must use a publicly available taxonomy for
the products she offers. This taxonomy T is modeled as a tree, being its root
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node a generic identifier such as Product, and each leaf a specific product in
the set of products P = {p1, . . . , pn} on sale. The inner nodes of the tree are
the subsequent categories to which the products belong: the closer to the leaf
nodes, the more specific categories are.
A generalization function g : T → T returns the parent of a node. Ap-
plying the generalization function m times will be denoted as gm. As an ex-
ample, for the product pi = ”Inception”, its generalizations might be g(pi) =
ActionMovie, g2(pi) = Movie, g
3(pi) = DigitalMedia and g
4(pi) = Product.
For simplicity and ease of implementation, it is desirable that all leaves be at
the same depth, that is, that the path from the root to any leaf be of the same
length.
Customers in our loyalty program protocol will receive a list of purchase
receipts (R1, . . . , Rn) for every product they purchase. This list contains a
receipt for the specific product and receipts for all of its generalizations in the
path up to the root of the taxonomy (generalization path).
Now, when a customer decides to submit her purchase history, she chooses
how much she want to generalize each purchase in her history, from no general-
ization (the actual name of the product) to maximum generalization (just the
top category Product). Then the customer is required to send for each purchase
all the tokens in the purchase generalization path from the chosen generalization
level up to the root of the taxonomy. Following the movie example above, a
customer who wants to submit her purchase generalized to level 2 will submit
the tokens Movie, DigitalMedia and Product.
Forcing customers to send all tokens from the selected generalization level
to the root prevents them from using tokens in the generalization path of a
purchase to falsely claim additional purchases.
4.5 Anonymous tokens with controlled linkabil-
ity
Loyalty points and purchase receipts have requirements in line with those of
anonymous electronic cash and anonymous electronic credentials. These well-
known primitives commonly use blind signatures and/or zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge [28, 29, 32, 73]. We will treat loyalty points and purchase receipts
using a construction that we call anonymous tokens with controlled linkability.
These tokens will be realized by using a partially blind signature construction,
namely the one described in [98], with slight changes introduced in the messages
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to be signed.
4.5.1 Controlled linkability of tokens
The use of partially blind signatures will ensure that a submitted token can-
not be linked to an issued token, nor to the customer to whom it was issued.
However, if vendors are to be allowed to build customer profiles from anony-
mous purchase receipts, there must be a mechanism whereby, if allowed by the
customer, the vendor can verify that several submitted purchase receipt tokens
really correspond to the same (anonymous) customer, even if receipts have been
generalized by the customer prior to submission. Note that if all (ungeneralized)
purchase receipts from the same customer could be linked, customer anonymity
would be problematic in spite of partially blind signatures: a very long and
detailed profile is likely to be unique and goes a long way towards leaking the
customer’s identity.
Thus, we propose a mechanism that allows customers to decide which pur-
chase receipt tokens can be linked together, by employing an additional identifier
as part of the secret message in the partially blind signature. This identifier is
chosen by the customer for each receipt token at the moment of token issuance.
If a customer picks a fresh random number for each issued purchase receipt,
then none of this customer’s receipts will be linkable to each other; however, if
the customer uses the same identifier for a group of purchase receipt tokens at
the time of token issuance, then all of the tokens in this group can be verifiably
linked together by the vendor after they are submitted.
4.5.2 Description
We use a partially blind signature scheme from bilinear pairings presented
in [98]. This scheme satisfies the requirements of correctness, partial blindness
and unforgeability against one-more forgery under chosen-message attacks in
the random oracle model under the inverse CDH assumption in bilinear groups,
and thus it is considered secure. Security proofs can be found in [98]. Addi-
tionally, this scheme produces short signatures, it is computationally efficient
and allows aggregate verification of signed messages bearing the same agreed
public information. Note that we use this partially blind signature scheme as a
black box, and any other secure scheme would fit in our proposed protocol. For
completeness, we describe this scheme below.
Anonymous tokens with controlled linkability are operated in four phases:
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• In the setup phase, a certification agency generates the public parameters
of the partially blind signature scheme.
• In the key generation phase, users (i.e. vendors and customers) get their
key pairs from the certification agency.
• In the issuance phase, a token corresponding to some loyalty points or to
a purchase receipt is generated by a customer, it is signed in a partially
blind way by a vendor and it is returned to the customer.
• Finally, in the verification phase, a customer submits previously generated
tokens to a vendor, who in turn verifies that each token was correctly
signed. If tokens correspond to purchase receipts, the vendor may verify
whether the submitted tokens are linked with each other and/or with
previously submitted tokens.
Setup
This algorithm is executed once by a certification authority to set up the system
parameters. It takes as input a security parameter γ. The algorithm chooses
bilinear groups (G1,G2,GT ) of order q > 2γ , an efficiently computable bilinear
map e : G1×G2 → GT , a generator g ∈ G1 and collision-resistant hash functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G2. The public parameters are params =
{q,G1,G2,GT , e, g,H,H0}.
Key generation
A vendor gets a secret key skV = x ∈R Z∗q and a public key pkV = gx, and
publishes his public key.
Token issuance
A customer wants to obtain from a vendor a token with an agreed public infor-
mation c (this information may specify a number of loyalty points or a purchase
receipt for a certain product). This is an interactive protocol which produces a
partially blind signature on public information c, and a secret message contain-
ing a unique identifier α of the token and a (possibly) unique identifier y. The
protocol is depicted in Figure 4.1 and described next:
1. The customer chooses a value for y, either from a list of previously used
values or by generating a new one uniformly at random from Z∗q .
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2. The customer and the vendor agree on a public string c ∈ {0, 1}∗.
3. The customer chooses random α, r ∈R Z∗q and builds the message m =
(α, y). Then, the customer blinds the message by computing u = H0(c||m)r
and sends u to the vendor.
4. The vendor signs the blinded message by computing v = u(H(c)+skV)
−1
and sends it back to the customer.
5. The customer unblinds the signature by computing σ = vr
−1
. The result-
ing tuple T = 〈c,m, σ〉 is the token.
An execution of this protocol, between a vendor V and a customer C, is
denoted by T = 〈c,m, σ〉 = Issuance(V, C, c, y).
Customer Vendor
y ∈ Z∗q skV
c∈{0,1}∗←−−−−−−−−−→
α, r ∈R Z∗q
m = (α, y)
u = H0(c||m)r u−−−−−−−−−−→
v←−−−−−−−−−− v = u(H(c)+skV)−1
σ = vr
−1
T = 〈c,m, σ〉
Figure 4.1: Issuance protocol
Token verification
The submission and verification of a token is an interactive protocol between a
customer and a vendor. The customer submits the token T = 〈c,m, σ〉 and the
vendor returns accept or reject as a result of the verification. Informally, the
vendor checks that the signature on the token is valid and has been produced
by himself; then, if the value y contained in the message matches the one of a
previously submitted token, the tokens are grouped. The protocol is outlined
in Figure 4.2 and described next:
65
CHAPTER 4. LOYALTY PROGRAMS
1. The customer sends T = 〈c,m, σ〉 to the vendor.
2. The vendor parses the message m as (α, y).
3. The vendor verifies the signature by checking the equality
e(gH(c) · pkV , σ) ?= e(g,H0(c||m)).
If the above equality holds, he checks whether the token has already been
spent (he verifies whether a token with the same α has previously been
submitted). If the verification was successful and the token has not been
spent yet, he marks it as spent and sends an accept message to the cus-
tomer. Otherwise, he sends a reject message to the customer.
4. Finally, the vendor checks whether the identifier value y is the same as
the one in a previously spent token. If yes, he links the new token with
that previous one.
An execution of this protocol involving a customer C, a vendor V and a token
T is denoted as accept/reject = Verification(V, C, T ).
Customer Vendor
T pkV
T=〈c,m,σ〉−−−−−−−−−−→
Parse m as (α, y)
e(gH(c)pkV , σ)
?
= e(g,H0(c||m))
accept/reject←−−−−−−−−−− and token not spent yet.
Link token to previous ones with same y
Figure 4.2: Verification protocol
Aggregate verification
This protocol allows the customer to aggregate signatures of messages bearing
the same public information by just multiplying the resulting signatures. If
there is a list of tokens {T1, . . . , Tn}, where Ti = 〈ci,mi, σi〉, and ci = c for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, a customer can aggregate the partially blind signatures by computing
66
4.6. PRIVACY-AWARE LOYALTY PROGRAM CONSTRUCTION
σagg =
∏n
i=1 σi and submitting Tagg = 〈c, {m1, · · · ,mn}, σagg〉. The vendor can
then verify the validity of the aggregated token by checking the equality
e(gH(c) · pk, σagg) ?= e(g,
∏
H0(c||mi)).
4.6 Privacy-aware loyalty program construction
Our proposed solution for privacy-aware loyalty programs builds on the anony-
mous tokens with controlled linkability we described in Section 4.5 and the
generalization of purchase histories described in Section 4.4. As introduced in
Section 4.3, our construction consists of the following protocols: Setup, Ven-
dorSetup, Enroll, Buy, Submit, Issue and Redeem.
Protocol 1. Setup.
The setup phase is run by a certification authority to generate the public pa-
rameters params of the anonymous token with controlled linkability construction
described in Section 4.5. These parameters are made public to every V offering
loyalty programs and to every C intending to participate in them.
Protocol 2. VendorSetup.
Each vendor V publishes a product taxonomy TV as described in Section 4.4.
Then, V obtains a key pair built as described in the key generation procedure in
Section 4.5. Finally, V publishes his public key.
Protocol 3. Enroll.
Customers obtain the public parameters params and some means to communicate
with the system, namely a smartcard or a smartphone application. Furthermore,
customers enrolling to a loyalty program from a particular vendor obtain the
vendor’s public key and his taxonomy of products. This step is not mandatory,
but it allows customers to check that tokens issued by vendors are valid and
purchase receipt generalizations are correct.
Protocol 4. Buy.
A customer C in a loyalty program offered by a vendor V purchases a product,
either at a physical or online store of V. Note that, in the case of an online
store, C should use additional anonymization measures, such as anonymous In-
ternet surfing, offered for example by Tor networks [3], anonymous shipping
methods [59], and anonymous payment methods (e.g. [72, 32, 71] or simply
prepaid scratch cards). The protocol is as follows:
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1. C sends to V the name pi of the product C wants to buy.
2. C chooses a value y to be used in the token issuance protocol, depending
on her privacy preferences: if she wants the new purchase receipt to be
linkable to previously obtained purchase receipts (linkability is incentivized
as described in Section 4.6.1 below), she will reuse the same y that was
used in those previous receipts; if she does not want this new purchase
receipts to be linkable to previous receipts, she will pick a new random
y ∈ Z∗q .
3. In order to produce purchase receipt tokens for product pi and all its
generalizations, V and C run the interactive protocol Issuance(V,P, pi, y),
Issuance(V,P, g(pi), y), Issuance(V,P, g2(pi), y), etc. up to the root of the
taxonomy. In this way, C obtains as many purchase receipt tokens as the
depth of pi in V’s taxonomy.
Protocol 5. Submit.
At any moment, a customer can submit a list of purchase receipts (or a gener-
alized version of them) to the vendor and obtain loyalty points. To this end, for
each purchased product in her claimed purchase history, the customer sends the
receipt token corresponding to the level of generalization she wishes. In partic-
ular, the customer could use maximum generalization (a receipt just specifying
that she has purchased a “product”) if she does not wish to disclose anything
about what she has bought. In principle, the more generalization is used by
the customer, the less loyalty points she can expect to be given by the vendor,
although the correspondence between token detail and loyalty points depends
on the vendor’s reward policy.
Additionally, as said in Section 4.4, for each product she also submits all
tokens from the selected generalization level up to the root of the taxonomy (to
ensure tokens in the generalization path cannot later be used as independent
purchase receipts). Submission of each token Ti is performed according to the
Verification(V,P, Ri) protocol described in Section 4.5.2.
Protocol 6. Issue.
To issue loyalty points, the vendor builds a message info that encodes an iden-
tifier of the vendor, the number of points this token is worth and an expiration
date. Unlike for purchase receipts, the vendor has no legitimate interest in
linking several tokens containing loyalty points and thus does not incentivize
linkability. Hence, the customer picks a fresh random y for each new loyalty
points token she claims. Then the vendor and the customer run the interactive
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protocol Issuance(V,P, info, y). The generated token contains the loyalty points
issued to the customer.
To ensure that a loyalty points token submitted for redemption cannot be
linked with an issued loyalty points token, the number of loyalty points associated
to a single token should be limited to a small set of possible values, similar to the
limited denominations of bank notes. There is an efficiency toll to be paid for
this caution, as issuing a certain amount of loyalty points can require running
the Issuance protocol several times (several tokens may be needed to reach the
required amount).
Protocol 7. Redeem.
A participant C who wants to redeem a loyalty points token T previously earned
at a vendor V’s in exchange for some benefits runs the interactive protocol
Verification(V,P, P ).
It is possible to simultaneously redeem several loyalty points tokens by using
the aggregation of signatures described in Section 4.5.2.
4.6.1 Incentives related to purchase receipts submission
Vendors can establish strategies to incentivize or discourage certain customer
behaviors:
• To encourage customers to use little or no purchase receipt generalization
(and hence to renounce some of their privacy), the amount of loyalty
points awarded per receipt token should depend on the chosen level of
generalization: more loyalty points awarded to less generalized purchase
receipts.
• If the customer submits unlinkable receipts, she should just get enough
loyalty points to reward her as a returning customer. To encourage cus-
tomers to allow linkage of purchase receipt tokens by the vendor (and
hence customer profiling), a customer should get more loyalty points if
she submits n1 + n2 tokens with the same y value than if she submits
n1 tokens with one y value and then n2 tokens with a different y value
(superlinear reward). Furthermore, the vendor may require that the list of
linkable receipt tokens for which reward is claimed correspond to purchases
made within a certain time window (if linking purchases very distant in
time is uninteresting for profiling).
• Two or more customers might be tempted to share their y values in order
to submit a longer list of linkable receipts and thereafter share the super-
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linear number of loyalty points they would earn. As long the reward is
only slightly superlinear, customer collusion is discouraged if the customer
C who submits the list of linkable tokens is required by V to actually show
all the actual linkable tokens (and not just a reference to them): colluders
different from C may not like to pay the privacy toll of disclosing their
purchase receipts to C.
4.7 Complexity and security analysis
We count here the number of operations required by the Issuance and Verification
protocols described in Section 4.5. These are the two performance-critical proto-
cols, because they are the ones that need to be run every time a token (carrying
a purchase receipt or loyalty points) is to be generated or verified.
The Issuance protocol requires computation by the vendor of 1 exponen-
tiation in G2; also, 1 hash, 1 addition and 1 inversion in Z∗q . The customer
computes 2 exponentiations in G2 and 1 inversion in Z∗q . The Verification pro-
tocol requires computation by the vendor of 1 exponentiation, 1 multiplication
in G1 and 1 hash to G2; also, 1 hash in Z∗q and 2 pairings.
As shown by the computing times given in Section 4.8 below, the above
computations can be done in a very reasonable time, even though the customer’s
computation must be carried out by her smartphone.
Regarding security, we justify here that, the security requirements identified
in Section 4.3.1 are satisfied by the above protocol suite.
• Correctness. If the partially blind signature is correctly computed during
token issuance, the token verification equation will pass, because
e(gH(c) · pk, σ) = e(gH(c)+x, σ)
= e(gH(c)+x, vr
−1
)
= e(gH(c)+x, u(H(c)+x)
−1·r−1)
= e(gH(c)+x, H0(c||m)r·r−1·(H(c)+x)−1)
= e(g,H0(c||m)r·r−1·(H(c)+x)·(H(c)+x)−1)
= e(g,H0(c||m)).
• Unforgeability. Unforgeability against one-time forgery under chosen
message attack of receipt and loyalty points tokens is provided by the
partially blind signature scheme. Note that we use the partially blind
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signature recalled in Section 2.4 as a black box: the Issuance and Verifi-
cation protocols in Section 4.5.2 use partially blind signatures exactly as
described in [98]; hence, the security proof of [98] guarantees the security
of such protocols.
• Anonymity. No information on the user is obtained by a server during
the protocol. Submitted tokens cannot be linked to issued tokens or to the
identity of a requester or prover because of the partial blindness property
of the signature scheme [98]. The justification of partial blindness given
in [98] is briefly recalled below.
• Controlled linkability. When a token is issued, the identifying value y
is only known to the customer who generated the token, due to the par-
tial blindness of the signature. Hence, if two verified tokens contain the
same identifying value y, there are two possibilities: i) both tokens were
generated by the same customer, who reused y to allow the vendor to link
them; ii) the customer who generated one token leaked y to the customer
who generated the other token. If the latter leakage is prevented by tech-
nical means or discouraged with appropriate incentives (see discussion in
Section 4.6.1), then two tokens containing the same y can be linked by the
vendor as corresponding to the same customer.
• Partial blindness. In the blinding phase of the partially blind signature
of [98], r is randomly chosen from Z∗q , and thus u = H0(c||m)r is a random
element of the group G2. The signer receives this random information and
the public information which he already knows. Therefore, no information
about the message is leaked.
The signer is assured that a signature issued by him contains the public
information he has agreed on and this information cannot be removed
from the signature. This is true because if a malicious user could generate
c′ and replace c in the signer’s signature (c,m, σ) to produce a signature
containing c′, then the verification equation would be
e(gH(c
′) · pk, σ) ?= e(g,H0(m||c′)),
or equivalently
e(g(H(c
′)+x)(H(c)+x)−1 , H0(c||m)) ?= e(g,H0(c′||m)). (4.1)
Verification (4.1) would only pass for c′ 6= c ifH(c′) = H(c) andH0(c′||m) =
H0(c||m). This is unlikely, because H, H0 are cryptographic hash func-
tions.
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Finally, due to the randomness introduced during the blinding phase and
the fact that the public information is independent of the message, even
if the same embedded information is used for two messages, the signer
cannot link a signature to the corresponding instance of the signature
issuing protocol.
Hence the partially blind signature scheme of [98] satisfies partial blind-
ness.
4.8 Experimental results
We first report execution times of the various protocols from a prototype im-
plementation. We then analyze the deployability of our protocol in stores, by
means of two case studies: a physical store and an online store.
4.8.1 Execution times from a prototype
We created a testbed to test the performance of the new protocol in a real
environment. Specifically, we wrote a prototype Android customer’s applica-
tion that requests and submits tokens and a vendor application running on a
laptop that issues and verifies tokens. To conform to current loyalty program
implementations, the communication between customer and vendor is done via
NFC using Android’s host-card emulation (HCE). Generalization of purchase
receipts is done using the Walmart Open API [94] which, on input a product
name, returns a list of categories to which the product belongs. The crypto-
graphic protocol was implemented using the jPBC library version 2.0 [36], which
runs both in standard and Android Java without further dependencies.
The testbed configuration and parameters are the following. The laptop
running the vendor application is an Asus S56C with Intel core i7 3517U, 8GB
RAM DDR3 1600Mhz and Ubuntu 15.04. The customer’s application is written
in Java7 (opendjk-1.7). The NFC reader is an ACS ACR122. The smartphone
running the client application is an LG-D821 “Nexus 5” with Android version
5.1, using the ART virtual machine. We generated an asymmetric pairing of
Type III, elements in G1 are 160 bits long, elements in G2 are 512 bits long.
The first step in a purchase receipt issuance is to obtain the generalization
path of the product, from the product name up to the root of the product
taxonomy. Using Walmart Open API requests, the mean response time was
1,534 ms. This step does not affect the issuance of loyalty points, and can be
drastically reduced if caching mechanisms are used or if the product taxonomy
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is stored locally. To test the impact of caching, we implemented a naive caching
mechanism, by which responses from the Walmart Open API are stored in a
hash table together with the corresponding query. When the vendor makes a
query, we check if it was made previously; if yes, we obtain the response from
the hash table instead of sending the query to the online service. The tests have
shown that the time to obtain the generalization path of a previously queried
product name when using caching is reduced to 229 nanoseconds for a universe
of 6,167 different products. Clearly, that is a more than affordable time.
Figure 4.3 shows the execution time for the Issuance protocol, broken down
by the different stages. The measured total time is 659.1 ms, divided in three
stages: blinding, executed by the client application on the customer’s smart-
phone; signing, executed by the vendor on the laptop; and unblinding, again
executed by the application on the smartphone. The three stages take, re-
spectively, 356.4 ms, 19.5 ms and 141.7 ms. The difference between the total
measured time and the sum of the three stages is 141.5 ms, which corresponds
to communication overheads.
Figure 4.3: Execution times for the Issuance protocol
Figure 4.4 shows the execution time for the Verification protocol. The mea-
sured execution time to verify the validity of a token by the vendor is 275.7
ms, while the remaining 401.7 ms is the communication overhead due to the
transmission of the whole token (which does not fit in a single APDU).
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Figure 4.4: Execution times for the Verification protocol
4.8.2 Deployability analysis in stores
We evaluate the applicability of the proposed scheme by means of two case
studies: the first one is a physical store and the second is an online store.
Physical store
We model the impact of the application of our solution in physical stores by
using queueing theory. By comparing the typical perfomance of the queues at
a store with the performance when our solution is applied, we can estimate the
additional resources (number of queues) that the store would need to cope with
the additional workload incurred by our solution.
Let us set the scenario: each cashier at the physical store is equipped with
an NFC reader within whose range the client puts her smartphone as the cashier
checks every product. Thus, checking each product and issuing receipt tokens
are performed in parallel.
To evaluate the scenario, we need to parameterize it in a realistic way. On
the one side, we need to assume a value for the rate λ of customer arrivals
per second at the store. To choose a realistic λ, we use Tesco’s UK figures, as
reported in [2]. In 2014 Tesco lost in the UK 1 million customer visits a week,
which decreased their sales by £25m a week; this amounts to £1,300 a year,
and this is said to represent 3.1% decrease. Hence, we can deduce Tesco UK
receives 32.24 million customers a week, which means 4.6 million customers a
day. Now, according to their web, Tesco UK have around 2,500 stores, which
results in an average 1,840 customers per store per day; since their opening
hours are from 6:00 to 23:00, they receive λ = 0.03006 customers per store per
second. Hence, for any store, the expected inter-arrival time (time between the
arrivals of two successive customers) can be estimated as 1/λ = 33.7 seconds.
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The actual inter-arrival time can be modeled as an exponential random variable
with parameter λ.
The next parameter is the service time, that is, how long it takes the cashier
to serve a customer on average. Like the inter-arrival time, the service time
can also be viewed as following an exponential distribution, in this case with
parameter µ, where 1/µ is the expected service time. We set this time as the
number n of products in the customer’s basket times the time to check each
product (which we estimate at 2 seconds), plus a constant time c = 30 s, which
is the time devoted to payment. When our protocol is applied, we have to take
into account the depth of the generalization tree d and the time to issue a token,
which is 0.65 seconds (according to our prototype described in Section 4.8.1).
Since token issuance takes place in parallel to product checking, the expected
service time is 1/µ = max(2, 0.65d)n + 30. Finally, we assume the number of
cashiers in a shop is q = 4 (which is a rather modest estimate for large stores
such as Tesco’s).
Figure 4.5: Mean waiting time and utilization of cashiers, depending on the
number of products per customer and the generalization depth d
In Figure 4.5, we show the mean waiting time at each of the queues/cashiers
and the utilization of each of the cashiers as a function of the average number
of items in the customers’ baskets and the depth of the generalization tree.
The blue curve corresponds to three situations: not using the protocol (just
bare product checking without token issuance) and also using the protocol with
d = 2, 3. We label it ‘No Protocol’ because, even if the protocol is used with
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depths 2 or 3, the 2 seconds needed to check each product dominate the time
to issue d tokens. We see that the utilization reaches 70% with 20 products
and d = 5. Although this is acceptable, adding an additional queue might be
advisable for those parameter values.
Analytically, assuming an M/M/q model, for token issuance time τ , average
number n of products per customer, depth d of the generalization tree, expected
inter-arrival time 1/λ and number of cashiers q, the utilization of each cashier
is
ρ =
λ
µq
=
λ(τnd+ c)
q
, (4.2)
and the mean waiting time is
Tw =
C(q, λ/µ)
µq − λ =
(
τnd+ c
q
)(
C(q, λ(τnd+ c))
1− ρ
)
, (4.3)
where C(q, λ/µ) is Erlang’s C formula.
Results in [89] show that the mean waiting times in a scenario with parallel
queues and jockeying (switching queues), which is the typical scenario at a store,
are similar (but not equal) to an M/M/q scenario. Formula (4.3), then, gives
no more than an approximation to the actual mean waiting time.
Expressions (4.2) and (4.3) are helpful to design a store. For example, given
values of τ , n, c and λ for a certain store, and given maximum acceptable
values of ρ and Tw (imagine the maximum for ρ is specified by unions and the
maximum for Tw by a consumer survey), the store designer can determine the
necessary number of cashiers q if using a generalization hierarchy with depth d
is desired.
Online store scenario
In an online store transaction, there are typically two main phases: add-to-cart,
in which the desired products are added to a list, and checkout, in which the
products in the list are actually paid for and purchased.
Our implementation proposal is as follows. Customers adding products to
the cart immediately compute the blinding phase of the receipt token issuance
for the selected product and all its generalizations. For tree depth d, this step
takes 356.4d ms of computation by the customer (time according to our proto-
type described in Section 4.8.1). The online store adds the product to the cart
database, as well as the cryptographic material sent by the user. Optionally,
the store could execute the signing phase of the token issuing protocol at this
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moment, which takes 19.5d ms (again according to our prototype). While sign-
ing tokens in parallel to product checking has the advantage of making checkout
lighter, it might be a waste of resources to sign a receipt token of a product the
customer has not yet paid for (because the customer might decide to withdraw
one or several products from her basket before checkout). When the customer
finally checks out, the store computes (if it has not done so previously) the
signature on all receipt tokens and sends them to the customer. At this point,
the transaction is already over. The customer can then unblind the signatures
on her tokens oﬄine. The additional storage capacity needed by the store is d
times the storage required by a token signature per product entry in the cart
database (512d bits in our prototype).
In this scenario, we can use metrics for server utilization and average waiting
time analogous to the ones we used for physical stores. The main difference is
that the number of queues (or servers) q is much more flexible in the online
scenario than in the physical scenario (in which each queue required a physical
cashier).
Both in a physical and in an online store, the issuance of loyalty points
tokens can be analyzed in a way similar to the issuance of receipt tokens, except
that loyalty points do not depend on the d factor (whereas d receipt tokens are
always issued per product, loyalty points tokens can be issued one at a time).
Otherwise, the computation and the storage required to issue one loyalty points
token are the same as for one receipt token. Spending loyalty points would
be done in the checkout phase, and this would increase the computation time
by 275.7 ms per token (the verification time by the store, according to our
prototype described in Section 4.8.1).
4.9 Extension for the untransferability of tokens
As mentioned in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.6.1 above, losing loyalty points and pur-
chase privacy is often enough to deter a customer from giving her receipts to
another customer. However, in some cases additional deterrence by V may be
needed to prevent purchase receipt transfer and even loyalty points transfer
among customers. In this section we propose an extension of our token issuance
and verification protocols to enforce untransferability of tokens.
Note that the vendor may be interested in preventing transfer only for one
type of tokens. Untransferability is more critical for purchase receipts (because
their transfer prevents customer profiling), whereas transferring loyalty points
among customers may be tolerable in many situations. If only one type of tokens
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needs to be made untransferable, then the extended issuance and verification
protocols described in this section should only be applied to that type of tokens.
The intuition is to require the customer to commit to a certain value (e.g.
the value y) during the token issuance protocol and to require the customer to
prove possession of the commitment key during the token verification protocol.
The commitment keys should be securely stored in the device to prevent
users from transferring them. If this is achieved, then the tokens are also un-
transferable. To do so, one might use a trusted platform module installed in the
device. For example, Google’s Nexus series (up to Nexus 4) carry a TPM inte-
grated in the NFC chip. A more practical solution, and one which is currently
gaining popularity among banking applications (and credit card emulation apps)
is to use privileged instructions of the device’s main processor, a standard ARM
extension called TrustZone [90]. Making use of this feature, Android provides
a hardware-backed secure keystore API which allows applications to store cer-
tificates and keys in a secure way. A key stored by some application can only
be retrieved by the same application, even if the device has been compromised.
This approach has been used for secure applications such as secure PIN en-
try, digital rights management, e-ticketing, etc. KNOX [4] is a technology from
Samsung, which also uses the TrustZone extension to provide a secure execution
environment in mobile devices.
We next specify the changes to the original construction that are needed to
guarantee token untransferability:
• Both the setup and the key generation phases remain mostly as described
in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.2 above, respectively. However, during key gen-
eration an additional commitment key skC ∈R Z∗q is generated and given
to the customer C in a secure device (e.g. a smart card) such that the key
cannot be modified or extracted from the device.
• More changes are needed in the Issuance and Verification protocols with
respect to Section 4.5.2. We describe these changes in the following sub-
sections.
4.9.1 Extended Issuance protocol
During this phase, the customer C commits to the public and the secret infor-
mation contained in the token with her commitment key, as in Schnorr’s ZKP
protocol [85]. Namely, Step (3) in Section 4.5.2 is replaced by the following one:
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(3*) The customer chooses random α, r ∈R Z∗q and builds the message m =
(α, y, hskC ), being h = H0(c||α||y). Thus, hskC is a secret commitment on
the token information (as the vendor does not know the value α). Then,
the customer blinds the message by computing u = H0(c||m)r and sends
u to the vendor.
The rest of the protocol of Section 4.5.2 remains unaltered. The resulting
extended protocol including this modification is shown in Figure 4.6.
Customer Vendor
skC , y ∈ Z∗q skV
c∈{0,1}∗←−−−−−−−−−→
α, r ∈R Z∗q
h = H0(c||α||y)
m = (α, y, hskC )
u = H0(c||m)r u−−−−−−−−−−→
v←−−−−−−−−−− v = u(H(c)+skV)−1
σ = vr
−1
T = 〈c,m, σ〉
Figure 4.6: Issuance protocol with untransferability
4.9.2 Extended Verification protocol
During this phase, the vendor checks whether the signature on token T was
correctly computed (normally by the vendor himself at a previous time) and
whether the token has not yet been spent. Additionally, this version of the
protocol includes Schnorr’s 3-step interactive ZKP [85] to prove knowledge of
the commitment key skC .
First, and to account for the changes in the contents of the token, replace
Step 2 of the Protocol in Section 4.5.2 by the following step:
(2*) The vendor parses the messagem as (α, y, hsku) and computes h′ = H0(c||α
||y).
Then, if the signature verification at Step 3 is correct and the token has
not yet been spent, notify the customer to start the interactive ZKP to prove
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knowledge of the commitment key. This implies adding the following steps
between Steps 3 and 4 of the original protocol
(3a) The customer chooses k ∈R Z∗q and sends t = hk to the vendor.
(3b) The vendor answers with a challenge sc ∈R Z∗q .
(3c) The customer computes a response r = k + skC · sc and sends r to the
vendor.
(3d) If h′r ?= t · hskC·sc holds, the vendor sends an accept message to the
customer. Otherwise, the vendor sends a reject message.
If the customer can prove knowledge of the commitment key, the vendor
is convinced that she participated in the issuance of the token. Hence, the
token has not been transferred to a different customer since it was issued. The
resulting extended protocol is shown in Figure 4.7.
Customer Vendor
h, skC , T pkV
T=〈c,m,σ〉−−−−−−−−−−→
parse m as (α, y, hskC )
h′ = H0(c||α||y)
e(gH(c)pkV , σ)
?
= e(g,H0(c||m))
ok/stop←−−−−−−−−−− and token not spent yet
k ∈R Z∗q
t = hk
t−−−−−−−−−−→
sc←−−−−−−−−−− sc ∈R Z∗q
r = k + skC · sc r−−−−−−−−−−→
accept/reject←−−−−−−−−−− h′r ?= t · hskC·sc
Link token to previous ones with same y
Figure 4.7: Verification protocol with untransferability
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4.9.3 Complexity and security analysis of the extension
Regarding complexity, we evaluate the new computations added by the ex-
tension. In the new Step (3*) of the Issuance protocol a commitment is now
computed. This requires the customer to compute one additional hash and one
additional exponentiation in Z∗q .
In the new steps added to the Verification protocol, the following additional
computations are needed:
• The customer computes a hash in Step (2*), a random number and an
exponentiation in Z∗q in Step (3a) and a multiplication in Step (3c).
• The vendor computes a random challenge in Step (3b) and two exponen-
tiations and a multiplication in Z∗q in Step (3d).
If one compares these new computations with the computations in the orig-
inal protocols before the extension, it can be inferred that the computing time
does not even double as a result of the extension, neither for the customer nor
the vendor. Hence, it remains affordable.
The security of the extension is based on:
• The security of Schnorr’s ZKP, proven in [85, 70]. Hence, a customer
not holding the commitment key cannot convince a vendor that she holds
the key. Also, neither the vendor nor any observer learn any bit of the
commitment key.
• The tamper-resistance of the secure device. This device performs all cus-
tomer computations involving the commitment key, in such a way that
the customer cannot learn the value of her own key. This ensures that no
customer can transfer her commitment key to another customer. Hence,
when a customer proves during token verification that she holds the same
commitment key used for token issuance, the vendor is convinced that the
token has not been transferred.
4.10 Summary
In our privacy-aware alternative to traditional loyalty programs, the customers
are granted the power to decide what private information they want to dis-
close, and how accurate that information is. We have described a privacy-aware
protocol suite that still offers the two main features of loyalty programs: to
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reward returning customers and to make customer profiling possible. We have
presented experimental results that show that our suite is usable in practice.
Finally, we have proposed an extension of our protocol suite which prevents
purchase receipts and loyalty points from being transferred among customers; if
only transfer of one type of tokens is to be prevented, then our extension need
only be used to issue and verify that type of tokens.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-preserving implicit
authentication
5.1 Introduction
Implicit authentication refers to a software system authenticating individuals
based on the way they interact with their device, i.e. their behavior. In this
context, the user behavior can be determined by collecting a variety of features,
such as keystroke patterns, browser history and configuration, IP addresses,
location, visible antennas, etc. Implicit authentication can be viewed as a com-
plement of the usual explicit authentication based on identifiers and credentials.
Implicit authentication is gaining importance as the smartphone market
rises. Relatively small and sometimes unwieldy screen keyboards in smart-
phones make typing strong passwords a difficult task. This situation, added to
the well-known problem of weak password choices, repeatedly aired in the me-
dia, makes the use of secondary authentication mechanisms almost mandatory.
Among these, biometric (fingerprint) authentication and two-factor authentica-
tion with one-time passwords are the most common choices. Biometric authen-
tication has the shortcomings of needing special sensors in the user’s device and
requiring the authenticating server to acquire and store the user’s reference bio-
metric pattern. Two-factor authentication, on its side, has an intrinsic problem:
the second channel (email, SMS, mobile app) used for confirmation is usually
accessible on the same device (typically an Internet-enabled smartphone) used
for the primary channel, so both channels may be simultaneously compromised.
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Implicit authentication is not free of problems either. A salient issue is the
privacy exposure of end users, who need to be profiled in order to provide a
reference pattern against which their current behavior can be authenticated by
the server.
5.1.1 Contributions
We propose in here two privacy-preserving implicit authentication protocols
based on the computation of distances between feature sets. We justify that
these distances can be obtained from the size of the intersection of the feature
sets and use two different mechanisms from the literature on record matching
schemes to compute the intersections in a private way. Thus, our first mecha-
nism is based on the protocol from [49], of which we provided an overview in
Section 2.6. The second one is computationally lighter, since it is based on the
intersection of Bloom filters (described in Section 2.8).
The contributions in this chapter have been published in [46, 15, 43]. The
implicit authentication construction based on Bloom filters has been submitted
to a journal.
This Chapter is organized as follows. First, in Section 5.2 we give an overview
of the past related works in implicit authentication and privacy-preserving im-
plicit authentication. In Section 5.3 we state the implicit authentication prob-
lem, including a description of the scenario, user profiles and possible threats.
Then, in Section 5.4 we describe the types of feature sets that model the user
preferences or behavior, and that are supported by our distance computation
mechanism and our implicit authentication mechanism. In Section 5.6 we pro-
pose a robust privacy-preserving implicit authentication mechanism based on
the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem. Sections 5.7 and 5.8
justify the security and privacy guarantees of the protocol and provide ex-
perimental results, respectively. Section 5.9 describes an alternative privacy-
preserving implicit authentication mechanism, based, in this case, on Bloom
filters and their properties. In Section 5.10 and 5.11 we discuss the security and
privacy of the protocol, and provide experimental results, respectively. Finally,
Section 5.12 presents the final remarks on our two proposed privacy-preserving
implicit authentication protocols.
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5.2 Related work on implicit authentication
We first specify the usual setting of implicit authentication and we then move
to privacy-preserving implicit authentication.
5.2.1 Implicit authentication
The usual scenario of implicit authentication is one in which the user carries
a mobile networked device (called just user’s device in what follows) such as a
cell phone, tablet, notebook, etc. The user wishes to authenticate to a server in
order to use some application. The user may (or not) use a primary password
authentication mechanism. To strengthen such a primary authentication or
even to replace it, the user resorts to implicit authentication [58]. In this type
of authentication, the history of a user’s actions on the user’s device is used
to construct a profile for the user that consists of a set of features. In [58]
empirical evidence was given that the features collected from the user’s device
history are effective to distinguish users and therefore can be used to implicitly
authenticate them (instead or in addition to explicit authentication based on
the user’s providing a password).
The types of features collected on the user’s actions fall into three categories:
(i) device data, like GPS location data, WiFi/Bluetooth connections and other
sensor data; (ii) carrier data, such as information on cell towers seen by the
device, or Internet access points; and (iii) cloud data, such as calendar entries.
It is not safe to store the accumulated profile of the user in the user’s device,
because an intruder might compromise the device and alter the stored profile in
order to impersonate the legitimate user. Hence, for security, the profile must be
stored by some external entity. However, the user’s profile includes potentially
sensitive information and storing it outside the user’s device violates privacy.
Implicit authentication systems try to mitigate the above privacy problem
by using a third party, the carrier (i.e. the network service provider) to store
the user’s profiles. Thus, the typical architecture consists of the user’s device,
the carrier and the application servers. The latter want to authenticate the user
and they collaborate with the carrier and the user’s device to do so. The user’s
device engages in a secure two-party computation protocol with the carrier in
order to compare the fresh usage features collected by the user’s device with
the user’s profile stored at the carrier. The computation yields a score that
is compared (by the carrier or by the application server) against a threshold,
in order to decide whether the user is accepted or rejected. In any case, the
application server trusts the score computed by the carrier.
85
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMPLICIT AUTHENTICATION
5.2.2 Privacy-preserving implicit authentication
In the privacy-preserving implicit authentication system proposed in [82], the
user’s device encrypts the user’s usage profile at set-up time, and forwards it
to the carrier, who stores it for later comparison. There is no security problem
because during normal operation the user’s device does not store the user’s
profile (it just collects the fresh usage features). There is no privacy problem
either, because the carrier does not see the user’s profile in the clear.
The core of proposal [82] is the algorithm for computing the dissimilarity
score between two inputs: the fresh sample provided by the user’s device and
the profile stored at the carrier. All the computation takes place at the carrier
and both inputs are encrypted: indeed, the carrier stores the encrypted profile
and the user’s device sends the encrypted fresh sample to the carrier. Note that
the keys to both encryptions are only known to the user’s device (it is the device
who encrypted everything).
The carrier computes a dissimilarity score at the feature level, while provably
guaranteeing that: i) no information about the profile stored at the carrier is
revealed to the device other than the average absolute deviation of the stored
feature values; ii) no information about the fresh feature value provided by the
device is revealed to the carrier other than how it is ordered with respect to the
stored profile feature values.
The score computation protocol in [82] uses two different encryption schemes:
a homomorphic encryption scheme HE (for example, Paillier’s [74]) and an
order-preserving symmetric encryption scheme OPSE (for example, [20]). For
each feature in the accumulated user’s profile, two encrypted versions are cre-
ated, one under HE and the other under OPSE. Similarly, for each feature
in the fresh sample it collects, the user’s device computes two encrypted ver-
sions, under HE and OPSE, respectively, and sends them to the carrier. The
following process is repeated for each feature:
1. Using the HE ciphertexts the carrier performs some computations (ad-
ditions and scalar multiplications) relating the encrypted fresh sampled
feature value and the set of encrypted feature values in the stored en-
crypted user’s profile.
2. The output of the previous computations is returned to the user’s de-
vice, which decrypts it, re-encrypts it under OPSE and returns the re-
encrypted value to the carrier.
3. Using the order-preserving properties, the carrier can finally compute a
dissimilarity score evaluating how different is the fresh sampled feature
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from those stored in the encrypted user’s profile. This score can be roughly
described as the number of feature values in the stored encrypted profile
that are less dissimilar from the median of the stored values than the fresh
sampled value.
The authors of [82] point out that, in case of a malicious user’s device (e.g.
as a result of it being compromised), one cannot trust the device to provide
the correct HE-encrypted version of the fresh sampled feature. Nor can it be
assumed that the device returns correct OPSE-encryptions in Step 2 above.
In [82], a variant of the privacy-preserving implicit authentication protocol is
presented in which the device proves the correctness of HE-encrypted fresh
sampled features and does not need to provide OPSE-encrypted values. This
version is secure against malicious devices, but its complexity is substantially
higher.
Other shortcomings of [82]:
• It is restricted to numerical features, due to the kind of computations that
need to be performed on them. However, among the example features
listed in Section 5.2.1, there are some features that are not numerical, like
the list of cell towers or Internet access points seen by the user’s device.
• It discloses the following information to the user’s device: i) how the fresh
sample is ordered with respect to the stored profile feature values; ii) the
average absolute deviation of the stored feature values.
5.3 Preliminary definitions
5.3.1 Scenario
We consider a scenario in which smartphone users log into online services offered
by some service provider. Users set their login information at registration time,
and this information is managed by either the service provider or by a third
party (an identity provider that delivers authentication services). The entity in
charge of authenticating users offers an additional security measure: it analyzes
the behavior of users to detect potentially compromised user accounts. The
service provider denies service to accounts labeled as compromised, and the
rightful owners of those accounts are notified.
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5.3.2 User profiles, behavior samples and feature sets
In this section, we describe the user profiles as we will use them throughout the
rest of this work. A user profile is a list of snapshots of the user’s behavior at
different times. These snapshots, or samples, are labeled by a timestamp and
contain one or more feature sets. Each feature set contains readings from one
specific data source in the user’s device for a fixed period of time.
User profile P
Sample S1
IA: App11, App
1
2, . . .
CT: CT 11 , CT
1
2 , . . .
WH: URL11, URL
1
2, . . .
L: Loc11, Loc
1
2, . . .
Sample S2
IA: App21, App
2
2, . . .
CT: CT 21 , CT
2
2 , . . .
WH: URL21, URL
2
2, . . .
L: Loc21, Loc
2
2, . . .
Figure 5.1: User profile with two behavior samples. Within each sample, feature
sets are as follows: installed applications (IA), visible cell towers (CT), web
browsing history (WH), visited locations (L).
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a user profile P with two samples S1 and S2,
each of them containing several feature sets Si (each of them labeled according
to the data it contains), namely installed applications, visible cell towers, web
browsing history and visited locations. The label St refers to specific sample
and the subscript t may refer to the time of collection (a timestamp). Each
of the feature sets includes information gathered from different sources during
some predefined period of time; for example, the set labeled as CT in sample
S1 may be the set of cell towers that the device has seen during the last day.
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Typical data sources considered for authentication are, among others, in-
stalled applications, installed applications by category, usage of applications,
usage of applications by category, visible cell towers, strength of the signal of
cell towers, battery level at the time the device is connected for charging, time
between consecutive charges, power consumption, idle and awake times, web
browsing history, web browsing history by category, trajectories of the user, etc.
Some of these features may be considered more important than others when
taking an authentication decision; hence, different weights may be assigned to
the various features.
In the implicit authentication protocol, the user sends a new sample to the
server, who compares it to ` previous samples, feature set by feature set, to reach
an authentication decision. It is also worth considering that, since users may
behave differently in work days and weekends, samples may need to be compared
with parts of the profile corresponding to similar days and times. New samples
that result in successful authentications can be stored by the server to update
the user profile.
Assuming that every feature has the same weight when taking the authenti-
cation decision (e.g., installed applications matter as much as visited locations),
our construction allows representing each sample as a single feature set of the
following form (where each value is labeled with the name of the feature set it
comes from):
• S1: {IA:App11, IA:App12, . . . ,CT:CT 11 , . . . ,WH:URL11, . . . ,L:Loc11, . . . }
• S2: {IA:App21, IA:App22, . . . ,CT:CT 21 , . . . ,WH:URL21, . . . ,L:Loc21, . . . }
In this case, the implicit authentication protocol can run a single set com-
parison per sample. However, if the weights of the features differ, or the profiles
contain categorical and numerical feature sets, the authentication protocol will
have to compute the distances between several sets. An example of this situation
is shown in Figure 5.2.
In this case, to compare the sample S3 with older samples (of the same form)
in an authentication attempt, the following sets have to be compared:
• {IA:App31, IA:App32, . . . ,CT:CT 31 ,CT:CT 32 , . . . }
• {WH:URL31,WH:URL32, . . . ,L:Loc31,L:Loc32, . . . }
• {K31 ,K32 , . . . }
While the mechanisms for the collection of data and the data sources them-
selves are outside of the scope of this work, we impose the requirement that
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S3
IA (ω1): App
3
1, App
3
2, . . .
CT (ω1): CT
3
1 , CT
3
2 , . . .
WH (ω2): URL
3
1, URL
3
2, . . .
L (ω2): Loc
3
1, Loc
3
2, . . .
K (ω1): {K31 ,K32 , . . . }
Figure 5.2: Behavior sample with different weights (denoted by ω1 and ω2). Cat-
egorical feature sets: installed applications (IA), visible cell towers (CT), web
browsing history (WH), visited locations (L). Numerical feature set: kilometers
walked each hour (K).
features must be discretized, for example via generalization/coarsening. Take
location data as an example: GPS location data are too fine-grained for com-
parison using our distance computation mechanism, so we require them to be
coarsened either by translating the latitude-longitude pairs to names (e.g. street
names), or by truncating some decimals (which in practice amounts to defining
a grid in a map).
5.3.3 Privacy attacker
We regard any entity with legitimate or illegitimate access to the stored user
profiles as a potential privacy attacker. An attacker seeing the profile of a user
learns sensitive information about the user, such as her typical locations, her
preferences, the software installed on her computer, etc. The user’s profile may
also allow inferring the user’s identity, in case the latter is not readily available.
Hence, user profiles must be protected while in transit and when stored on the
server premises.
5.3.4 Impersonator
An attacker who gains access to a user’s device, her account credentials (e.g.
login and password) or both, may try to impersonate the user by accessing her
accounts. By analyzing the behavior of the impersonator it should be possible
to detect the attack and deny access to the impersonator.
90
5.4. DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN FEATURE SETS DEPENDING ON DATA TYPES
5.4 Dissimilarity between feature sets depend-
ing on data types
We present in here how the dissimilarity between two feature sets X and Y can
be evaluated using set intersection. If we let X be the user’s profile and Y be
the fresh sample collected by the user’s device, our privacy-preserving implicit
authentication mechanisms aim at computing the distances of these sets in some
protected form. We describe here the case of two plaintext sets X and Y and
we will deal with protected sets in the following sections.
5.4.1 Case A: independent nominal feature values
Consider two feature sets X and Y containing independent categorical values,
such that the relationship between any two values is equality or nothing. These
sets might for example represent the user’s browser history (containing only
domain names, but not specific pages, because specific pages would be clearly
correlated to their domains), visible cell towers, installed applications, etc. The
(dis)similarity between X and Y can be computed as the multiplicative inverse
of the size of their intersection, that is 1/|X ∩ Y |, or ∞ when the intersection
is empty. Note that Bloom filters allow computing also the cardinality of the
union of two sets, which makes it possible, in our case, to compute the Jaccard
similarity index J(X,Y ) = |X ∩ Y |/|X ∪ Y | or its complement, the Jaccard
distance, that is dJ(X,Y ) = 1− J(X,Y ) = (|X ∪ Y | − |X ∩ Y |)/|X ∪ Y |. This
latter distance, being normalized, is a very convenient measure.
Clearly, the more the coincidences between X and Y , the more similar is the
profile stored at the server to the fresh sample collected by the device.
5.4.2 Case B: correlated categorical feature values
As in the previous case, we assume the feature values are expressed as qualitative
features. However, these may not be independent. For example, if the feature
values are the IDs of cell towers or Internet access points seen by the device,
nearby cell towers/access points are more similar to each other than distant cell
towers/access points.
In this case, the dissimilarity between X and Y cannot be computed as the
size of their intersection.
Assume we have an integer correlation function l : E×E 7→ Z+ that measures
the similarity between the values in the sets of features held by the device and
the carrier, where E is the domain where the sets of features of both players take
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values. For nominal features, semantic similarity measures can be used for this
purpose [83]; for numerical features that take values over bounded and discrete
domains, standard arithmetic functions can be used. Assume further that both
the device and the carrier know this function s from the very beginning.
Here the dissimilarity between the set X and the set Y can be computed as
1/(
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y l(x, y))
when the denominator is nonzero. If it is zero, we say that the distance is ∞.
5.4.3 Case C: numerical feature values
In this case, the profile of the user is a set of numerical values, for example,
sensor data, the browser history expressed as the number of accesses to each
website in a list, a histogram of user preferences, etc.
Given two sets X = {x1, · · · , xt} and Y = {y1, · · · , yt}, a way to measure the
dissimilarity between them is to compute
∑t
i=1 |xi − yi|. If X and Y represent
normalized histograms, that is, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i and
∑t
i=1 xi = 1 (or 100
if the values are given as percentages), we could also normalize the resulting
distance, because the maximum possible distance is known (2 if the features of
each histogram add to 1).
5.5 Proposed architecture
The high-level architecture of both our implicit authentication mechanisms is
centered on a protection module in the user’s smartphone that collects sen-
sor data and protects the samples, and a distance computation module on the
server’s side that can compute the (dis)similarity of the protected fresh sample
and the protected recorded user profile, and return an authentication score or
decision. We propose two alternative architectures built on these core modules.
The first one, shown in Figure 5.3 is a traditional approach, in which the ser-
vice provider is in charge of authenticating its users; the second one, shown in
Figure 5.4 follows a single sign-on approach, in which an identity provider, for
example the carrier, is in charge of authenticating the users on behalf of the
service provider.
Next, we briefly describe the two above-mentioned core modules. Then,
the interaction between the protection module and the distance computation
module, that is, the implicit authentication protocol, is described in Sections 5.6
and 5.9, which account for our two proposed mechanisms.
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Figure 5.3: Basic architecture
Figure 5.4: Architecture with an identity provider (IP)
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Protection module
The protection module in the user’s device is a software module that first gathers
data from the device. These data, as pointed out in previous sections, are sensor
data, network statistics, installed applications, browser histories, etc. They are
used to build the fresh sample of the user profile that will be the input to implicit
authentication. Then the protection module protects the sampled profile by
encoding it into a Bloom filter. Finally, the module sends the Bloom filter to
the server.
Distance computation module
The distance computation module runs on the server side and is capable of com-
paring protected sampled profiles against previously stored protected reference
user profiles. The comparison returns an authentication score that is compared
to a threshold, in order to output an authentication decision.
5.6 Privacy-preserving implicit authentication
from Paillier
In this section we show that computing dissimilarities in the above three cases
A, B and C can be reduced to computing the cardinality of set intersections.
Furthermore, this can be done without the carrier revealing X and without
the user’s device revealing Y , as required in the implicit authentication setting.
The idea is that, if the dissimilarity stays below a certain threshold, the user is
authenticated; otherwise, authentication is refused.
In Chapter 2, we gave some background on privacy-preserving set inter-
section protocols in the literature. Unfortunately, most of them assume an
honest-but-curious situation, but we need a privacy-preserving set intersection
protocol that works even if the adversary is a malicious one: notice that the
user’s device may be corrupted, that is, in control of some adversary. Hence
we proceed to specifying a set intersection protocol that remains robust in the
malicious scenario and we apply it to achieving privacy-preserving implicit au-
thentication in Case A. We then extend it to Cases B and C. We make use of
Paillier’s cryptosystem [74], which is recalled in Chapter 2.
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5.6.1 Implicit authentication in case A
Set-up
Let the plaintext user’s profile be (a1, · · · , as). In this phase, the user’s device
transfers the encrypted user’s profile to the carrier. To do so, the user’s device
does:
1. Generate the Paillier cryptosystem with public key pk = (n, g) and secret
key sk.
2. Compute the polynomial p(x) =
∏s
i=1(x−ai) = p0+p1x+p2x2+· · ·+psxs.
3. Compute Enc(p0), · · ·Enc(ps) where Enc(pi) = gpirni mod n2.
4. Randomly choose R′ ∈ Zn2 . Find r′0, · · · , r′s ∈ Zn2 such that
R′ = r′0 · r′1aj · r′2a
2
j · · · r′sa
s
j mod n2, j = 1, · · · , s. (5.1)
Note that the system (5.1) has a trivial solution r′0 = R
′ and r′1 = · · · =
r′s = 1, but, since it is underdetermined (s + 1 unknowns and s equa-
tions), it has many non-trivial solutions too (see correctness analysis in
Section 5.7).
5. Compute Ri = r
′
i/ri mod n
2. Randomly choose integer d ∈ Zn. Send
pk,Enc(p0), · · ·Enc(ps);R0d, · · · , Rsd mod n2
to the carrier. Locally delete all data computed during the set-up protocol,
but keep (d,R′) secretly.
Implicit authentication protocol
As discussed in Section 5.4.1, in case of independent nominal feature values
(Case A), dissimilarity is computed as 1/|X ∩ Y |. Hence, to perform implicit
authentication the carrier just needs to compute the cardinality of the inter-
section between the fresh sample collected by the user’s device and the user’s
profile stored at the carrier. The challenge is that the carrier only holds the
encrypted user’s profile and the user’s device does no longer hold the plaintext
user’s profile either in plaintext or ciphertext.
Let Y = {b1, · · · , bt} ⊆ E be the fresh sample collected by the user’s device.
Then the device and the carrier engage in the following protocol:
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Step 1 The carrier randomly chooses θ, and sends pk, Enc(p0)
θ, · · · Enc(ps)θ;
R0
d, · · · , Rsd to the user’s device.
Step 2 The user’s device picks a random integer r(j) ∈ Zn2 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
The device computes for 1 ≤ j ≤ t
Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(bj)) = Enc(p(bj))d·θ·r(j)
= (Enc(p0) · · ·Enc(ps)bsj )d·θ·r(j)
= gr(j)·d·θp(bj)γn·d·θj mod n
2
where γj = (r0 · r1bj · r2b2j · · · rsbsj )r(j) mod n2. The user’s device then
computes Υj = (R0 · R1bj · R2b
2
j · · ·Rsb
s
j )dr(j) mod n2. For all j, the
device randomly orders and sends
{(Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(bj)),Υj , R′r(j)d)} (5.2)
to the carrier.
Step 3 For 1 ≤ j ≤ t, the carrier does:
• Compute Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(bj)) ·Υnθj ;
• From Expression (5.1), if bj = ai for some i ∈ {1, · · · , s}, then p(bj) =
0 and hence Enc(r(j)d·θ·p(bj))·Υnθj = R′r(j)dnθ; note that the carrier
can recognize R′r(j)dnθ by raising R′r(j)d received in Expression (5.2)
to nθ. Otherwise (if bj 6= ai for all i ∈ {1, · · · , s}) Enc(r(j)·d·θ·p(bj))
looks random. See correctness analysis in Section 5.7.
If both parties are honest, then the carrier learns |X ∩ Y | but obtains no
information about the elements in X or Y .
5.6.2 Implicit authentication in case B
Here, the carrier inputs X and the user’s device inputs Y , two sets of features,
and they want to know how close X and Y are without revealing their own set.
In the protocol below, only the carrier learns how close X and Y are.
We assume that the domain of X and Y is the same, and we call it E. The
closeness or similarity between elements is computed by means of a function s.
In particular, we consider functions l : E × E → Z+. Observe that Case A is a
particular instance of this Case B in which l(x, x) = 1 and l(x, y) = 0 for x 6= y.
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Let Y be the input of the user’s device. For every z ∈ E, the device computes
`z =
∑
y∈Y l(z, y). Observe that `z measures the overall similarity of z and Y .
Let Y ′ = {z ∈ E : `z > 0}. It is common to consider functions satisfying
l(z, z) > 0 for every z ∈ E, and so in general Y ⊆ Y ′.
An implicit authentication protocol for such a computation can be obtained
from the protocol in Case A (Section 5.6.1), by replacing Steps 2 and 3 there
with the following ones:
Step 2’ For every z ∈ Y ′, the user’s device picks `z random integers r(1), · · · ,
r(`z)∈Zn2 and for 1 ≤ j ≤ `z does
• Compute
Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(z)) = Enc(p(z))d·θ·r(j)
= (Enc(p0) · · ·Enc(ps)zs)d·θ·r(j)
= gr(j)·d·θp(z)γn·d·θj mod n
2
where γj = (r0 · r1z · r2z2 · · · rszs)r(j) mod n2.
• Compute Υj = (R0 ·R1z ·R2z
2 · · ·Rsz
s
)dr(j) mod n2.
• Let Ej = {(Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(z)),Υj , R′r(j)d)}.
Finally, the user’s device randomly re-orders the sequence of all computed
Ej for all z ∈ Y ′ (a total of
∑
z∈Y ′ `z elements) and sends the randomly
re-ordered sequence of Ej ’s to the carrier.
Step 3’ For every received Ej , the carrier does
• Compute Enc(r(j)dθ · p(z)) ·Υnθj ;
• From Expression (5.1), if z ∈ X, then p(z) = 0 and hence Enc(r(j)d ·
θ · p(z)) · Υnθj = R′r(j)dnθ (see correctness analysis in Section 5.7);
otherwise (if z 6∈ X) Enc(r(j)dθ · p(z)) looks random.
Hence, at the end of the protocol, the total number of Ej which yield
R′r(j)dnθ is ∑
x∈X
`x =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
l(x, y),
that is, the sum of similarities between the elements of X and Y . This clearly
measures how similar X and Y are. At the end of the protocol, the carrier
knows |Y ′| and the device knows |X|. Besides that, neither the carrier nor the
device can gain any additional knowledge on the elements of each other’s set of
preferences.
97
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMPLICIT AUTHENTICATION
5.6.3 Implicit authentication in case C
Let the plaintext user’s profile be a set U of t numerical features, which we
denote by U = {u1, · · · , ut}. The device’s fresh sample corresponding to those
features is V = {v1, · · · , vt}. The carrier wants to learn how close X and Y are,
that is,
∑t
i=1 |ui − vi|.
Define X = {(i, j) : ui > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ ui} and Y = {(i, j) : vi >
0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ vi}. Now, take the set-up protocol defined in Section 5.6.1 for
Case A and run it by using X as plaintext user profile. Then take the implicit
authentication protocol for Case A and run it by using Y as the fresh sample
input by the device. In this way, the carrier can compute |X ∩Y |. Observe that
|X ∩ Y | = |{(i, j) : ui, vi > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ min{ui, vi}}| =
∑
1≤i≤t
min{ui, vi}.
In the set-up protocol for Case A, the carrier learns |X| and during the implicit
authentication protocol for Case A, the carrier learns |Y |. Hence, the carrier
can compute
|X|+ |Y | − 2|X ∩ Y | =
t∑
i=1
(max{ui, vi}+ min{ui, vi})− 2
t∑
i=1
min{ui, vi}
=
t∑
i=1
(max{ui, vi} −min{ui, vi}) =
t∑
i=1
|ui − vi|.
5.7 Security, privacy and complexity
5.7.1 Correctness
In general, the correctness of our protocol follows from direct algebraic verifi-
cation using the properties of Paillier’s cryptosystem. We go next through the
least obvious steps.
Set-up protocol
In the set-up protocol, r′0, · · · , r′s are found as a solution of the following system R
′
...
R′
 =

r′0 · r′a11 · r′a
2
1
2 · · · r′a
s
1
s mod n
2
...
r′0 · r′as1 · r′a
2
s
2 · · · r′a
s
s
s mod n
2
 .
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The above system has s+ 1 unknowns and s equations. Therefore it has one
degree of freedom. To avoid the trivial solution r′0 = R
′ and r′1 = · · · = r′s = 1,
we choose a random r′0. Then we divide the system by r
′
0 and we take logarithms
to get
log(R′/r′0)
log(R′/r′0)
...
log(R′/r′0)
 mod n =
 a1 a
2
1 · · · as1
...
...
...
as a
2
s · · · ass
 ·

log r′1
log r′2
...
log r′s
 mod n.
The matrix on the right-hand side of the above system is an s × s generalized
Vandermonde matrix (not quite a Vandermonde matrix). Hence, using the
techniques in [38] it can be solved in O(s2) time for log r′1, · · · , log r′s. Then s
powers modulo n2 need to be computed to turn log r′i into r
′
i for i = 0, · · · , s.
Implicit authentication protocol
We specify in more detail the following derivation in Step 2 of the implicit
authentication protocol of Section 5.6.1:
Enc(r(j) · d · θ · p(bj)) = Enc(p(bj))d·θ·r(j) mod n2
= (Enc(p0) · · ·Enc(ps)bsj )d·θ·r(j) mod n2
= (gp0rn0 · · · (gpsrns )b
s
j )d·θ·r(j) mod n2
= (gp(bj))d·θ·r(j)(r0 · rbj1 · · · r
bsj
s )
r(j)·n·d·θ mod n2
= gr(j)·d·θp(bj)γn·d·θj mod n
2.
Regarding Step 3 of the implicit authentication protocol, we detail the case
bj = ai for some i ∈ {1, · · · , s}. In this case, p(bj) = 0 and hence
Enc(r(j)dθ · p(bj)) ·Υnθj mod n2 = Enc(0)r(j)dθ ·Υnθj mod n2
= (r0 · rbj1 · · · r
bsj
s )
nr(j)dθ ·Υnθj mod n2
= (r0 · rbj1 · · · r
bsj
s )
nr(j)dθ · (R0 ·Rbj1 · · ·R
bsj
s )
dr(j)nθ mod n2
= (r′0 · r′ai1 · · · r′a
s
i
s )
r(j)dnθ mod n2 = R′r(j)dnθ mod n2. (5.3)
If in Step 3, if we have bj 6= ai for all i ∈ {1, · · · , s}, then Derivation (5.3)
does not hold and a random number is obtained instead. On the one side, the
powers of g does not disappear from Enc(r(j)dθ · p(bj)). On the other side, the
exponents bj , · · · , bsj cannot be changed by ai, · · · , asi as done in the last step of
Derivation (5.3). Hence, a random number different from R′r(j)dnθ is obtained.
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5.7.2 Privacy and security
Unless otherwise stated, the assessment in this section will focus on the protocols
of Case A (Section 5.6.1), the protocols of Cases B and C being extensions of
Case A.
We define privacy in the following two senses:
• After the set-up is concluded, the user’s device does not keep any infor-
mation about the user’s profile sent to the carrier. Hence, compromise of
the user’s device does not result in compromise of the user’s profile.
• The carrier learns nothing about the plaintext user’s profile, except its
size. This allows the user to preserve the privacy of her profile towards
the carrier.
Lemma 1. After set-up, the user’s device does not keep any information on
the user’s profile sent to the carrier.
Proof. The user’s device only keeps (d,R′) at the end of the set-up protocol.
Both d and R′ are random and hence unrelated to the user’s profile.
Lemma 2. The carrier or any eavesdropper learn nothing about the plaintext
user’s profile, except its size.
Proof. After set-up, the carrier receives pk,Enc(p0), · · ·Enc(ps);R0d, · · · ,
Rs
d mod n2. Since d is random and unknown to the carrier, R0
d, · · · , Rsd
mod n2 look random to the carrier and will give him no more information about
the plaintext user’s profile than the Paillier ciphertexts Enc(p0), · · ·Enc(ps).
That is, the carrier learns nothing about the user’s plaintext profile X = {a1,
· · · , as} except its size s. The same holds true for an eavesdropper listening to
the communication between the user’s device and the carrier during set-up.
At Step 2 of implicit authentication, the carrier only gets the fresh sample
Y encrypted under Paillier and randomly re-ordered. Hence, the carrier learns
no information on Y , except its size t. At Step 3, the carrier learns |X ∩Y |, but
not knowing Y , the size |X ∩ Y | of the intersection leaks to him no information
on X.
If we define security of implicit authentication as the inability of a dishonest
user’s device to disrupt the authentication outcome, we can state the following
result.
Lemma 3. A dishonest user’s device has no better strategy to alter the outcome
of implicit authentication than trying to randomly guess the user’s profile.
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Proof. At the end of the set-up protocol, the (still uncompromised) user’s
keeps no information about the user’s profile (Lemma 1). Hence, if the user’s
device is later compromised and/or behaves dishonestly, it still has no clue on
the real user’s profile against which its fresh sample is going to be authenticated.
Hence, either the user’s device provides an honest fresh sample and implicit au-
thentication will be correctly performed, or the user’s device provides a random
fresh sample with the hope that it matches the user’s profile.
5.7.3 Complexity
Case A
During the set-up protocol, the user’s device needs to compute:
• s+ 1 Paillier encryptions for the polynomial coefficients;
• values r′0, · · · , r′s; as explained before, this can be done by randomly choos-
ing r′0, then solving an s× s generalized Vandermonde system (doable in
O(s2) time using [38]) and finally computing s modular powers to find the
r′1, · · · , r′s;
• s+ 1 modular powers (raising the Ri values to d).
During the implicit authentication protocol, the user’s device needs to com-
pute (Step 2):
• t Paillier encryptions;
• ts modular powers (to compute the Υj values);
• t modular powers (to raise R′ to r(j)d).
Also during the implicit authentication protocol, the carrier needs to com-
pute:
• At Step 1, s+ 1 modular powers (to raise the encrypted polynomial coef-
ficients to θ);
• At Step 3, t Paillier encryptions;
• At Step 3, t modular powers (to raise the Υj values to nθ).
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Case B
The set-up protocol does not change w.r.t. Case A. In the implicit authentica-
tion protocol, the highest complexity occurs when Y ′ = E and the similarity
function l always takes the maximum value in its range, say L. In this case,∑
z∈Y ′
`z =
∑
z∈Y ′
∑
y∈Y
l(z, y) = |E|sL.
Hence, in the worst case the user’s device needs to compute (Step 2’):
• |E|sL Paillier encryptions;
• |E|sL modular powers (to compute the Υj values);
• |E|sL modular powers (to raise R′ to r(j)d).
Also during the implicit authentication protocol, the carrier needs to com-
pute:
• At Step 1, s+ 1 modular powers (to raise the encrypted polynomial coef-
ficients to θ);
• At Step 3’, |E|sL Paillier encryptions;
• At Step 3’, |E|sL modular powers (to raise the Υj values to nθ).
Note that the above complexity can be reduced by reducing the range of the
similarity function l(·, ·).
Case C
Case C is analogous to Case A but the sets X and Y , whose intersection is com-
puted, no longer have s and t elements, respectively. According to Section 5.6.3,
the maximum value for |X| occurs when all ui take the maximum value of their
range, say, M , in which case X contains tM pairs (i, j). By a similar argument,
Y also contains at most tM pairs.
Hence, the worst-case complexity for Case C is obtained by performing the
corresponding changes in the assessment of Case A. Specifically, during the
set-up protocol, the user’s device needs to compute:
• tM + 1 Paillier encryptions for the polynomial coefficients;
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• Solve a Vandermonde system tM × tM (doable in O((tM)2) time) and
then compute tM modular powers to find the r′i values;
• Compute tM + 1 modular powers (raising the Ri values to d).
During the implicit authentication protocol, the user’s device needs to com-
pute (Step 2):
• tM Paillier encryptions;
• t2M2 modular powers (to compute the Υj values);
• tM modular powers (to raise R′ to r(j)d).
Also during the implicit authentication protocol, the carrier needs to com-
pute:
• At Step 1, tM + 1 modular powers (to raise the encrypted polynomial
coefficients to θ);
• At Step 3, tM Paillier encryptions;
• At Step 3, tM modular powers (to raise the Υj values to nθ).
Note that the above complexities can be reduced by reducing the range of
the numerical values in sets U and V .
5.8 Experimental results
As stated in the previous section, the complexity of our implicit authentication
protocol ultimately depends on the sizes of the input sets. In Case A, the sizes
of the sets are directly given by the user inputs; in Case B, these sizes are the
product of the size of the input sets times the range of the similarity function
`; and in Case C, the sizes are given by the size of the original sets times the
range of their values. We ran an experiment to test the execution times of our
protocol, based on Case A, to which the other two cases can be reduced.
The experiment was implemented in Sage-6.4.1 and run on a Debian 7.7
machine with a 64-bit architecture, an Intel i7 processor and 8GB of physical
memory. We instantiated a Paillier cryptosystem with a 1024-bit long n, and the
features of preference sets were taken from the integers in the range [1 . . . 2128].
The input sets ranged from size 1 to 50, and we took feature sets of the same
size to execute the set-up and the authentication protocols.
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Table 5.1: Execution times (in seconds) for different input set sizes
# of features Set-up Authentication
1 0.89 0.08
5 0.79 0.47
10 1.10 1.05
15 1.83 2.00
20 4.67 3.37
25 11.45 5.40
30 24.65 8.27
35 47.60 12.13
40 84.99 17.30
45 144.81 23.39
50 228.6 31.20
Step 4 of the set-up protocol (Section 5.6.1), in which a system of equations is
solved for r′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, is the most expensive part of the set-up protocol. As
a worst-case setting, we used straightforward Gaussian elimination which takes
time O(s3), although, as mentioned above, specific methods like [38] exist for
generalized Vandermonde matrices that can run in O(s2) (such specific methods
could be leveraged in case of smartphones with low computational power). On
the other hand, Step 2 of the authentication protocol (Section 5.6.1), computed
by the user’s device, is easily parallelizable for each feature in the sample set.
Since parallelization can be exploited by most of the current smartphones in
the market, we also exploited it in our experiment. The results are shown in
Table 5.1 (times are in seconds).
Note that the set-up protocol is run only once (actually, maybe once in
a while), so it is not time-critical. However, the authentication protocol is
to be run at every authentication attempt by the user. For example, if a user
implicitly authenticates herself using the pattern of her 20 most visited websites,
authentication with our proposal would take 3.37 seconds, which is perfectly
acceptable in practice.
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5.9 Privacy-preserving implicit authentication
from Bloom filters
In this section we present an alternative privacy-preserving implicit authenti-
cation protocol leveraging the properties of Bloom filters. This construction is
computationally lighter and supports the computation of distances of feature
sets of the types A and C (as described in Section 5.4).
We use Bloom filters as described in Chapter 2 to encode the users’ profiles
so that the server cannot obtain the profile of a user from its Bloom filter repre-
sentation; this guarantees privacy. The decision whether a user is authenticated
or not will be taken by computing the distance between previously recorded
profiles and the fresh samples the user provides to the server; authentication
will be positive if that distance is below a predefined threshold.
5.9.1 Implicit authentication in cases A and C
Set-up protocol
Let the initial user’s profile be P = ∅. The aim of the set-up protocol is to
begin populating this profile with one or several behavior samples. Let the first
sample S0 be a collection of sets S0 = {S0,i | 1 ≤ i ≤ p}, in which every set
S0,i = {s0,i1 , . . . , s0,in } is a labeled feature set, for n ≤ N . The maximum allowed
value N , as well as the values k and m (number of hash functions and length
of the Bloom filters, respectively) are set by the server (who may be the carrier
or the service provider). The weights of each of the feature sets are also set by
the server.
The sample S0 and every subsequent sample St to be added to the user’s
profile are preprocessed as follows:
• Sets of categorical features St,i ∈ St are aggregated as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.2, by concatenating the label of the feature set to each of the
feature values and uniting them into sets Rt,j , taking into account the
weights of each of the features. For example, sets Applications: {Whats-
App, Facebook} and Antennas: {ANT001, ANT004} can be aggregated
into Applications Antennas: {Applications:WhatsApp, Applications:Face-
book, Antennas:ANT001, Antennas:ANT004}, as long as feature sets Ap-
plications and Antennas weigh the same in the authentication decision.
• Regarding sets of numerical features in St, for each St,i the following set
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is built
Rt,i = {(j, l) : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ l ≤ st,ij }. (5.4)
For example, from S = {2, 3, 1}, one would build
R = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)}.
The sizes of these sets are also required to be less than or equal to N .
The protocol proceeds as follows, using the modified sampleR0 = {R0,j | 1 ≤
j ≤ q}:
1. The user initializes a set of Bloom filters BR0 = {BR0,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ q}, each
of them of size m, by setting all their bits to 0.
2. Then, the device generates a large random number, say key, and stores it
in a secure location (for example, a hardware-backed key storage).
3. The user inserts all elements in R0,j into BR0,j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ q, that is, for
every feature r0,jl ∈ R0,j , the user computes the index set
Ir0,jl
= {h0(r0,jl , key), . . . , hk−1(r0,jl , key)}
and sets the corresponding bits to 1.
4. Finally, the user sends BR0 to the server in a confidential manner and
deletes S0, R0 and BR0 from the device.
In the last step of the set-up protocol, the user can send BR0 confidentially
to the server by encrypting BR0 under the server’s public key. This protocol
can be executed several times within a predefined training period, in order to
populate the user’s profile P with additional samples St.
Authentication protocol
To authenticate the user, the server needs to compute the distances between
the feature sets included in the new behavior sample provided by the user and
the reference profile (which may consist of several behavior samples).
Let the user’s new collected sample be a list of feature sets Sf . The user
preprocesses the sample to obtain the modified sample Rf , in the same way
described in the set-up phase, and builds a set of Bloom filters BRf , also in the
same way described in the set-up phase. The authentication protocol proceeds
as follows:
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1. The user and the server agree on a fresh random secret key K (for example,
using Diffie-Hellman key exchange).
2. The user’s device sends BRf encrypted under K to the server, and deletes
Sf , Rf and BRf .
3. The server then computes the distances between the protected sample
BRf and ` previously stored samples in the user profile. The feature sets
in each of the samples are assumed to be labeled in such a way that only
compatible features are compared. The distances are computed as follows:
• For sets of categorical features, the server computes |Rt,j ∩Rf,j | and
|Rt,j ∪Rf,j |, as described in Section 2.8.1 and using Expression (2.2),
and obtains the Jaccard distance dJt,f,j (Rt,j , Rf,j), for f − ` < t < f
and all i.
• For sets of numerical features, the server computes |Rt,j |, |Rf,j | and
|Rt,j ∩Rf,j |, and obtains the distance as
dt,f,j = |Rt,j |+ |Rf,j | − 2|Rt,j ∩Rf,j | (5.5)
because, using Expression (5.4),
|Rt,j |+ |Rf,j | − 2|Rt,j ∩Rf,j |
=
n∑
l=1
(max{st,jl , sf,jl }+ min{st,jl , sf,jl })− 2
n∑
l=1
min{st,jl , sf,jl }
=
n∑
l=1
(max{st,jl , sf,jl } −min{st,jl , sf,jl }) =
n∑
l=1
|st,jl − sf,jl |.
4. By aggregating the distances for all j’s according to their weights, the
server obtains a vector δ = [δf−`−1,f , · · · , δf−1,f ] of the distances between
the new sample and ` past samples in the user profile. This vector is used
then to compute a score (e.g. the mean and standard deviation of the
distances) which is compared to a threshold t to return an authentication
decision.
5. On a successful authentication, the server may store BRf as additional
reference for authentication.
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5.10 Privacy and security
As introduced in Section 5.3, a privacy attacker’s objective is to learn the be-
havior of the authenticated users. We have the following two claims related to
privacy.
Claim 1 (Privacy at the user’s device). An attacker with access to a user’s
device cannot obtain past feature samples.
Justification. The user’s device deletes the profiles and the protected pro-
files after set-up and after every authentication attempt.
Claim 2 (Privacy at the server). The server (or an attacker) does not learn
anything about the plaintext profiles other than the number of encoded elements
and the sizes of the intersections and unions with other protected profiles of the
same user.
Justification. The server does not receive the plaintext feature sets but
Bloom filter encodings of such sets. To recover one feature in the plaintext
profile, the server, or any attacker with access to the protected profile, needs to
find not just a pre-image of the Bloom filter(s) (see Section 2.8.2), but the right
pre-image corresponding to the feature. If the server finds a spurious pre-image
(not corresponding to any element), privacy is not violated.
Now, as described in Section 2.8.3, our instantiation of Bloom filters uses
keyed cryptographic hash functions, which, ideally, are resistant to pre-image
attacks. These hash functions have much larger domains (as their input includes
a long secret key only known to the user’s device) and take longer to compute
than plain hash functions. This thwarts brute-force attacks attempting to find
pre-images by exhaustive search. Hence, finding pre-images (even spurious ones)
is not feasible, let alone finding the right pre-images corresponding to inserted
features.
Regarding security against impersonation, we can justify the following claim.
Claim 3 (Security against impersonation). An impersonator with access to the
user’s device has no better chance to cheat the system than guessing a sample
profile close enough to the reference profile stored at the server, where the im-
personator’s guess must be made without knowing the reference profile or any
previous fresh sample of the legitimate user.
Justification. By Claim 1, having access to the user’s device does not give
the impersonator access to past samples. Let us examine his other options,
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which consist of attacking the set-up protocol, the authentication protocol or
the Bloom filters used in either protocol.
Attacks during set-up. Since the Bloom filters corresponding to samples in
the user’s profile are registered in a confidential manner at set-up time (see last
step of the set-up protocol in Section 5.9.1), the impersonator cannot get hold of
any Bloom filter registered by a legitimate user. On the other hand, the set-up
protocol cannot be executed a second time after the predefined training period
has expired, and so, an attacker cannot replace after set-up the Bloom filters in
the user’s profile with new Bloom filters of his choice (the only Bloom filters that
can be added to the user’s profile after set-up are those corresponding to fresh
samples that were successfully authenticated, see last step of the authentication
protocol in Section 5.9.1).
Attacks during authentication. Each fresh sample is encrypted under a dif-
ferent fresh random secret key K agreed upon by the user and the server in the
first step of the authentication protocol (see Section 5.9.1). Hence:
• The attacker cannot get hold of any previous plaintext Bloom filter sub-
mitted by the legitimate user, and therefore he cannot re-submit this
Bloom filter under a fresh key agreed upon between the attacker and
the server.
• The attacker cannot replay any eavesdropped encryption of a Bloom filter
under a previous K ′ agreed upon between the legitimate user and the
server, because a fresh K must be agreed upon each time the implicit
authentication protocol is run.
Attacks to Bloom filters. Finding a second pre-image for unknown legitimate
(BS , S), where S is a feature set and BS is a Bloom filter containing the elements
of S, is not easier than finding a second pre-image for known (BS , S); the latter is
difficult in our instantiation of Bloom filters based on keyed cryptographic hash
functions. Similarly, finding collisions S, S′ for unknown legitimate (BS , S) is
not easier than finding collisions for known (BS , S); the latter is difficult in
our instantiation of Bloom filters based on keyed cryptographic hash functions.
Hence, the only strategy to pass the authentication protocol that remains to an
attacker having access to the user’s device is to guess a fresh sample Sf such
that its corresponding Bloom filters BRf are close to some of the Bloom filters
stored by the server for the user to be impersonated.
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5.11 Experimental analysis
To test the applicability of our mechanism, we implemented our implicit authen-
tication protocol in Python. Our choice for the hash functions in the Bloom
filters is hi(x, key) = SHA-512(x)+ iHMAC(x, key) mod m, with i ranging from
1 to k. This construction follows the guidelines of [65] and is assumed to be
resistant against preimage and second preimage attacks; however, new security
requirements and attacks may require updating the above choice of hash func-
tions (this cautionary note is similar to the caveats about hash functions in the
context of digital signatures). The system in which the tests were performed
is an Ubuntu x64 14.04 LTS running on an Intel i7-2600 at 3.4 GHz and with
16GB DDR3 1333 Mhz.
5.11.1 Speed test for categorical features
In a first test, we checked the speed of the set-up and implicit authentication
protocols for different values of n, the size of the feature sets. Parameters m and
k were set as per Equations (2.3). A user’s profile containing a single feature
set was considered and the results are shown in Figure 5.5. The running time
of the set-up protocol does not include the encryption of BR. Also, the running
time of the implicit authentication protocol does not include the execution of the
protocol to agree on K. The reason to exclude such cryptographic components is
that we use them as a black box: they are not part of the core of our proposal and
their running time depends very much on the precise cryptographic algorithms
and implementations used.
It may be surprising that the running times of both protocols are so similar.
The explanation is that both protocols perform very similar tasks. As described
in the previous section, the set-up protocol builds a Bloom filter containing the
features in the set and sends it to the server. On the other hand, the implicit
authentication protocol builds a Bloom filter with the features in a fresh sample
and sends it to the server, who compares it with the reference profile received
at set-up time. It turns out that the time needed to compare two Bloom filters
is negligible (less than 1 ms) with respect to the time needed to build a Bloom
filter (23.4 s for n = 1, 000, 000), so that the latter dominates the total running
time of the implicit authentication protocol.
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Figure 5.5: Categorical features. Running times for different values of the fea-
ture set size n. The user profile is assumed to contain a single feature set.
5.11.2 Accuracy test for categorical features
In this second test, we measured the loss of accuracy introduced by our mech-
anism in the case of independent categorical features. For such a purpose, we
generated 5, 000 pairs of feature sets of size n = 50 with independent categorical
features. The first feature set of each pair was taken as the user’s profile sub-
mitted at set-up time. The second one was taken as a fresh sample submitted
at authentication time. Each of the fresh samples was modified by randomly
changing up to 50% of their features. Next, with a threshold t = 0.3, we
classified each of the pairs by computing the Jaccard distance of the pair and
tagging it as accepted if its distance was below the threshold or rejected other-
wise. Then, we ran our protocol for all pairs with different values of m and k
and we counted how many pairs were misclassified (that is, accepted pairs that
did not pass authentication plus rejected pairs that passed it). The results are
shown in Figure 5.6.
The vertical dashed line at approximately m = 29.5 is the optimal value for
m as per Expressions (2.3), using N = n = 50 and ρ = 0.001. We can see that
for values of m greater than or equal to the optimal value, the error rate falls
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Figure 5.6: Categorical features. Accuracy and running times for different values
of m and k. Results were obtained as the average of 5,000 pairs of feature sets,
each containing n = 50 features.
below 5%; in fact, it approaches 0% for m close to 220. Note that for m = 25
and k = 4 or k = 8, the error rate is 1. This is because for values of m below
the optimal value, the Bloom filter is quickly filled with 1’s. When all its m bits
become 1’s, by Expression (2.2) the Bloom filter contains ∞ elements (− ln 0);
in other words, any element passes the membership test. Hence, a large filter
size m is recommended, and the implicit authentication time plot shows that
sizes as large as m = 220 are quite manageable in terms of time. Regarding
storage and communication, large m values are not problematic either, because
Bloom filters can be easily stored and sent in lossless compressed form.
5.11.3 Accuracy and speed test for numerical features
In this test, we checked the accuracy of our mechanism in the case of indepen-
dent numerical features. We followed an approach similar to the one in the
previous test. We generated a reference profile consisting of a single feature set
S0 consisting of n = 50 percentage values adding to 100, that is, a normalized
histogram. The features in S0 might represent the user’s 50 most visited web-
sites with their relative frequencies. From S0, we generated additional feature
sets Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100, by modifying each of the 50 features of S0 randomly
and re-normalizing. Feature set S0 was taken as the user’s profile submitted as
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set-up time. Sets S1, . . . , S100 were taken as fresh samples.
We computed the difference between two samples as d(S0, Si) =
∑50
j=1 |s0j −
sij |. The average introduced distance d(S0, Si) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100 was 5.43. As
our method cannot deal with real numbers, we made a transformation by mul-
tiplying by 100 and rounding each feature values. This procedure introduced
an error of 0.46%. Note that multiplying feature values by 100 to eliminate
the decimal positions increases the size of the sets R0 and Ri, respectively built
during set-up and authentication according to Expression (5.4), because the
maximum values for s0j and s
i
j increase by a factor of 100.
We set m = 220 and k = 4. By using our implicit authentication method,
the average error introduced for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100 was 0.83%.
Beyond measuring the accuracy, we also measured the time taken by the set-
up and the implicit authentication protocols. Since we are in the independent
numerical feature case, the set-up protocol consisted of building the set R0
from the user’s profile feature set S0, and building the corresponding Bloom
filter (see Section 5.9.1). The mean time in this case was 133 ms. The implicit
authentication protocol consisted of building the set Ri from a fresh sample
profile Si, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 100}, then computing the sizes |R0|, |Ri| and
|R0 ∩Ri| and finally computing the distance from these sizes as per Expression
(5.5). The mean time of the authentication protocol was 133.3 ms (very similar
to the mean time of the set-up protocol).
5.11.4 Tests on the GCU dataset
Finally, we tested our authentication mechanism with the GCU Dataset Version
1 [63]. The GCU Dataset contains sensor data from 7 Android users. The data
consist of WiFi networks, cell towers, application use, light and sound levels,
etc.
In this experiment, we used the application usage data to authenticate users.
Since these data are categorical and independent, we used the Jaccard similarity
coefficient to test the users. The experiment began by choosing one of the 7 users
at random, and building a reference user profile by storing 50 samples of the
chosen user. Then, we made 1, 000, 000 authentication attempts, by choosing
sample readings at random from all 7 users. We authenticated a user when the
average similarity, computed as the average similarity of the random sample
against the 50 reference samples, was above a pre-specified threshold, taking
into account the standard error of the computed average.
In Figure 5.7, we show the performance metrics of this authentication mech-
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Figure 5.7: Performance indicators of the implicit authentication mechanism on
the GCU dataset. TPR stands for true positive rate (correct authentication)
and TNR for true negative rate (correct non-authentication). Type I Error
stands for false positive rate and Type II for false negative rate.
anism for the GCU dataset, including false positive and negative rates, for in-
creasing values of the threshold. Figure 5.7a shows the results of the experiment
when computing the distances with cleartext samples, while Figure 5.7b shows
the results for comparisons using our proposed mechanism based on Bloom fil-
ters. Note that the results of both approaches are nearly identical, showing that
the use of Bloom filters to protect the user profiles does not significantly affect
the authentication accuracy with respect to comparing the profiles in the clear.
An additional positive side effect of using Bloom filters is that the encoded
samples are significantly smaller than the average cleartext sample.
5.12 Summary
We have presented two privacy-preserving implicit authentication mechanisms
based on the private computation of the size of the intersections, using two
different primitives, which grant the two protocols similar functionalities but
slightly different properties.
To the best of our knowledge, our privacy-preserving implicit authentication
mechanism based on the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem
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is the second system in the literature after the one in [82]. The advantages of
this proposal with respect to [82] are:
• The carrier only needs to store the user’s profile encrypted under one
cryptosystem, namely Paillier’s.
• Dishonest behavior or compromise at the user’s device after the initial set-
up stage neither compromises the privacy of the user’s profile nor affects
the security of authentication.
• Our proposal is not restricted to numerical features, but can deal also with
all sorts of categorical features.
• In case of numerical or categorical ordinal features, our proposal does not
disclose how the fresh sample is ordered with respect to the feature values
in the stored user’s profile.
For binary or independent nominal features, the complexity of our proposal is
quite low (quadratic in the number of values in the user’s profile). For correlated
categorical feature values, the complexity is higher, but it can be reduced by
decreasing the range of the similarity function used. Finally, in the case of
numerical values, the complexity is also higher than in the binary/independent
nominal case, but it can be reduced by decreasing the range of the numerical
feature values.
Our second proposal, based on Bloom filters, improves significantly the com-
putational complexity of the implicit authentication protocol, while keeping
comparable properties to the first one. Our efficiency improvement, however,
comes at the cost of losing the semantic security provided by the previous pro-
tocol. In an extreme scenario, such a loss might impact on the privacy of our
solution.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future
work
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we have contributed privacy-aware schemes for group discounts,
loyalty programs and implicit authentication that maintain, to a very great ex-
tent, the functionalities of the usual non-private counterparts. While privacy
preservation comes at some loss of performance, in some cases such a loss is
only marginal (for example, the implicit authentication based on Bloom filters
is nearly as efficient as the non-private implicit authentication). In any case,
the performance loss is quantified and limited, and the proposed privacy-aware
protocols have been shown to be usable in practice. We believe that our contri-
butions exemplify that e-commerce services that currently invade the privacy of
the users can be made privacy-preserving without loss of functionality and with
acceptable performance.
Specifically, our contributions are the following:
1. A group size accreditation method that preserves anonymity of the mem-
bers of the groups. The anonymity provided by the scheme is configurable.
The method rests on two building blocks:
(a) A new parameterized key management scheme for identity-based sig-
natures that allows setting the anonymity level of users by providing
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them with multiple keys that are shared by many other users, but
that are extracted from a unique identity.
(b) A novel IBDT signature scheme based on asymmetric bilinear pair-
ings, that combines the properties of identity-based and threshold
signature schemes. Signatures produced with this scheme reveal only
the public keys of the group members, which are called identities, and
the size of the signing group. The signature scheme is efficient, and
the sizes of the signatures are constant.
2. A privacy-preserving loyalty program protocol suite, whereby vendors
can issue and verify loyalty points, and customers can maintain their
anonymity and configure the level of generalization for their purchase re-
ceipts before submitting them for additional loyalty points. This allows
vendors to still carry out client profiling in a privacy-aware way. This
protocol suite combines the following techniques:
(a) A new construction for anonymous (untransferable) tokens with con-
trolled linkability based on partially blind signatures and zero-know-
ledge proofs. The construction allows issuing and verifying tokens,
while the verifier cannot link tokens to a specific user or between con-
crete executions of the issuance and verification procedures, unless
such a linkage is authorized by the user. Moreover, if a hardware-
based keystore is available, the tokens can be made untransferable, so
that only users who originally received the tokens can submit them.
(b) Generalization techniques to select the level of anonymization of pur-
chase receipts.
3. A mechanism to compute the distance between user profiles (expressed as
feature sets of different data types) based on the size of the intersection
of the feature sets.
4. A privacy-preserving implicit authentication mechanism using the homo-
morphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem, that protects the privacy
of the sensitive data in the user’s profile and ensures that the server does
not learn anything about the user’s behavior.
5. A second privacy-preserving implicit authentication with similar function-
alities and higher speed compared to the previous one, based on the inter-
section of Bloom filters. While this mechanism provides slightly less pro-
tection than the previous one, its substantially better performance makes
it ideal for implementation in existing authentication suites.
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4. Alberto Blanco-Justicia and Josep Domingo-Ferrer, “Privacy-preserving
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6.3 Future work
Concerning our privacy-preserving group size accreditation method, we plan
to integrate it with a broad range of anonymous or near-anonymous payment
systems, in view of facilitating its effective adoption for group discounts. Beyond
group discounts, we will also explore additional applications of privacy-aware
group size accreditation.
Our anonymous (untransferable) tokens with controlled linkability are an in-
teresting primitive to support not only loyalty programs, but other applications
which involve, for example, tickets, receipts or temporary authorizations with
anonymity requirements. We plan to work further on this construction, to make
it more efficient, for example by reducing the number of messages exchanged in
the verification protocol for untransferable tokens.
Regarding implicit authentication, while our second protocol is a great im-
provement with respect to our first proposal in terms of performance, it cannot
offer the semantic security of the first protocol. We plan to address this problem
in future work, by considering the use of oblivious transfer protocols and homo-
morphic encryption (such as Goldwasser-Micali). Another line of future research
relates to finding ways of using Bloom filters to deal with correlated features in
profiles (case B in Section 5.4.2), that is, features that are not independent of
each other (for example, if the feature values are the IDs of cell towers or Inter-
net access points seen by the device, nearby cell towers/access points are more
similar to each other than distant cell towers/access points). This requires being
able to deal with multisets, which is not doable with standard Bloom filters.
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